Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Willie Henry Lewis appealed his convictions for the malice murders of Xavier Dinkins and Kejaun Webb, as well as a variety of other crimes that occurred over a four-day crime spree. On appeal, Defendant argued that a family tie between a prospective juror and the prosecuting attorney was grounds to strike that juror from voir dire for cause. Further, Defendant argued that the admission of certain facts into evidence were improper, and grounds for reversal of his conviction. He also contended that much of the evidence entered against him was insufficient to support his conviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decisions with respect to voir dire and the admission of evidence, however, the Court could not determine from the record whether Defendant's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective had merit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for a hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel issue. View "Lewis v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Paul Mathis was convicted of malice murder and related offenses in connection with the 2006 shooting death of Jurell Williams. Appellant appealed the denial of his motion for new trial, asserting evidentiary errors and ineffectiveness of trial counsel. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found the evidence sufficient to support Appellant's conviction. Furthermore, the Court found Appellant's remaining arguments to be without merit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Mathis v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant A.R. Mays, executor of the estate of decedent Gilbert Henry Kinchen, filed a petition to probate the decedent's will, and Appellee Katherine Rancine-Kinchen, the decedent’s widow, filed a caveat thereto. Appellant moved to dismiss the caveat. In its order resolving the motion to dismiss, the probate court granted the motion to dismiss in part by denying two counts raised by the caveat. The probate court declined to grant the remainder of the motion to dismiss when it allowed three counts of the caveat, which raised issues about a non-testamentary trust agreement that was referenced in the will, to remain pending. Because it concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to resolve the trust agreement issues, the probate court’s order transferred those issues to the superior court for resolution. Although it determined that appellee had not shown that the will was "incomplete" and "uncertain," the probate court nevertheless reserved admitting the will to probate until the trust issues were resolved by the superior court. It is from this order that Appellant directly appealed to the Supreme Court. Appellee moved to dismiss the appeal contending appellant failed to follow the correct appellate procedure. Finding that Appellee indeed did not follow the proper procedures, the Supreme Court dismissed the direct appeal. View "Mays v. Racine-Kinchen" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified two questions to the Georgia Supreme Court: "(1) Did the Georgia Insurance Commissioner act within his legal authority when he promulgated Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 120-2-20-.02, such that a multiple-line insurance policy providing first-party insurance coverage for theft-related property damage must be reformed to conform with the two-year limitation period provided for in Georgia's Standard Fire Policy, Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 120-2-19-.01?; and, (2) is this action barred by the Policy's one-year limitation period?" These questions arose from a dispute over Petitioner Ricardo White's purchase of a homeowner's insurance policy from Respondent State Farm Fire and Casualty Company. The insurance policy was a first-party insurance contract that provided multiple-line coverage, including coverage for loss or damage caused by both fire and theft. The policy contained a limitation provision stating that a lawsuit against State Farm must be brought "within one year of the date of loss or damage." After his home was burglarized in January 2008 (within the period of coverage), Petitioner filed a claim for the loss of more than $135,000 in personal property. State Farm denied the claim based on its determination that Petitioner misrepresented material information in filing his claim. Waiting more than one year after his date of loss, Petitioner filed a June 2009 complaint against State Farm in state court alleging claims for breach of contract, bad faith, and fraud. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court found that: (1) the Georgia Insurance Commissioner did not act within his legal authority and (2) this action was barred by the one-year limitation period in his insurance policy. View "White v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Following a May 1995 jury trial, Defendant Eric Kelley was convicted of two counts of felony murder (with the underlying felony of aggravated assault) in connection with the shooting deaths of two people at a pawn shop. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions on appeal. In 2006, Defendant filed a habeas corpus petition, amended in 2008 and 2009. Following an October 2009 hearing, in 2011 the habeas court granted Defendant relief on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Specifically, the habeas court found that appellate counsel was ineffective for having failed to argue on direct appeal that the trial court erred in charging the jury on both subsections (a) (1) and (a) (2) of OCGA section 16-5-21 when the indictment stated only that Defendant had committed aggravated assault in connection with felony murder by shooting the victims with a pistol. The Warden of Scott State Prison appealed that ruling. The habeas court relied on "Chapman v. Georgia" (548 SE2d 278 (2001)) in arriving at its conclusion. However, as the Supreme Court "made clear" in "Sharpe v. Georgia" (S12A0677 (2012)), "[w]here the indictment charges a defendant committed an offense by one method, it is reversible error for the court to instruct the jury that the offense could be committed by other statutory methods with no limiting instruction. The defect is cured, however, where … the court provides the jury with the indictment and instructs jurors that the burden of proof rests upon the State to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt." The Court found that the trial court specifically provided jurors with the indictment and instructed it that the burden of proof was with the State to prove every material allegation. As such, any error in overcharging the jury was cured. Accordingly, the Court reversed the habeas court's decision to grant Defendant the relief he requested. View "Williams v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Following the grant of a petition for habeas corpus relief brought by defendant, the warden appealed, contending that the trial court erred in its finding that cause and prejudice had been shown to raise the procedural bar on defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court concluded that the habeas court erred by reaching defendant's claims of ineffective assistance at all because they had previously been waived. The habeas court then compounded this error by inserting its own additional grounds, namely lack of preparation of trial counsel. Moreover, even if defendant had properly presented a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, his habeas petition would still have to be denied under Strickland v. Washington. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Tompkins v. Hall" on Justia Law

