Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted in 2000 of burglary and sentenced as a recidivist to 20 years in prison. At issue was whether a habeas court was required to transfer a properly filed petition for habeas corpus to another county's superior court when the petitioner was transferred to that county for detention. The court held that while a habeas court could in its discretion transfer a habeas petition after the petitioner's county of detention changes, transfer of the petition was not required in every case.

Defendant was convicted on two counts each of child molestation and sexual exploitation of a child and one count each of aggravated child molestation and statutory rape based on sexual acts committed on several occasions with a 15-year-old girl. On appeal, defendant challenged, inter alia, the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress incriminating evidence found in a locked briefcase owned by defendant that was seized from a third party's premises without a warrant and subsequently searched pursuant to a valid warrant. The court of appeals affirmed defendant's conviction and denied the motion to suppress pursuant to the "independent source" exception to the exclusionary rule. The court held that the independent source doctrine did not apply in the circumstances presented. The court also declined to decide whether the circumstances would warrant application of the "inevitable discovery" doctrine. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The parties in this case were adjoining landowners whose deeds both allegedly included a disputed six-acre parcel lying in Land Lot 95 of the 16th District, First Section, in Union County, Georgia. Based on the evidence, the trial court found that Porter had established superior title to the disputed property. In light of the court's holding in Division 1 that the trial court did not err in concluding that Porter had superior title by deed to the disputed property, the court need not address the trial court's alternative conclusion that Porter and her predecessors had otherwise established prescriptive title to the disputed property by adverse possession.

Defendant was convicted of the murder of his girlfriend's thirteen-month-old. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred in interfering with his right to cross-examine a critical witness and in denying his motion for a mistrial after the State mentioned his criminal history in violation of a pretrial order. The court held that because the trial court did not limit defendant's cross-examination of the lead investigator and gave a curative instruction following the reference to the outstanding warrants, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of felony murder and four other charges in connection with the death of the victim. The court granted the State's interlocutory appeal in which it challenged the grant of a new trial to defendant as a result of the finding of a fatal omission in the jury charge, to address (1) the circumstances under which an appellate court could review alleged jury instruction errors to which no objection was raised at trial; and (2) assuming such review was appropriate in this case, whether the trial court correctly held that the omission in the jury charge here constituted plain error. The court held that, while the trial court did properly conduct a plain error review of the unobjected-to jury charge, the court erred in holding that the omission in the charge did in fact constitute plain error. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

Caveators Celia Beth Simmons (Beth) and Lisa Kay Norton (Lisa) appealed from the grant of summary judgment to the propounder of the will of their father, Charles Powell Norton (Charles). Beth and Lisa contended that the superior court erred in granting summary judgment on their claim that the will was the product of undue influence on the part of their brother, Samuel. The court held that there was simply no evidence that Samuel exerted any influence over Charles in the making of the will and it was therefore not error to grant summary judgment.

Husband and Wife entered into a Prenuptial Agreement before their marriage in 1990. The parties divorced twenty years later, and following a hearing, the trial court agreed to enforce the Prenuptial Agreement and incorporated it into the parties' Final Decree. Wife appealed, primarily contending that the trial court erred in enforcing the Prenuptial Agreement. The court held that the evidence supported the trial court's conclusions that full financial disclosures were made to Wife before she agreed to sign the Prenuptial Agreement and that the agreement was not unconscionable. Furthermore, Wife had not shown that the increase in Husband's net worth over time presented a change of circumstances that would make enforcement of the agreement unfair and unreasonable. The court also held that Wife was also incorrect in her assertion that the trial court erred by entering its Final Decree despite pending counterclaims by Wife where the record revealed that all Wife's counterclaims dealt with matters that were specifically covered by the Prenuptial Agreement. The court dismissed Wife's remaining claim and affirmed the judgment.

Wife and Husband were divorced and in the Final Decree, Wife was awarded primary physical custody of the parties' two minor children, and was also awarded child support. Husband appealed, contending that these rulings were in error. The court held that there was evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that Wife should be awarded primary physical custody of the parties' children and therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The court also held that the trial court did not err in determining the child support obligation where the trial court properly ascertained the reasons for Wife's occupational choices and the reasonableness of these choices. The court further held that Husband's argument that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to abate his child support obligation or award him child support during summer visitation was without merit.

Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine and sentenced to four years imprisonment. Defendant appealed his conviction and the denial of his motion to suppress drug evidence seized from his vehicle, arguing that the vehicle search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The court held that the State failed to make any meaningful showing that this was the "rare" case justifying a warrantless vehicle search because officers were unable to fully effectuate an arrest. Because the State failed to meet its burden of proving the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, the exception did not apply.

Defendant was found guilty of malice and felony murder of her husband, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, concealing the death of another, and two counts of cruelty to children in the second degree. The felony murder verdict was vacated by operation of law and the district court entered judgments of conviction on the remaining guilty verdicts. The court held that the evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to reject the defense's theory that the victim's death was a suicide and to find defendant guilty of malice murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also held that because the trial court correctly entered judgment of conviction on the malice murder verdict and not the felony murder count, the court need not consider the sufficiency of the evidence as to that alternative charge. The court further held that the jury was authorized to conclude that the presence of an unembalmed corpse in the minor children's home for nearly three days was a criminally negligent act constituting an unsanitary condition and to infer from the reaction of the police officers that the resulting stench caused the children excessive mental pains. The court finally held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for change of venue. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.