Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his convictions for felony murder, criminal attempt to possess cocaine, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. The court held that defendant could not be sentenced on both felony murder and the underlying felony when found guilty of both. Therefore, the court vacated the separate judgment of conviction and sentence for criminal attempt to possess cocaine. The court also held that the omission of additional language concerning proximate cause could not be considered a clear and obvious error and the second prong of the plain error test could not be met. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part and vacated in part.

These appeals arose from annexations by the City of parcels of unincorporated real property in Fayette County. At issue was whether appellee, the City resident seeking to enjoin the City from providing services to the area annexed in 2007, had standing as a citizen-taxpayer to do so; whether the appeal was moot; and whether a subsequent annexation by the City cured the flaw the Court of Appeals found in the first annexation. The court concluded that the appeal was moot when it was docketed in the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals should have dismissed it as such. In light of this decision, there was no need to address the issue of appellee's standing as a citizen-taxpayer. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

Defendant appealed his convictions for felony murder, aggravated assault, and burglary. The court held that the trial court's finding that the statements defendant made to an officer were freely and voluntarily made was not clearly erroneous; the trial court did not err in determining that the telephone recording at issue to an attorney was admissible; any error in allowing a certain statement to be read did not contribute to the verdict and was therefore harmless; and the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed his conviction for malice murder and aggravated battery in connection with the fatal shooting of a victim and the wounding of another. On appeal, defendant maintained that he was denied due process of law because his convictions were obtained by use of perjured testimony which was not timely disclosed for the State and because his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The court held that there was no showing that any perjury actually occurred or that the witness at issue was ever charged with or convicted of perjury. Even assuming that the witness had perjured himself on the stand, it could not be said that the guilty verdicts and consequent judgments could not have been obtained without such evidence inasmuch as there was testimony from other witnesses at the crime scene portraying defendant's unjustified shooting. Nor is there any basis for defendant's claim of a due process violation. There was likewise no merit to defendant's claim that he was denied due process of law, and that the truth-seeking process was indeed corrupted. Defendant also failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel under Strickland v. Washington. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

This case stemmed from a dispute regarding the partition of a 40 acre piece of land where the testator's four heirs wanted to sell the land but the testator's grandson had been living on a 2.2 acre tract of land that was part of the 40 acres at issue. The grandson contended that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the heirs because a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to his claim that he owned the 2.2 acres at issue. The court held that despite the fact that the grandson had lived on the property at issue for several years, this fact alone was insufficient as a matter of law to satisfy the requirements for a parol gift of land. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the heirs.

Defendant was convicted of felony murder, aggravated assault, and other related offenses in connection with the shooting death of one victim and the aggravated assault of another victim. On appeal, defendant asserted, inter alia, that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel in that counsel failed to object to (a) the admissibility of a custodial statement given by co-defendant; (b) the admissibility of an out-of-court statement given to police by one of the victims during the investigation of the case; (c) testimony that guns and ammunition were seized from defendant's home and to the introduction of these items into evidence; and (d) certain testimony by an officer as inadmissible hearsay. The court found no reversible error and affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder and related offenses in connection with the shooting death of the victim. On appeal, defendant asserted, inter alia, that trial counsel was ineffective because he impeached his own witness with a first offender guilty plea. The court held that defendant failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington. The court found no error and affirmed the judgment.

The court granted petitioner a certificate of probable cause to appeal the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in order to determine whether the record of petitioner's guilty plea established that he affirmatively waived his constitutional rights under Boykin v. Alabama. The court concluded that the record showed undisputedly that the trial court did not fully inform petitioner of his Boykin rights on the record during the plea hearing. Moreover, the statement by petitioner's counsel at the hearing in which counsel acknowledged having advised petitioner of his legal and constitutional rights was not, in and of itself, sufficient to establish that petitioner had been informed of his Boykin rights. However, contrary to petitioner's contention, the habeas court did not err by relying on the waiver of rights form signed by petitioner. Therefore, the court rejected petitioner's argument that the waiver of rights form he signed could not serve as "some affirmative evidence that either the trial court or trial counsel entered into a colloquy with defendant and explained all three of his Boykin rights." The court found no merit in the argument that petitioner was not advised of his right against self-incrimination because the waiver of rights form wording did not make it clear that it was referring to the right to remain silent at trial. Petitioner was not entitled to grant of habeas relief based upon the trial court's failure to establish on the record a factual basis for petitioner's guilty plea and the habeas court did not err by denying petitioner's petition.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime while a convicted felon. On appeal, defendant contended his convictions were the results of ineffective assistance of counsel and of errors made by the trial court. The court held that the assistant district attorney's actions at issue did not qualify as prosecutorial misconduct authorizing a reversal of defendant's conviction; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making the evidentiary ruling regarding a witness' testimony since the State was permitted to rehabilitate a witness whose credibility had been attacked and the testimony at issue was relevant; the trial court did not err in admitting certain tape recordings at issue; and that trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed the denial of his pre-trial motion for his discharge and acquittal of charges stemming from a double murder, based upon an alleged violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The court did not find an abuse of the superior court's discretion in denying defendant's motion for discharge and acquittal and in refusing to dismiss his pending murder and related charges. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.