Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In a hierarchical church property dispute, the court granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied the "neutral principles of law" doctrine set forth in Jones v. Wolf. The court held that neutral principles of law demonstrated that an implied trust in favor of the PCUSA existed on the local church's property to which TPC, Inc. held legal title. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding to the contrary and the judgment was reversed.

This case involved a dispute over control of property belonging to the oldest church in Georgia, Christ Church in Savannah. At issue was whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in applying the neutral principles doctrine, particularly with respect to OCGA 14-5-46 and 14-5-47. The court held that although those courts could have erred to some extent in their reliance on OCGA 14-5-46 and 14-5-47, they correctly concluded that neutral principles of law showed that the property of Christ Church at issue was held in trust for the benefit of the Episcopal Church.

Appellants sued GLC and SGI asserting trademark infringement, deceptive trade practices, and breach of contract stemming from GLC's "Money Bags" lottery games of 2005 and 2007. At issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that GLC was entitled to assert sovereign immunity as a bar to a suit raising claims that arose outside the Georgia Tort Claims Act and whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that OCGA 10-1-440 required the bona fide use of a trademark to make out a claim concerning the trademark's infringement? The court held that because sovereign immunity applied to state instrumentalities, GLC was entitled to assert sovereign immunity as a defense in this case. The court also held that there was no error in the interpretation of OCGA 10-1-440(b) by the Court of Appeals where appellants have not made "bona fide" use of their MONEYBAG$ mark in commerce sufficient to establish protectable rights in the mark. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

The court granted certiorari to examine whether the "anti-indemnity" statute found at OCGA 13-8-2(b) applied to invalidate an indemnification clause within an assignment and assumption agreement transferring responsibility for the management and operation of a newly developed subdivision to its homeowner's association. The court held that OCGA 13-8-2(b) did apply to the assignment and assumption agreement. Therefore, the court held that the indemnification provision was invalid and given that the third party's claims were premised solely on this invalid provision, the Court of Appeals correctly held that summary judgment should have been granted to appellee.

Wife was granted an appeal from the superior court's denial of her motion for new trial, as amended, following its entry of a final judgment and decree of divorce and order of custody (decree). Wife appealed the decree's awards of custody, child support, and equitable division on the basis that the evidence at trial did not support them. The court held that, contrary to wife's contention, the court did not terminate her cross-examination of the guardian ad litem. The court also held that there was ample evidence to support an award of custody to the grandparents based on the best interest of their grandson. Although the court found wife's exact amount of income difficult to discern, it determined from all relevant circumstances, including her expenses and the fact that husband did not work when he lived in the home, that she must have had a minimum income of $5,000 a month and was capable of earning substantially more than that. Finally, there was no merit to wife's remaining complaint that the superior court erred by ordering her to pay $20,000 to husband as an equitable division of property. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of armed robbery, kidnapping with bodily injury, hijacking a motor vehicle, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The court granted defendant a certificate of probable cause to appeal the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus to consider whether his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in his consultation with defendant about a pretrial plea agreement offer. The court held that trial counsel did not fail in his duty to offer defendant his informed advice regarding the State's plea agreement offer. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of felony murder, armed robbery, burglary, and aggravated assault. Defendant appealed the denial of a motion for a new trial. The court held that, under Davis v. State, the trial court did not err by failing to grant a mistrial when defendant's co-indictee identified a certain individual in court at the request of the State. The court also held that, under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial under Crawford v. State. The court further held that defendant failed to show that trial counsel's performance was deficient and therefore, his ineffective assistance claims were without merit. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of felony murder, three counts of aggravated assault, and three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in connection with a shooting death. Defendant appealed the trial court's denial of his motion for new trial. The court held that the jury's question, regarding whether it was possible to find defendant not guilty on the malice murder count due to self-defense but still find him guilty on other counts, simply indicated that the jury was attempting to understand the law as fully as possible before reaching a verdict. Consequently, the court held that the case did not fall within the narrow exception to the inconsistent verdict rule. The court also held that defendant's claim that the trial court erred by giving incorrect instructions in response to the jury's questions was not properly preserved for review. The court further held that there was no plain error in the trial court's recharge of the jury on the subject of self-defense. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant, a seventeen-year-old, was found guilty of felony murder and several other offenses in connection with a shooting death. On appeal, defendant contended that he was unfairly denied his right to conflict-free counsel; that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a hearing regarding his competence to stand trial; and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The court held that defendant's speculation that a conflict of interest necessarily arose simply because a single investigator was used and because multiple co-indictees were represented by the same public defender's office was insufficient as a matter of law to show that an actual conflict existed. The court also held that the trial court did not err by failing to hold a hearing regarding defendant's competency where defendant did not present any information to the trial court that should reasonably have raised a doubt about his competency and alerted the trial court to the possibility that he could neither understand the proceedings, appreciate their significance, nor rationally aid his attorney in his defense. The court further held that defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was without merit. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Purchasers sued Developers and Brokers, alleging that at the time of their purchases in a 26-story condominium, Developers had already undertaken plans to develop a 46-story building directly across the street. Developers advertised "spectacular city views" from the 26-story condominium and Brokers advised that any future developments to the south of the building would be low to mid-rise office buildings. Purchasers alleged that they paid substantial premiums for their views of the city which was now blocked by the 46-story building. At issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the trial court's grant of judgment on the pleadings on Purchasers' claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligent supervision and violation of the Georgia's fair business practices statute. The court held that the trial court was correct in finding that Purchasers did not properly elect rescission as a remedy, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision; the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Purchasers were not bound by the agreements they signed; because there can be no justifiable reliance where Purchasers were bound by their agreements, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Purchasers' fraud-based claims could proceed; and the trial court correctly found that Purchasers did not sufficiently plead a cause of action against Developers for negligent supervision and the Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the trial court's decision on that count.