Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals and addressed the issue of whether a party must make a prayer for prejudgment interest under OCGA 7-4-15 and, if so, whether it could be made without leave of court following the grant of summary judgment. The court held that as long as there was demand for prejudgment interest prior to the entry of final judgment, a trial court should award it. The only requirement for a prejudgment interest award upon a liquidated damages claim was a demand. That is because the party opposing the award must be given an opportunity to contest it prior to the entry of judgment. Inasmuch as Crisler was given an opportunity to contest the award by opposing Haugabook's amendment and motion for the entry of final judgment, the award of prejudgment interest was proper. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Crisler et al. v. Haugabook et al." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for aggravated sodomy, aggravated child molestation, child molestation, and felony sexual battery. At issue was whether a criminal suspect who was told by police officers that he would be able to return home after questioning regardless of what he said had received a "hope of benefit" that rendered his subsequent confession inadmissible at trial under OCGA 24-3-50. The court held that the answer was no, as long as the officers' statements did not amount to a promise that the suspect would never be charged or would face reduced charges or a reduced sentence based on what he told the officers during the interview. In this case, defendant could not reasonably have construed the officers' statements as such a promise and therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Brown v. State" on Justia Law

Pin Ups, an adult entertainment business, brought this appeal from an order of the trial court denying its petition for an interlocutory injunction against the Board's "Hours of sale and operation" ordinances. As Pin Ups alleged a violation of free speech rights under the Georgia Constitution, the trial court erred in applying the rational basis test. Such laws could be upheld only "if it furthers an important government interest; if the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of speech; and if the incidental restriction of speech is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Therefore, the court held that, inasmuch as the trial court made its ruling based upon an incorrect legal standard, the court must reserve its decision and the court remanded the case to that court for it to evaluate Pin Ups's request for injunctive relief using the correct legal standard. View "Great American Dream, Inc., d/b/a Pin Ups Nightclub v. DeKalb County, et al." on Justia Law

Lewis Dempsey admitted to shooting Dillard Jewell Crane but claimed self-defense. In Case No. S11A1875, the State appealed the trial court's order granting Dempsey's motion to quash indictment number 10-CR-003-DB (second indictment). In Case No. S11X1876, Dempsey cross-appealed the trial court's earlier denial of his motion to quash indictment number 09-CR-325-MM (first indictment). The court agreed with Dempsey that the trial court should have granted his motion to quash the first indictment were the juror at issue was ineligible to serve on a grand jury under OCGA 15-12-60(b)(1) because he was an elected local government officeholder. The court held, however, that the effect of the juror's presence as to the first indictment was to nullify the proceedings at which he was purportedly grand juror. As there was never a proceeding at which a legally constituted grand jury received testimony, the trial court properly quashed the second indictment. View "State v. Dempsey; Dempsey v. State" on Justia Law

Lisa Krebs sued Carmen McReynolds and GM for serious injuries she received when McReynold's car struck the GM vehicle in which Krebs was a passenger. McReynolds subsequently appealed the trial court's rulings. The court granted certiorari to consider two questions: (1) Did the Court of Appeals correctly construe OCGA 51-12-33 to require a trier of fact to apportion an award of damages among multiple defendants when the plaintiff was not at fault?; and (2) Did the Court of Appeals correctly find that McReynolds's insurer made a counteroffer in response to Krebs's settlement demand? The court answered both questions affirmatively. The court held that in applying section 51-12-33, the trier of fact must "apportion its award of damages among the persons who were liable according to the percentage of fault of each person" even if the plaintiff was not at fault for the injury or damages claimed. In light of this holding, there was no error in the dismissal of McReynolds's cross-claims for contribution and set-off against GM. The court construed the response by McReynolds's insurer to Krebs's settlement offer, proposing to resolve the hospital and other liens "as part of this settlement," as a counteroffer rather than an unconditional and unequivocal acceptance. Accordingly, no binding settlement was formed. View "McReynolds v. Krebs" on Justia Law

Wife contended that the trial court erred in upholding in a final decree of divorce the jury's allegedly erroneous finding than an IRA in husband's name was husband's separate property that was not subject to equitable division. As a preliminary matter, the court held that wife did not waive any alleged error when her counsel stated affirmatively that wife had no objections to the "form" of the verdict returned by the jury. The court held, however, that because at least some evidence supported the jury's determination that husband's IRA was his separate property, the court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Curran v. Scharpf" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of felony murder predicated on a drug transaction and attempted violation of the state's controlled substances act. The court held that the trial court was authorized to instruct the jury pursuant to OCGA 16-3-21(b)(2); given the latitude allowed during closing argument, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling defendant's objection to the prosecution's closing argument; even if it had been error to allow the prosecutor's comments during closing, the trial court's subsequent instructions and responses to the jury's inquiry would render the error harmless; there was sufficient nexus between the violation of the state's controlled substances act and the victim's death to show that defendant's participation in the drug transaction was the proximate cause of the victim's death; the trial court properly instructed the jury; and defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were rejected. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law

Micah L. Haffner filed this action to quiet title to a parcel of land in Haralson County that he claimed to have purchased from his mother's estate. The trial court granted summary judgment to James and Regina Davis and Community and Southern Bank and denied Haffner's motion for summary judgment. Because Haffner had been in possession of the property at issue for less than 20 years and failed to exercise reasonable diligence, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Haffner v. Davis, et al" on Justia Law

This case arose from the arrest of defendant for various crimes, including an attempted violation of the state's controlled substances act following an exchange of telephone messages between defendant and law enforcement officers who posed as another individual. At issue was whether the Court of Appeals properly determined that a police officer's search of a cell phone incident to arrest was lawful. The court found that the Court of Appeals gave appropriate guidance regarding the scope of a search of a cell phone incident to arrest and reviewing the reasonable scope of the search was largely a fact-specific inquiry. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hawkins v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for malice murder in connection with the death of a 63-year-old victim. Although the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction, the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce similar transaction evidence without conducting the hearing required by Uniform Superior Court Rule 13.3(b) and making the necessary findings on the record. Accordingly, the court vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a Rule 31.1 hearing and entry of proper findings or, if need be, a new trial. View "Moore v. State" on Justia Law