The court granted certiorari to the court of appeals to consider whether that court erred in holding that defendant should have been allowed to present evidence in support of his justification defense about a previous incident of violence allegedly committed by the victim against third parties, where defendant claimed that he had heard of the previous incident but did not witness it or have any other evidence in support of the claim. The court held that the trial court correctly refused to allow defendant to testify about the unsupported alleged violent incident involving the victim and third parties. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "State v. Hodges" on Justia Law

In The Landings Association, Inc. v. Williams, et al., the court of appeals held that the trial court properly denied in part motions for summary judgment brought by The Landings Association, Inc. and The Landings Club, Inc., finding that a question of fact remained as to whether The Landings entities failed, pursuant to the law of premises liability, to take reasonable steps to protect Gwyneth Williams from being attacked and killed by an alligator in the planned residential community and golf club owned and/or managed by The Landings entities. At issue was whether the court of appeals erred in reaching this conclusion. Because the record showed that Williams had equal knowledge of the threat of alligators within the community, the court reversed. View "The Landings Assoc., Inc. v. Williams, et al." on Justia Law

Wife appealed from the trial court's finding that husband's alimony obligation was for permanent periodic alimony. The court held that the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that husband's alimony obligation was for permanent alimony that terminated upon the wife's remarriage. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's erroneous ruling with respect to husband's alimony obligation and remanded the case to the trial court for a proper consideration of wife's motion for contempt. View "Hardigree v. Smith" on Justia Law

After appellant, the elected mayor of the City of Springfield, refused to resign after an ethics investigation, appellees petitioned the superior court for his removal pursuant to Section 45 of the city's charter. Appellant moved to dismiss the petition for removal pursuant to OCGA 9-11-12(b)(6), arguing that the petition did not state a claim for which relief could be granted and arguing a number of theories challenging the constitutionality of Section 45. After hearing the parties' arguments, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and denied appellant's request for a certificate of immediate review. Appellant subsequently contended on appeal that the trial court erred when it failed to dismiss the petition for removal pursuant to OCGA 9-11-12(b)(6). The court agreed with appellant, holding that the trial court erred when it denied appellant's motion and allowed the case to proceed with the petition as pled. The error was not harmless because throughout the proceedings appellant was forced to guess as to what charges he would be required to defend himself. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was reversed. View "Northway v. Allen, et al." on Justia Law