Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the habeas court's denial of his motion to transfer his habeas action. Defendant sought transfer of his habeas petition to the superior court of the county to which he had been transferred after properly filing his petition in his original county of detention. The court held that there was no error in the denial of the motion to transfer and affirmed the judgment where Wilkes v. Terry held that a habeas court had the discretion, but generally was not required, to transfer a habeas petition in the event the petitioner's county of detention changes.

The County appealed from the grant of a writ of mandamus ordering it to reinstate appellee to his former position as a fire captain and awarding him back pay and costs of litigation. The court held that because appellee had a clear legal right to reinstatement, a right violated by the County's steadfast refusal to abide by the order of the hearing officer, as affirmed by the Council on appeal, mandamus was properly granted. The court also approved the monetary award fashioned by the trial court to make appellee whole for the full amount of salary he was denied from the date of his wrongful termination. The court further held that the record showed that the County affirmatively waived its right to a hearing on the issue of attorney fees.

Defendant was convicted and sentenced for malice murder and armed robbery, assault of the victim with intent to rob, the aggravated assault of the victim by shooting him with a deadly weapon, and for being in possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Defendant appealed. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to authorize a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of malice murder and armed robbery. However, the conviction and sentence for aggravated assault with intent to rob must be vacated because it merged into the armed robbery conviction, and the conviction and sentence for aggravated assault by using a deadly weapon to shoot the victim must be vacated because it merged as a matter of fact into the malice murder conviction. The court also held that the trial court's findings of facts were not clearly erroneous and the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress defendant's custodial statements. The court further held that defendant did not overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and therefore, the trial court did not err when it concluded that defendant did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel.

Wife appealed a final judgment of divorce, contending that, in awarding primary physical custody of the parties' two children to husband, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider evidence of alleged family violence perpetrated by husband against her and that the trial court erred by failing to enter written findings of fact explaining its reasons for granting primary physical custody to husband. The court held that the trial court did not fail to consider the evidence of family violence and that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in awarding physical custody of the children to husband, with wife having joint legal custody and extensive visitation. The court also held that wife could not complain about the trial court's child support calculations where she specifically asked that court to use her child support worksheet. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed an order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging his 1988 guilty plea to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. At issue was whether the habeas court erred in holding that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel at the guilty plea hearing. The court concluded that it was error for the habeas court to find a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel where defendant was never informed that he had a right to counsel during the plea hearing. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed.

Dr. Carol Walker, a physician who sold nutritional supplements, filed a damage suit in the State Court of Gwinnet County against AmeriSciences and three of the company's corporate officers (appellants) under the Fair Business Act (FBPA), OCGA 10-1-399(b), for failure to disclose and comply with the repurchase requirements of the Sale of Business Opportunities Act (SBOA), OCGA 10-1-415(d)(1). On appeal, appellants contended that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to give res judicata effect to an earlier Texas declaratory judgment. The court held that Dr. Walker was barred by the Texas judgment from filing an FBPA claim against AmeriSciences in Georgia and a Georgia court could not make its own determination regarding whether the forum selection clause precluded the filing of an FBPA claim in Georgia. Also at issue was whether the State Court of Gwinnett County had personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants. The court held that because the "fiduciary shield" doctrine did not apply in Georgia, the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to withstand appellants' attack on the trial court's jurisdiction over the individual defendants on the ground that they acted in their corporate capacities. Appellants further contended that, even if the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants, they could not be personally liable for violations of the SBOA because none of them was a "seller" within the meaning of OCGA 10-1-410(10). The court held that pursuant to OCGA 10-1-399(a) and 10-1-417(b), each individual defendant was subject to personal liability for any violation of the SBOA which he had committed and which was proved by Dr. Walker.

Appellant contended that it was a "public utility" under OCGA 48-1-2 and, as such, was required under OCGA 48-5-511 to make an annual tax return of its Georgia property to the Georgia Revenue Commissioner rather than to the Chatham County tax authorities. Appellant filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment and for writ of mandamus in superior court, seeking to have the trial court recognize appellant as a "public utility" and to order appellee to accept appellant's annual ad valorem property tax return. The trial court granted appellee's motion to dismiss the complaint based on appellant's failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the doctrine of sovereign immunity was applicable to the claims. The court reversed and held that it need not address whether sovereign immunity would act as a bar to appellant's declaratory action, as it was clear that, if the declaratory action were barred by sovereign immunity, appellant's mandamus action would still remain viable.

Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial in violation of his rights under the State and Federal Constitutions, as well as the denials of his "plea in bar and motion to dismiss" and "general demurrer," which both asserted that the indictment returned against him was defective because the non-murder crimes charged therein were time-barred. The court held that there was no abuse of the superior court's discretion in denying defendant's motion to dismiss based on alleged violations of his constitutional rights to a speedy trial; the superior court did not err in failing to dismiss the indictment where neither prejudice nor deliberate adverse action on the part of the State had been shown; and the superior court did not err in failing to grant his "plea in bar and motion to dismiss" and his "general demurrer," where the applicable statute of limitations was tolled under OCGA 17-3-2(2). Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed his convictions for malice murder, aggravated assault, possession of a deadly weapon at a public gathering, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of aggravated assault. The court held that defendant did not cite to any evidence indicating, or evidence that otherwise showed a Brady violation, and thus he failed to meet his burden; to the extent that defendant's enumeration of error embraced the motion for mistrial, without a contemporaneous objection, no error was shown in the denial of the motion; and trial counsel was not deficient. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed his convictions for the malice murder of Rocky Heard, the aggravated assault of Ray Dean Heard, possession of a firearm during the commission of the crime of aggravated assault, affray, and simple battery. The court held that review of the record revealed that the conviction for the aggravated assault of Rocky merged into the malice murder conviction as a matter of law. Accordingly, the separate judgment of conviction and sentence for the aggravated assault of Rocky must be vacated. The court held, however, that the trial court did not clearly err by denying introduction of prior acts of violence by Rocky and Ray Dean against third parties; the trial court did not err in giving the jury instructions; and the trial court did not err in determining that defendant was advised of his right not to testify. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part and vacated in part.