Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his murder conviction, contending, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the state adequately established the chain of custody for the victim's blood sample that was later matched to the blood on defendant's shorts. The court held that defendant presented no evidence that the blood sample had been tampered with or substituted and there was no abuse of discretion in determining that the State laid a proper foundation. The court also held that the trial court did not err in failing to dismiss a juror for inappropriate contact with a member of the victim's family where the contact caused no prejudice. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court erred by admitting certain evidence and by giving an improper jury instruction. The court held that there was no merit to defendant's claim that the trial court's instruction on "malice aforethought" confused the jury where the trial court's instruction was based on the pattern charge and the trial court was legally correct, the trial court had discretion to give unrequested instructions not contained in the trial court's original charge, and it was unlikely that the jury was confused by the recharge. The court disposed of defendant's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed his conviction for felony murder and firearm possession in connection with a shooting death of an unarmed victim. The court held that defendant's claims, that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to give curative jury instruction, call a mistrial, or pool the jurors, were not raised at trial and could not be raised for the first time on appeal. Even if the court overlooked defendant's waiver, these claims would fail on the merits. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Appellants were indicted by a grand jury on charges of, inter alia, offering to assist and assisting in the commission of suicide in violation of OCGA 16-5-5(b). At issue was whether OCGA 16-5-5(b) was constitutional under the free speech clauses of the federal and state constitutions. OCGA 16-5-5(b) provided that any person "who publicly advertises, offers, or holds himself or herself out as offering that he or she will intentionally and actively assist another person in the commission of suicide and commits an overt act to further that purpose is guilty of a felony." The court held that the State has failed to provide any explanation or evidence as to why a public advertisement or offer to assist in an otherwise legal activity was sufficiently problematic to justify an intrusion on protected speech rights. Absent a more particularized State interest and more narrowly tailored statute, the court held that the State could not, consistent with the United States and Georgia Constitutions, make the public advertisement or offer to assist in a suicide a criminal offense. The court also concluded that OCGA 16-5-5(b) restricted speech in violation of the free speech clauses of both the United States and Georgia Constitutions. Accordingly, the order of the trial court holding otherwise was reversed.

Defendant, pro se, appealed from the trial court's denial of his motion for out-of-time appeal. In 1984, defendant pled guilty to one count of murder in a negotiated plea deal in which the State agreed to withdraw its intent to seek the death penalty and allowed a second count for cocaine possession to be disposed as a nolle prosequi. In June 2011, defendant moved for an out-of-time appeal which the court denied on July 22, 2011. The court held that defendant could not prevail on his motion for out-of-time appeal based on allegations that could be resolved against him based on the facts in the record; when defendant entered his plea voluntarily, he waived the challenges to the circumstances of his arrest and/or validity of the arrest warrant; and defendant's remaining allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel was not subject to review from a motion for out-of-time appeal. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was indicted in superior court for armed robbery and other offenses even though he was 16 years old at the time of the alleged crimes. Defendant moved to transfer the case to juvenile court. Although the superior court found that no money was actually physically removed from the cash register, the trial court denied the motion to transfer, concluding that a taking and thus an armed robbery had occurred. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The court held that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the superior court's denial of the motion to transfer where the single act of pulling a cash drawer out from the register constituted the requisite change of location.

In this divorce case, wife asserted, inter alia, that the trial court erred in calculating wife's interest in husband's pension and in ordering husband to pay wife alimony in the amount of $1,250 per month once husband's pension matured. The court held that it was at wife's urging that the trial court chose to evaluate and "distribute" the pension in this case as alimony. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in choosing to award wife a specific dollar amount, rather than a percentage of the pension benefit, as alimony. Based on considerations of, inter alia, the value of the pension, the overwhelming marital debt, husband's contribution of inherited assets to the marriage, and wife's recent promotion, as well as based on the wide latitude given to the trial court in fixing the amount of alimony, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting alimony at $1,250 per month. The court also held that there was no abuse of discretion in the division of the marital assets; no reversible error in ruling that wife should have the sole right to claim one-half of the mortgage interest; no abuse of discretion in requiring wife to indemnify husband and hold him harmless for debts the trial court ordered her to pay; and no abuse of discretion in awarding wife attorney fees.

Defendant was convicted of aggravated child molestation, aggravated sodomy, and two counts of sexual battery against a person under sixteen. On appeal, defendant asserted, inter alia, the "Child Hearsay Statute," OCGA 24-3-16, was unconstitutional because it violated the Confrontation Clause. The court agreed with defendant that the statute did not, as construed in previous cases and as applied in this case, comport with the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. However, the right of confrontation could be satisfied by construing the statute to require pretrial notice of the Sate's intent to use a child victim's hearsay statements. The court concluded that the child's statements to her mother were nontestimonial, whereas the child's statements to the forensic interviewer, made several weeks after the crimes, was testimonial. The statements made by the child and her mother to the police at the scene of the crime could not be categorized easily because the moment when police neutralized any threat to the public was unclear. Nonetheless, the court need not make that determination because even if the child's statements to the forensic examiner, and the statements made by the child and her mother to the police were admitted erroneously, the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Sterling, a limited liability corporation engaged in the business of importing and selling Iraqi currency, hired Grossi, a company that specialized in web-based marketing strategies, in an effort to create an internet-based sales platform. After the parties' dispute over the modification of a compensation scheme by which Grossi was paid, Sterling filed suit against Grossi seeking a temporary restraining order, interlocutory and permanent injunctions, and damages. Grossi subsequently appealed the grant of interlocutory injunction in favor of Sterling, contending that the trial court erred by entering an interlocutory injunction that failed to preserve the status quo. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by entering the injunction in light of Grossi's threats to do harm to the website. The court also rejected Grossi's contention that the interlocutory order was, in reality, a mandatory, permanent injunction affecting the rights of the parties. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

The court granted Wife's application for interlocutory appeal to determine whether the superior court erred in denying her motion to dismiss her ex-Husband's petition to modify child support. The court held that it was error to refuse to dismiss the petition because, even assuming arguendo, that the superior court had the authority to modify the dismissal order to provide that it was not an adjudication on the merits, the ruling terminated the Husband's petition for modification. Thus, it was a "final order" and triggered application of the prohibition in OCGA 19-6-15(k)(2). Further, there is no merit to the policy argument that the interest of judicial economy was served by allowing the modification action to proceed.