Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jamie Inagawa, the Solicitor-General of Fayette County, filed a mandamus action against Fayette County and its Commissioners in their official capacities asserting that since July 1, 2007 his compensation had been incorrectly calculated. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Inagawa and partial summary judgment to the County, and each party appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly held that Inagawa was improperly compensated beginning in July 2007. The Court disagreed with the trial court's conclusion that the County properly compensated Inagawa as of January 1, 2009 in accordance with an amended local law, because the Court found that amendment invalid. Accordingly, the Court reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Inagawa v. Fayette County" on Justia Law

The DeKalb County district attorney brought a declaratory judgment action against the county's magistrate judges seeking guidance regarding a dispute on the proper evidentiary standards for establishing probable cause at preliminary hearings. The trial court issued a declaratory judgment in the district attorney's favor, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari to consider whether declaratory judgment was an appropriate remedy for challenging evidentiary policies or practices at preliminary hearings. Because this dispute was not a civil case that presented a justiciable controversy and declaratory relief would not provide any more guidance or certainty than current case law, the Court concluded that declaratory relief was not an appropriate remedy. Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "Leitch v. Flemming" on Justia Law

The superior court denied the writ of mandamus in this case where a taxpayer requested that a school district to return "excess proceeds" collected pursuant to an educational sales and use tax approved by referendum. In 2001, voters in the Clarke County School District approved a one percent educational sales and use tax (ELOST) for a period of five years beginning immediately upon the expiration of an ELOST that had been approved in 1997. The purpose of the referendum was to provide funds to pay the cost of specified, authorized projects totaling $87,849,000. The total amount of taxes collected pursuant to the 2001 ELOST was $93,413,789, which was $5,564,789 more than the amount of taxes the school district intended to collect, but less than the amount the school district actually spent on the authorized projects. In 2006, voters again approved a one percent ELOST for an additional five years. In spite of these referendums and taxes, as of September 1, 2012, the school district had debt totaling at least $10,855,000. In denying the writ, the superior court found, inter alia, appellant did not show a clear legal right to relief because the school district did not violate the "excess proceeds" provision. The Supreme Court agreed with the superior court and affirmed the lower court's ruling. View "Marsh v. Clarke County Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Defendant Marquez Powell was tried by a Fulton County jury and convicted of the murder of Shah Walton, as well as possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Following the denial of his motion for new trial, Defendant appealed, contending that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, that the prosecuting attorney made improper and prejudicial remarks in her closing argument, and that the court below impermissibly allowed the State to constructively amend the indictment at trial. Upon its review of the briefs and the record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed. View "Powell v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the appellate court correctly construed the standing requirement for a motor vehicle dealership to sue under OCGA 10-1-664 (the anti-encroachment provision of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Franchise Practices Act). "While the anti-encroachment provision could have been drafted more clearly, we believe that the Act as a whole, and particularly its definitions provision, OCGA 10-1-622, elucidate[s] the proper application of the anti-encroachment provision to the facts of this case." Though the Court disagreed with the rationale of the majority of the appellate panel, it concluded the panel reached the right result, and therefore affirmed the court of appeals' judgment. View "WMW, Inc v. American Honda Motor Company, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Husband's application for discretionary appeal to consider whether the trial court erred in determining his child support obligation when he petitioned to modify it. Upon review, the Court concluded that the trial court indeed erred in its ruling. Husband raised two other issues, but the Court found no merit to them. Accordingly, the Court partly affirmed the trial court, partly reversed, and remanded the case for recalculation of the support obligation. View "Wetherington v. Wetherington" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted discretionary appeal of the parties' final judgment and divorce decree. After review, the Court affirmed most of the trial court's judgment. The Court found that the divorce decree included a deviation from the statutory child support guidelines without the written findings that are statutorily required to support the deviation. Therefore, the Court reversed that part of the judgment and remanded the case for a redetermination of child support. View "Walls v. Walls" on Justia Law

Defendant Kelvin Simmons was convicted for the malice murder of Sheila Easley in February 2002. Following the trial court's denial of his motion for new trial, Defendant appealed. He contended the evidence was insufficient to convict him, the trial court committed procedural errors, the trial court erred in instructing the jury, and trial counsel was ineffective. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Simmons v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Defendant Daniel Sosa filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, contending that his attorney was ineffective for failing to advise him that his guilty plea would subject him to removal or deportation. The State moved to dismiss the petition as untimely. The habeas court denied the motion and granted habeas relief on the ground that Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel at his plea hearing in 2002. However after its review, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant's habeas petition was untimely under the four-year statute of limitations in OCGA 9-14-42, and reversed. View "Georgia v. Sosa" on Justia Law

Caveator Lisa Patterson-Fowlkes appealed a superior court's denial of her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, motion for a new trial, following the entry of a final judgment on a jury verdict which upheld the last will and testament of her grandmother, Ruth Chancey Wright ("Wright"). The sole challenge on appeal was that Wright lacked the capacity necessary to execute the will. Wright executed her will on November 1, 2005, when she was 90 years old. She died three years later. Wright's grandson and Patterson-Fowlkes's brother, Bobby Chancey ("Chancey ") petitioned to probate the will. Shortly after, Patterson-Fowlkes filed her caveat. The probate court denied the caveat and upheld the will. Patterson-Fowlkes appealed to the superior court, and the case was tried before a jury, which rendered a verdict upholding the will. After its review of the lower courts' records, the Supreme Court found that the execution of Wright's will was videotaped. Patterson-Fowlkes contended that Wright was unable to answer simple questions such as recalling her family members and identifying the property subject to the will. However, the videotape revealed that when asked, Wright immediately named her sister, brother, and sister's children. She further identified her two grandchildren to whom her property was bequeathed and even her great- grandchildren. Wright mistakenly claimed that she owned two separate 100-acre tracts that she purchased for Patterson-Fowlkes and Chancey. While this was inaccurate, when asked what she wanted to do with her land, Wright answered how she wanted the property disposed. The Court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that Wright possessed the capacity to execute the will in question: "significantly, the jury viewed the videotape of the will's execution, which is a linchpin of Patterson-Fowlkes's challenge." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's to deny Patterson-Fowlkes' motions. View "Patterson-Fowlkes v. Chancey" on Justia Law