Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

MCI sued CMES on theories of negligence and trespass, and sought damages consisting of the costs to repair a severed cable, compensation for the loss of use of the cable during the time it took to repair it, and punitive damages. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of CMES, holding that MCI could not recover loss of use damages. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified the following question: "Under Georgia law, may a telecommunications service provider whose cable is severed recover loss-of-use damages measured by the rental value of substitute cable when it has not rented such cable or otherwise incurred any monetary loss apart from the cost of repair?" The court concluded that a telecommunications carrier was not entitled to loss of use damages measured by the hypothetical cost to rent a replacement system where it suffered no actual loss of use damages and did not need to rent a replacement system because it was able to reroute calls within the existing redundant cable system the carrier necessarily installed in order to operate its business. View "MCI Communications Services v. CMES, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury returned a verdict for Dr. Mary Johnson on her legal malpractice claim against Steven K. Leibel, Leibel filed a motion for JNOV and a motion for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion for JNOV but granted the motion for new trial. Both parties appealed and the court of appeals reversed the grant of Leibel's motion for new trial but affirmed the denial of the motion for the JNOV. The court held that, contrary to the court of appeals' reasoning, the second jury in the malpractice case was not deciding what the first jury would have done in the underlying case had the attorney not been negligent, but only what a reasonable jury would have done had the underlying case been tried without the attorney negligence alleged by plaintiff. Because the jury in the malpractice case was not being asked to decide what a prior jury would have done, it was merely being asked to do exactly what any jury in a discrimination lawsuit would do, which was, evaluate the evidence in the case and decide the case on the merits. This was a task that was solely for the jury, and that was not properly the subject of expert testimony. Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in concluding that the expert testimony at issue was admissible in this case. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Leibel, et al. v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Appellant, a young child with severe cerebral palsy, was excluded from most of the liability phase of the trial of her and her parents' lawsuit alleging that her condition was caused by appellees' medical malpractice. At issue was whether a party could be denied a right to be present in court during the trial of their case and excluded from the courtroom because her physical and mental condition could evoke undue sympathy from the jury and thereby improperly prejudice the other party. The court concluded that a party could not be excluded from her own trial simply because her physical and mental condition could evoke sympathy, even under these circumstances. Instead, trial courts could and should address the risk of undue sympathy by using jury instructions and other common and time-tested means of ensuring that both parties received a fair trial, without infringing on the parties' right to be present. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Kesterson, et al. v. Jarrett, et al." on Justia Law

The court granted wife's application for discretionary appeal from the final judgment and decree of divorce. At issue was the equitable division of a closely-held non-profit corporation. The court concluded that the superior court functioned as the finder of fact, and as such, it was authorized to give credit and weight to the disputed evidence in favor of husband. The court also concluded that wife's complaints that the superior court erred in failing to consider her request for attorney fees and to award them to her because husband refused to comply with discovery and/or there was substantial disparity in the parties' financial circumstances was unavailing. View "Jones-Shaw v. Shaw" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of malice murder, burglary, and other related offenses in 1998 and was sentenced to death. The habeas court subsequently granted defendant habeas relief, vacating all of his convictions on several grounds. The court held that the habeas court erred in granting defendant relief on his Brady claim; on the ground that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on the offense of voluntary manslaughter; on his claim of several instances of prosecutorial misconduct and trial court error in connection with that alleged misconduct; on his claim that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte stop the alleged prosecutorial misconduct; and in vacating defendant's convictions based upon a finding of cumulative error. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Humphrey v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sustained a serious brain injury when he fell while climbing down from the roof of a residence while working for EWES. At the time of the accident, EWES held a commercial liability insurance policy issued by Maxum. Maxum denied coverage and refused to defend, citing the policy's Employer Liability Exclusion. After plaintiff obtained a negligence judgment against EWES, he filed suit against Maxum pursuant to an assignment of claims from EWES, asserting breach of the duty to defend and seeking indemnification. The court reversed as to the notice issue, finding that Maxum waived its right to assert a defense based on untimely notice because it did not properly alert EWES that the lack of timely notice would be a potential bar to coverage. The court also reversed the Court of Appeals' decision regarding Maxum's duty to defend, finding that since Maxum waived its right to assert a defense related to EWES' failure to give timely notice of the occurrence, timely notice of the occurrence was not a prerequisite to Maxum's duty to defend. View "Hoover v. Maxum Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

After being indicted for certain theft crimes, defendant filed a pre-trial petition for writ of habeas corpus. At issue on appeal was whether the holding in Hicks v. Scott, preventing a pro se prisoner in a post-conviction habeas case from being dismissed for failure to comply with certain appellate procedural requirements unless he was correctly informed of those requirements, should be extended to pre-trial habeas cases and whether the holding in Hicks should be overruled. The court concluded that compliance with OCGA 5-6-35 could not be excused for failure to inform defendant of its requirements and the holding in Hicks could not be applied in this pre-trial habeas case. Accordingly, the application for discretionary review filed by defendant was subject to dismissal as untimely, and the current appeal, not being authorized, must be dismissed. View "Crosson v. Conway" on Justia Law

Defendant and his co-indictee were separately tried for the malice and felony murder of the victim and for other offenses. Defendant subsequently appealed the denial of his amended motion for a new trial after he was convicted of felony murder during the commission of criminal attempt to possess cocaine. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all of the crimes for which he was convicted. However, defendant was erroneously sentenced on both felony murder and the underlying felony. The court also concluded that defendant waived his argument that the trial court should have given his requested instructions regarding inherent dangerousness; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing a juror; the trial court did not err in granting a motion in limine made by the State to exclude certain demonstrative evidence; the trial court did not abuse its discretion under OCGA 17-16-6 in fashioning an appropriate remedy and in refusing the harsh remedy of evidence exclusion for the untimeliness of discovery; and the court rejected defendant's claims that a new trial was required and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. View "Chance v. State" on Justia Law

These cases arose from a declaratory judgment action filed by a trustee seeking to determine the effect of an in terrorem clause in an express trust. At issue was whether appeals that involved the proper interpretation of a trust provision came within the court's general appellate jurisdiction over "equity cases," Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III(2), because the resolution of that legal issue would affect the administration of the trust. Consistent with the court's precedent on this question, the court concluded that such cases did not come within its equity jurisdiction. View "Durham v. Durham; Callaway v. Willard" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of cruelty to children in the first degree, aggravated child molestation, and child molestation. At issue was whether the court of appeals improperly limited the court's holding in Division 3 of Woodard v. State. Woodard struck down, as violation of the equal protection of the law, a 1995 amendment to the Child Hearsay Statute, OCGA 24-3-16, that expanded the scope of the hearsay exception to allow admission of out-of-court statements by all children under age 14 who witnessed sexual contact or physical abuse, as opposed to only children who were themselves the victims of such abuse. The court concluded that Woodard's reasoning could not be sustained. Thus, while it clearly should not be extended to the circumstances of the case, the court thought it was more appropriate simply to overrule Division 3. Accordingly, there was no reversible error and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bunn v. State" on Justia Law