Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Husband appealed a trial court's issuance of a final divorce judgment and decree that divided some unimproved real property in Florida and two Morgan Stanley funds equally between the parties and made no disposition of the interests in an apartment complex, thereby leaving each party with his or her own interest. The court held that the two Morgan Stanley accounts were transformed into marital property when Husband gave Wife an ownership interest in the property; the Florida property was transformed into a marital asset where it was deeded to him and his Wife as tenants in common; and in regards to the apartment complex, Wife acquired an ownership interest separate and distinct from Husband's. Finally, the court held that Husband's claims that the trial court abused its discretion by announcing a prejudgment of the case prior to his presentation of evidence was without merit. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant challenged his guilty plea to two counts of malice murder. The court affirmed where the trial court found that defendant fully understood the terms of the negotiated agreement, including that he would be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. The trial court also found that defendant's plea counsel appropriately recommended that defendant plead guilty, and accepted a life sentence without the possibility of parole, due to the grief that a trial would cause the victims' families and the emotion and strain it would cause defendant. Therefore, the trial court's factual findings were supported by the record.

This case arose after a divorce decree between Husband and Wife. After a hearing, the trial court entered a final order granting primary physical custody of the children to Husband and visitation to Wife. Thereafter, Wife filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. Wife then appealed this ruling, contending, among other things, that the trial court erred by relying on evidence adduced at the temporary hearing. The court held that the record and the trial court's final order explicitly showed that the trial court relied on evidence from the temporary hearing to reach its final decision regarding custody of the children and there was no indication that the parties were notified in advance that this was going to happen. As a result, pursuant to Pace v. Pace, the court reversed the trial court's final order and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was indicted for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault after the victim was fatally shot with a crossbow. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for discharge and acquittal and plea in bar, alleging that his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the presumptive prejudice arising from delay in bringing defendant to trial was insufficient for him to prevail on his constitutional speedy trial claim, given that the State's pre-indictment delay was not intentional, that defendant was dilatory in asserting his rights, and that there was not any demonstrable prejudice to his defense.

Defendant was convicted of felony murder and other offenses in connection with the death of the victim. On appeal, defended asserted, inter alia, that the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The court held that because a report detailing the findings of a private consulting company hired by the mayor to investigate the operations of the police department was hearsay and inadmissible, defendant had not shown how its disclosure would have led to admissible evidence. Therefore, the report did not constitute Brady material. The court also held that defendant's assertion that Brady was violated because the State refused to identify a witness was without merit where defendant was aware pretrial that the State had taken statements from the witness. The court further held that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of a 2004 convenience store homicide as a similar transaction. The court finally rejected defendant's contention that the trial court should have permitted him to cross-examine an officer about any possible bias and rejected defendant's contention that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a jury view. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiffs brought suit against the Board, alleging that sections 2 and 3 of Ordinance No. 10-01, amending two sections of the Local Act, Ga. L. 1983, p. 4594 (sections 10 and 14), were unconstitutional and sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, as well as nominal damages and expenses of litigation, including attorney's fees. Section 14 prohibited members of the Board from transacting business with the county and section 10 provided that all bills shall be paid by check signed by the clerk and by the chairman or vice-chairman. Section 3 amended section 14 by adding a provision that section 14 would not apply where a majority of the Board approved the contract or transaction after establishing that the goods, services, or property could not be obtained for less and that the taxpayers' interests would be served. Section 2 amended section 10 by providing that all bills shall be paid by check signed by at least two officials among a list of officials. The court held that section 2 conferred only administrative rather than executive authority on the chair of the Board's finance committee and that it therefore did not violate Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. 1(c)(2) by affecting the composition or form of the Board; section 3 did not constitute an action affecting the elective office of commissioner in violation of Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I (c)(1); section 3 was not preempted by OCGA 36-1-14; and section 3 did not impair OCGA 16-10-6 but rather effectively augmented and strengthened it. Accordingly, the trial court erred in declaring sections 2 and 3 unconstitutional, in granting partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their claims of declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and in denying defendants' motion for summary judgment. The remaining enumeration of error regarding defendants' immunity defenses was moot.

Wife appealed the trial court's orders subsequent to a divorce decree, contending that the trial court erred by retroactively reducing husband's alimony obligation and by failing to grant wife attorney fees. The court held that the trial court erred by modifying husband's alimony obligation pursuant to Hendrix v. Stone. The court held, however, that the trial court's decision to have each party pay his or her own attorney fees stands because wife waived her right to pursue this argument. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Defendant entered negotiated pleas of guilty to charges of murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant appealed from the trial court's denial of his out-of-time appeal. The court held that defendant was not entitled to an out-of-time appeal for his contention that the indictment was void for failing to allege what instrument was used to shoot the victim where the indictment was not lacking an essential element of the crime of malice murder; for defendant's challenge that the indictment was void because the name of the grand jury foreman and the date of offense as to Count II were altered where the claims were not supported by the record; for defendant's claim that the trial court failed to swear him in prior to his guilty plea where the issue could be decided against him on the existing record; and for his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel because such claims could not be resolved on the facts appearing in the record. Accordingly, his remedy was to file a petition for habeas corpus; the trial court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised; and defendant was not entitled to the appointment of counsel on his motion for out-of-time appeal.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder and other related offenses in connection with the stabbing death of one victim and the aggravated stalking of another. Defendant appealed. The court held that defendant failed to preserve his contention that the trial court violated OCGA 24-3-38 by refusing to allow the witness to testify to the "complete statement" defendant made to her in the hours following the stabbing; the court agreed with the trial court's credibility determination as well as its conclusion that an acquittal would not likely have resulted had the jury heard the witness' testimony in its entirety and therefore, defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever the counts; even assuming arguendo, the court found no error in the admission at trial of defendant's first offender plea; and the trial court did not plainly err in refusing to give defendant's requested jury instruction on mutual combat.

DRST Holdings filed a petition for money rule nisi and mandamus against Sheriff Brown demanding payment of excess funds where Sheriff Brown had determined that the redemption of certain property by DRST Holdings was unauthorized and thus released the excess funds to an unauthorized representative of the estate of the defendant who owned the property at the time of the sale. The court held that Sheriff Brown was required to file a verified answer and it was undisputed that he ultimately submitted verification of the answer. Therefore, the court rejected DRST Holdings' contention that the trial court should have granted the motion to strike the unverified answer and issue a rule absolute. The court also rejected DRST Holdings' contention that the trial court erred in holding that it was not a party entitled to redeem the real property from the tax sale where DRST Holdings failed to present evidence establishing that it held an interest in the real property or that it was a creditor of the defendant pursuant to OCGA 48-4-40 and 48-4-41. Therefore, the redemption by DRST Holdings was void and the excess funds from the tax sale were properly paid to the unauthorized representative.