Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants, Thomasina Beverly Mack and Demario Steven Smith, were convicted of the malice murder of Mack's 30 month old child, who died as a result of blunt-force head trauma and strangulation. The court held that the trial court did not err when it denied Mack's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal or in denying Mack's motion to sever her trial from that of Smith; allowed the testimony of the deputy examiner; overruled Mack's objections to the prosecutor's closing argument; denied the portion of Smith's motion for new trial alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and denied Smith's motion to continue the hearing on the motion for new trial. Accordingly, the judgments were affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of, inter alia, malice murder of his pregnant girlfriend and her sister. Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied and he appealed. The court held that, viewed in context, defendant's statement "I can't go on answering these questions" was not an unambiguous and unequivocal assertion of the right to remain silent. Accordingly, agents had no obligation to cease the interview and it was not error to admit defendant's incriminating statements into evidence. The court also held that, even assuming the trial court erred by admitting the challenged testimony based on hearsay, the error was harmless because other admissible evidence covered the same subject matter. The court further held that it was not error to admit bullets and bullet casings found at the scene of the crime into evidence at trial.

Defendant appealed his sentence and conviction involving murder, burglary, and related offenses. The court held that the trial court did not err by excusing potential jurors; convictions for eight of the alleged offenses were proper; defendant's contention that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to state an incorrect interpretation of the law was without merit; the court rejected defendant's contention that a new trial was required because his conviction for malice murder as a party to the crime was mutually exclusive of his convictions of tampering with evidence; the trial court did not fail to instruct the jury on the manner by which he allegedly committed the aggravated assaults in Counts 11 and 12; any issues with regard to the felony murder counts was moot because defendant's felony conviction was vacated by operation of law; the trial court did not err in denying a motion for mistrial; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for continuance; and the trial court had sufficient evidence to sentence defendant as a recidivist.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder and other related offenses in connection with the stabbing of one victim and the aggravated assault of another. On appeal, defendant challenged certain evidentiary rulings of the trial court and asserted that he was denied effective assistance of trial. The court found no error and affirmed the judgment.

Father and Mother's judgment of divorce incorporated by reference a parenting plan and custody order that gave Mother primary physical custody of the parties' daughter, with Father awarded visitation that required supervision when the child spent the night in Father's custody. At issue was whether the judgment contained an improper self-executing modification that was contingent upon a determination to be made by a person other than a judge. The court held that since the provision regarding the termination of supervision of Father's overnight visitation with his child was a material change in visitation that would occur automatically without judicial scrutiny into the child's best interests, it was an invalid self-executing change of visitation that should not have been included in the judgment and decree of divorce. Accordingly, the court reversed that portion of the judgment and decree of divorce and remanded the case.

Appellants are the biological paternal grandparents of a child born to appellee and appellants' son. After Douglas Bailey married the child's mother, he adopted the child in 2006 when appellants' son terminated his parental rights to the child. The court had granted appellant's petition for certiorari and posed the following question: Did the Court of Appeals correctly "conclude that the limiting language of OCGA 19-7-3 (b) - forbidding original actions for grandparent visitation if the parents are together and living with the child - includes adoptive parents"? The court answered the question in the affirmative and upheld the judgment by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err when it concluded that the term "parents" in OCGA 19-7-3(b) did not exclude an adoptive parent such as Mr. Bailey. The Court of Appeals also did not err when it concluded that the trial court erred when it denied appellees' motion to dismiss.

Testatrix had four predeceased siblings, and Propounder and Caveator were two of five nieces and nephews who were Testatrix's heirs at law. Caveator appealed the probate court's order holding that Propounder carried her burden of proving that the proffered will was the last will and testament of Testatrix and that Testatrix possessed the required testamentary capacity to make a will at the time of execution. The court affirmed the order where Caveator failed to establish sufficient evidence to meet his burden of proof.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder of one victim and aggravated assault of three other victims. Defendant was also convicted of armed robbery of each of the four victims and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the crimes against each of the four victims. On appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, contending that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self-defense. Defendant's testimony presented an account of events that differed from that presented by the State through the testimony of the surviving victims. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to reject defendant's justification defense and find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted.

Prine filed a caveat challenging the validity of her father's will on the grounds that he lacked testamentary capacity and was operating under undue influence. The probate court ordered the probate of the will in solemn form, and the superior court granted summary judgment to the estate. The court held that because the record showed that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the lack of testamentary capacity or undue influence at the time the testator executed his will, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the drive-by shooting of the victim. Defendant contended that he did not receive a fair trial because the trial court restricted his cross-examination of an eyewitness and the prosecutor improperly injected his character into evidence. The court held that because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting impeachment related to a witness's first offender plea or denying the motion for a mistrial, the judgment was affirmed.