Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The court granted defendant a certificate of probable cause to appeal an order of the Superior Court denying his application for a writ of habeas corpus in order to consider whether the habeas court erred in concluding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to further investigate the actual validity of defendant's prior convictions in the face of the State's notice of intent to rely on those convictions for sentencing enhancement purposes. Finding that it was not error to reject the claims of the ineffectiveness of counsel on the basis urged, the court affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief. View "Barker v. Barrow" on Justia Law

This appeal returned to the court following its grant in 2010 of defendant's pro se application for a certificate of probable cause and its remand of the case to the habeas court with direction "to analyze and make appropriate findings and legal conclusions regarding the prejudice prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel." On remand, the habeas court concluded that defendant did not satisfy the prejudice prong and denied relief. The court held that there was evidence to support the factual findings made by the habeas court and the legal conclusions drawn by the habeas court were sound. Therefore, the court affirmed that court's determination that defendant failed to establish the prejudice prong of the Strickland test and its judgment that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus should be denied. View "Cox v. Howerton" on Justia Law

Wife and husband divorced and in the final order, the trial court awarded primary custody of the parties' children to husband and ordered wife to pay child support. The court granted wife's application to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 34(4). The court held that, in light of the guardian ad litem actually testifying at the final hearing and the fact that wife could not show that the trial court inappropriately relied on the guardian's report in any way, the court found any alleged error in the trial court's failure to admit the report into evidence was harmless. The court found no merit to wife's claim that the trial court had no other choice but to order husband to pay temporary child support in the manner she desired, rather than in the manner that it ordered. Further, the record belied wife's assertion that the trial court did not consider the parties' incomes when it made its final child support award. Finally, the court rejected wife's assertion that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings to support its custody and visitation findings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gresham-Green v. Mainones" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted and sentenced for the 1993 felony murder of the victim. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court improperly curtailed the jury's consideration of a voluntary manslaughter conviction as a possible alternative to convicting him of felony murder. The court held that nothing in the recharge suggested that the jury was required to acquit defendant of malice murder and felony murder before considering whether he committed voluntary manslaughter. Moreover, when the jury initially returned the handwritten verdict sheet not showing a verdict on voluntary manslaughter, the trial court instructed the jury on how to return such a verdict if it so desired. Therefore, there was no Edge v. State violation and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Morgan v. State" on Justia Law

In divorce proceedings, wife added husband's company, SJV, as a party to the proceedings. SJV filed an application to appeal, which the court granted pursuant to the now-expired Pilot Project, by which the court granted all non-frivolous applications for discretionary review from a final judgment and decree of divorce. The court held that there was evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that, after wife filed for divorce, husband violated the Standing Order by transferring the Cobb County property from Seiz Joint Venture #1 to SJV. Based on this transfer of property that was properly the subject of the divorce proceedings, the trial court was authorized to add SJV as a party in order to ensure that wife might be afforded complete relief in the case. The court also held that SJV was not required to make wife a voting member of the company in order to facilitate her receipt of company distributions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Seiz Joint Venture, LLC v. Seiz" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 1996 convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the bludgeoning death of the victim. The court held that the trial court did not plainly err in considering the jury's request for recharge to have been tacitly withdrawn; the trial court did not err in allowing the jury to rehear portions of the trial testimony during deliberations where the trial court's instruction adequately addressed defendant's concerns; the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial based on improper juror contact and in denying his new trial motion raising the same claim where that court found that the exchange was momentary and had no effect on the verdict; and defendant's ineffective of assistance of counsel claimed failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Shank v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of malice murder, kidnapping, and other charges arising out of the shooting death of the victim. After the trial court granted defendant's motion for a new trial, he filed a plea in bar contending that double jeopardy prohibited a second trial on the same charges. The trial court granted the plea in bar and the State appealed. Because the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the State's appeal of the new trial order, the court dismissed that portion of the appeal. In regards to the plea in bar, the court concluded that double jeopardy did not bar a second trial since the grant of the new trial was based on the improper admission of evidence. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's grant of the plea in bar. View "State v. Cafee" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged the trial court's denial of her motion for discharge and acquittal under the speedy trial statute for capital cases, OCGA 17-7-171. At issue was whether, following defendant's demand for a speedy trial, section 17-7-171(b) required only two, or more than two, full terms of court to pass without a trial before defendant was entitled to discharge and acquittal. Although several prior appellate decisions involving section 17-7-171 have said in dicta that only two terms must pass, section 17-7-171(b) plainly said that "more than two" terms of court must expire, and the court must follow the statutory text instead of the inaccurate dicta. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's ruling. View "Walker v. State" on Justia Law

This case involved an underlying action for quiet title and came to the court from the trial court's grant of appellee BB&T's motion for summary judgment. The court could not sustain appellants' allegation that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to BB&T because genuine issues of material fact remained. The court also held that the trial court did not err when it granted BB&T's motion for summary judgment when appellants failed to show specific damages to support their claim of slander of title. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Giles, et al. v. Swimmer, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal involved three adjacent properties in rural Lee County owned by the Goodsons, the Ellers, and the Fords. All three properties descended from a common owner who recorded, but later withdrew, a subdivision plat that included the Goodson Property and the Eller Property. The Goodsons and Ellers claimed that they have the right to use all of "Carol Street." In 2007, the Fords filed a petition to quiet title to the Ford Property, which included Carol Street. The court affirmed the trial court's rejection of the Goodsons' and Ellers' claim of title to Carol Street by adverse possession; held that the trial court properly found the Goodsons' interest in Carol Street based on the subdivision plat was in the nature of an easement rather than legal title and the Fords' were estopped from denying the Goodsons' easement by express grant; held that the trial court did not err in placing limitations on the scope of the Goodsons' easement to use Carol Street; and rejected the Goodsons' and Ellers' claims of unclean hands and laches. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Goodson, et al. v. Ford, et al." on Justia Law