Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of felony murder and aggravated assault with the shooting death of the victim. Defendant subsequently appealed from the denial of his motion for new trial, arguing that a search warrant for his medical records and the introduction of the records into evidence violated his constitutional rights; the trial court erred in admitting his custodial statements; and his trial counsel was ineffective. The court held that defendant could not claim an expectation of privacy in the medical records to the extent that they contained information he disclosed to medical personnel or they disclosed to him in the presence of two officers and, even if defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, the search and seizure of the medical records pursuant to a valid warrant was lawful. The court also held that admitting the medical records into evidence at trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause and, in any event, none of the medical records were testimonial inasmuch as the circumstances surrounding their creation and the statements and actions of the parties objectively indicated that the records were prepared for the primary purpose of facilitating defendant's medical care. The court further held that the trial court's error in admitting defendant's response to an officer's inquiry was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the statement was cumulative of numerous admissible statements defendant made and that defendant's voluntary, unsolicited statements made to or in the presence of officers at the medical center were properly admitted into evidence. The court finally held that trial counsel's strategic decision to forego filing an out-of-time demand for speedy trial to continue to pursue his investigation was reasonable and did not constitute ineffective assistance. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff brought a slip and fall action against CSX under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51 et seq., which provided a federal tort remedy for interstate railroad employees who were injured while working within the scope of their employment. At issue was whether 29 C.F.R. 1910.24(f) applied to an indoor office building and whether the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear evidence of, and determine whether, plaintiff was out of service because he was within the broad scope of protection of the FELA. The court held that, because the requirement of section 1910.24(f) that the nosings be of nonslip finish was applicable to the stairs in CSX's office building, was raised by the evidence, and was not otherwise covered in the jury instructions, the trial court should have given plaintiff's request to charge the jury that it could consider a violation of that regulation as evidence of negligence on the part of CSX. The court also held that because the circumstances surrounding plaintiff's dispute with the supervisors a few hours before he went to CSX's administration building to attend the safety meeting were at least indirectly material to matters at issue in this case, including whether plaintiff was acting within the cope of his employment at the time of his fall, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing CSX to cross-examine plaintiff on the issue and in admitting the testimony of supervisors for purposes of disproving certain facts to which plaintiff had testified.

In 1995, a jury found defendant guilty of rape, aggravated sodomy, aggravated child molestation, and six counts of child molestation. The court subsequently granted certiorari in this case to consider whether a trial court had the authority to grant an out-of-time discretionary appeal in a criminal case as a remedy for counsel's failure to timely file a discretionary application. The court held that Georgia courts did not have such authority where, as here, that remedy was not required by a violation of defendant's constitutional rights.

This case arose from an automobile collision in which a police officer employed by the City of Newman was driving a City police car when it was struck by a motor vehicle owned and operated by the insured, who had $25,000 of motor vehicle liability coverage. The City had a Member Coverage Agreement (Agreement) with the Georgia Interlocal Risk Management Agency (GIRMA), established under OCGA 36-85-1 et seq. The officer subsequently sued the insured in tort and served a copy of the complaint on GIRMA to notify GIRMA that it might be held responsible as an uninsured motorist carrier pursuant to OCGA 33-7-11. The court subsequently granted a writ of certiorari to the court of appeals to consider whether that court properly determined that a municipality's motor vehicle liability coverage secured through an interlocal risk management agency was not statutorily obligated to satisfy the requirements for uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage that were applied to commercial insurance policies and private self-insurance plans. The court held that the district court reached the correct conclusion when it determined that there was no authority for the conclusion that an interlocal risk management program such as that offered by GIRMA must include uninsured motorist coverage pursuant to OCGA 33-7-11. Therefore, the Agreement was limited to its express terms and did not include the underinsured motorist protection that the police officer sought. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Wife appealed the trial court's final divorce decree, contending that the district court erred in enforcing a postnuptial agreement and in determining that child custody was governed by the postnuptial agreement. The court held that the trial court's authority to find full and fair disclosure from wife's extensive familiarity with husband's business dealings and personal financial condition was not altered, but was further supported, by the affirmation in the agreement that each party had "knowingly and voluntarily chosen to forego" formal discovery, investigation, and analysis of the other party's financial condition "and accept the provisions of this agreement on [the] basis of information acquired prior to this date without further such discovery." The court also held that the trial court did not base its custody decision solely on the postnuptial agreement, but expressly and properly based that decision on its alternative application of the "best interests" standard pursuant to OCGA 19-9-3. Therefore, pretermitting the postnuptial agreement's relevance and the applicability of OCGA 19-9-5, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's custody award.

