Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following a jury trial, Reginald L. Lynch appealed his conviction for malice murder, felony murder, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finding no merit to Appellant's claims, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Lynch v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In January 2011, Reliance Equities, LLC acquired title to an Atlanta property pursuant to an August 2009 tax sale and a subsequent foreclosure of all rights of redemption. Nancy Karlen claimed to have had an interest in the Property based on 2001-2003 tax liens on the Property that she had purchased in 2004. In February 2011, Reliance filed a quiet title action to establish that it was the fee simple owner of the Property free and clear of all adverse claims. Reliance requested that the matter be submitted to a special master, and the Superior Court granted the request. Following a hearing which was not transcribed, and after Karlen acknowledged that she had received proper service of the quiet title action, the special master allowed Karlen additional time to file an amended answer and extended the time for Karlen to assert her right to redeem the Property. Karlen neither amended her answer nor made a tender of the statutory redemption amount within the required time period. The special master found that any potential rights held by Karlen had been divested. The special master also ruled that Karlen was prohibited from challenging the validity of the tax sale due to her failure to tender the statutory redemption amount. The trial court adopted the special master's findings and entered a final order and decree vesting title in Reliance. Karlen appealed pro se from the trial court's order, and, finding no error in the special master's findings, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Karlen v. Reliance Equities, LLC" on Justia Law

A jury convicted William David Riley of murdering his three children and of first degree arson, and the jury imposed death sentences for the murders. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed Riley's convictions and sentences in 2004. Riley filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 2005, and he amended his petition in 2007. The habeas court held an evidentiary hearing in 2008. The habeas court granted Riley's petition in an order filed in 2012, vacating both Riley's convictions and his sentences. The Warden appealed in case number S12A0910, and Riley cross-appealed in case number S12X0945. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the habeas court’s decision to vacate Riley's convictions and sentences in the Warden's appeal, the Court affirmed the habeas court's denial of relief on the grounds addressed in Riley's cross-appeal, and remanded for the consideration of Riley's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. View "Riley v. Humphrey" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether an employee who filed an injury claim against his employer under the State Workers' Compensation Act and receives compensation in exchange for a "no liability" settlement with his employer that is approved by the State Board of Workers' Compensation may then turn around and sue the co-employee who caused the injury in a tort action. Ten years ago, the Court of Appeals answered this question no, holding that the Act's exclusive remedy provision bars such a lawsuit based on the same injury for which the employee has already received a remedy. In this appeal, however, the Court of Appeals was equally divided as to whether the underlying case law should be overruled, and the case was sent to the Supreme Court for resolution. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that "Ridley" was correctly decided. Thus, appellant Joseph Smith, having previously entered a Board-approved settlement with his employer in exchange for compensation, would be barred from suing appellee John Ellis for the same injury in tort if Ellis qualified as an "employee of the same employer" as Smith, rather than a "third-party tort-feasor," as those phrases are used in the applicable statutory authority. However, the evidence did not establish that Ellis was acting as "an employee of the same employer" in the course of his employment, at the time he injured Smith. The trial court therefore erred in granting summary judgment to Ellis, and that judgment was reversed. View "Smith v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Antonio Faniel appealed his convictions for felony murder while in the commission of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in connection with the fatal shooting of Doreen Young. He challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of his guilt, the admission into evidence of other transactions, and the effectiveness of his trial counsel. Finding the challenges to be without merit, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Faniel v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Torrance Dunn was convicted of malice murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and five counts of felony obstruction in connection with the shooting death of Ramon Smith. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him at trial, in addition, he raised an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. Furthermore, his motion for new trial was denied, and he appealed that too. Finding that Appellant's claims lacked merit based on its review of the trial court evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. View "Dunn v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In February 2003, appellant Leviticus Burns entered a negotiated guilty plea to a murder charge stemming from his indictment for the October 2001 shooting death of Reginald Berry. Appellant's other charges were placed on a dead docket and he was sentenced to life in prison for murder. In May 2011, appellant moved for an out-of-time appeal which motion the trial court denied. Appellant timely appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no abuse of the trial court's discretion, and affirmed its denial of appellant's out-of-time appeal. View "Burns v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Erma David Baker (Husband) and Ivy Baker Schrimsher (Wife) were divorced in November 1998 by final judgment and decree. A settlement agreement incorporated into the final judgment and decree required Husband to refinance in his name the mortgages for the marital home and the auto loan for a 1998 Ford Explorer, and required Husband to assume payment on all indebtedness on each piece of property within sixty days. If Husband failed to refinance the vehicle in his name, he was required to transfer ownership, title, and interest in the vehicle to Wife. As to the marital residence, Husband was required to list the property for sale if he vacated it within the sixty-day timeframe. As to both properties, Husband was required to hold Wife harmless and indemnify her from any liability for any indebtedness. Husband failed to meet these obligations and, in March 2002, a default judgment was entered against Wife for the auto loan in the amount of $12,328.84 and, in June 2009, a payment demand letter was sent to Wife from the mortgage company seeking to collect the outstanding balance of $25,177.44 which was due on the second mortgage. Wife filed a contempt action in March 2009 and Husband moved to dismiss arguing that, with the passage of almost ten years, the final judgment was dormant and that Wife was barred by laches. The trial court held a hearing and denied the motion to dismiss. The trial court found Husband in willful contempt and ordered him to pay Wife $37,506.28, the total amount of indebtedness for both properties. Husband then moved for a new trial which, after a hearing, the trial court also denied. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred when it denied Husband’s motion to dismiss and when it required Husband to pay the full amount of outstanding debt. Because there was no error, the trial court's judgment was affirmed. View "Baker v. Schrimsher" on Justia Law

Husband and wife were divorced in 2009. They had two children. The decree awarded joint custody to the parties, with primary physical custody to wife. Thereafter, husband filed a contempt action, and also sought a psychological custody evaluation of wife. Wife was living in Forsyth County at that time, and she was served at her residence in that county. Almost four months later, wife filed a “motion to dismiss.” She did not challenge personal jurisdiction or venue in that motion. Thereafter, husband appended a motion for change of custody to the contempt action. However, the parties entered into a settlement agreement to resolve the custody and contempt issues, which was announced in open court. The parties abided by the settlement agreement for about eight months. Then wife moved to invalidate the agreement and to dismiss the change of custody action, arguing it should have been filed in Fulton County because she moved there at some point while the case was pending. The trial court denied wife’s motions, finding that she waived personal jurisdiction and venue defenses. It also awarded husband physical custody of the children, denied wife visitation rights with the children until she underwent and paid for a psychological custody evaluation, and ordered wife to pay child support in the amount of $704 per month. Finally, the trial court found wife in contempt for failing to pay child support in the amount of $3,168 and uncovered medical expenses for the minor children in the amount of $331. Wife appealed, but finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Andersen v. Farrington" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Donald Hugh Gamble, Jr., of the murder of Quamaine Rickman in Richmond County. Gamble contended on appeal that the evidence was insufficient and the trial court erred in its jury instructions. The Supreme Court affirmed because the evidence was sufficient and there was no error in the jury charge, but vacated the conviction and sentence for felony murder due to a sentencing error. View "Gamble v. Georgia" on Justia Law