The court granted the interlocutory application of defendant to review the trial court's denial of a motion for bond defendant filed pursuant to OCGA 17-7-50. The appeal required the court to construe the statute to determine what constituted "confinement" that triggered the 90-day period within which the case of an unindicted and confined arrestee must be considered by the grand jury. The court held that, since it was undisputed that defendant was under arrest, was taken to the hospital pursuant to governmental authority, and was physically restrained during his two-day hospital stay as he was handcuffed to the hospital bed under the watchful eye of a deputy sheriff in an area of the hospital that contained jail cells, defendant was "in confinement" during his hospital stay and the 90-day period in which his case was required to be presented to the grand jury commenced on the day he was arrested. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it denied defendant's motion for bail on the charges for which defendant was arrested and held for 90 days without grand jury action. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment.

Defendant was indicted for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony when he punctured Jeffrey Waldon's femoral artery by a knife he held during a physical struggle between the two men. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that he was immune from criminal prosecution under OCGA 16-3-24.2. The trial court granted defendant's motion finding that Waldon had assaulted defendant by head-butting him in the mouth; at the time of the confrontation, defendant was in fear of death, or in fear of having a forcible felony committed against him by Waldon; and Waldon had placed defendant in reasonable fear for his life, which indicated that defendant had acted in his own self-defense pursuant to OCGA 16-3-24.2. The state appealed and the court affirmed the trial court's findings, holding that defendant would have been justified in using deadly force against Waldon to protect himself, although he was no required to do so in order to be immune from prosecution. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to determine that defendant met his burden of proving that he was entitled to immunity from prosecution pursuant to OCGA 16-3-24.2. Consequently, the state's argument that defendant somehow was not entitled to immunity because he was engaged in the crime of aggravated assault during the confrontation with Waldon was without merit.

Defendant was convicted of felony murder, aggravated assault, and concealing the death of another. The felony murder was subsequently vacated by operation of law, and the trial court merged the aggravated assault count into malice murder and sentenced defendant to life imprisonment for malice murder and to a consecutive ten-year term for concealing the death of another. After a motion for a new trial was denied, defendant appealed. The court held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court also held that the state clearly met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that venue was properly in DeKalb County not only for the murder, but also for the crime of concealing the death of another. The court further held that trial counsel did not err by failing to excuse two prospective jurors for cause and that defendant failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective during voir dire by failing to examine the two prospective jurors. The court finally held that the medical examiner's testimony was admissible and that an audio recording of a prior inconsistent statement made by defendant was admissible. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of felony murder, reckless conduct, aggravated battery, tampering with evidence, and possession of a firearm. Defendant raised several issues on appeal. The court held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to reject defendant's justification defense and find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court held, however, that the trial court erred when it sentenced defendant for felony tampering with evidence. Inasmuch as the evidence showed defendant threw the murder weapon away, thereby tampering with evidence in his own case and not that of another, he could not be convicted of a felony, but only convicted of a misdemeanor. Accordingly, it was erroneous for the trial court to impose a five-year probated sentence for the tampering with evidence conviction. The court also held that defendant's claim that the trial court erred when it allowed two witnesses to testify on cross-examination that they did not take seriously the threats made by the victim was without merit; and the charges given on justification, provocation, and voluntary manslaughter did not preclude the jury from considering defendant's claim of self-defense. The court further held that the trial court did not commit reversible error when it did not charge the jury on the issue of lack of a duty to retreat when a person acted in self-defense; when it recharged the jury on malice murder, felony murder, and voluntary manslaughter; and when it refused to give defendant's requested charge on transferred justification. The court finally held that the judgment of conviction and the sentence for reckless conduct must be vacated where the reckless conduct charge should have merged into the aggravated battery charge as a matter of fact. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims of error.

Defendant was convicted of murder and other crimes after a pool hall fight. On appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court's refusal to give a voluntary manslaughter jury instruction, the effectiveness of his trial counsel, the admission of his post-arrest statement, and the trial court's sustaining an objection to his cross examination of a state witness. The court held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to reject defendant's justification defense and find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court held that neither fear that someone was going to pull a gun nor fighting prior to a homicide were types of provocation demanding a voluntary manslaughter charge and, moreover, defendant testified that he fired because he was "just scared," and acting out of fear was not the same as acting in the heat of a sudden irresistible passion. The court further held that defendant failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; defendant's post-arrest statement was admissible where he was advised of his Miranda rights both verbally and in writing, and he signed a waiver; and the trial court did not err when it limited defendant's cross examination of the detective who interrogated him where the trial court merely imposed reasonable limits on cross examination. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.