Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of malice murder and other crimes arising out of the shooting death of his wife. Defendant appealed from the denial of his motion for a new trial. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court also held that the trial court did not err by concluding that the search of defendant's residence was authorized due to exigent circumstances and the challenged evidence was admissible at trial. The court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by holding that a witness's testimony about the victim's statements bore sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to be admissible under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule; that contrary to defendant's assertion, it followed that courts were under no obligation to place a defendant's decision whether to testify on the record and it was not error for the trial court to fail to do so here; that there was no error in the trial court's removal of a juror after concluding the juror slept through the presentation of portions of the evidence; and that defendant received effective representation of trial counsel.

A jury found defendant guilty of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, as well as to a consecutive five-year term for the weapons offense. After a motion for a new trial was denied, defendant appealed. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court also held that defendant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that trial counsel was ineffective. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of three counts of burglary, two counts of false imprisonment, two counts of kidnapping with bodily injury, two counts of armed robbery, one count of kidnapping, three counts of aggravated assault, and malice murder. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment plus 30 years and, after a motion for a new trial was denied, defendant appealed. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Husband challenged a divorce decree and the trial court's post-decree order denying his motion for a copy of the trial transcript. The court held that the trial court erred in denying the transcript motion and the court should not resolve the challenges to the divorce decree without the transcript. Accordingly, the court reversed the transcript order and remanded the case.

The court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in order to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the State Board of Worker's Compensation exceeded its authority in promulgating its Rule 205. The court held that, contrary to the analysis and resulting conclusion by the Court of Appeals, Rule 205 was not burden-shifting in the manner found and did not interfere with the substantive rights of the parties. The court also held that there was evidence to support the subject ruling that Mulligan did not sustain a subsequent compensable injury. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the order of the superior court interpreting Rule 205 was affirmed.

Appellants filed suit against all appellees for compensatory and punitive damages, asserting breach of contract, negligence, fraud, and violations of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), OCGA 16-14-1 et seq. In 2009, the trial court, inter alia, granted summary judgment to all appellees on the contract, negligence, and RICO claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grants of summary judgment. The court held that, since the Court of Appeals erred in making reliance an element of mail fraud and in affirming the grant of summary judgment to appellees based on the failure of appellants to establish reliance, the court reversed that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the grant of summary judgment to appellees on the RICO claim based on mail fraud and remanded for further proceedings. The court also held that there was no evidence in the record that would provide the basis for a fact-finder to calculate damages upon a finding of liability and therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that summary judgment was authorized due to the failure of appellants to present evidence of damages.

The court granted wife's non-frivolous application for discretionary appeal of the parties' final judgment of divorce. Wife contended, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion by entering its decree nunc pro tunc so as to eliminate a "transition period" from supervised to unsupervised visitation that the trial court had orally announced it was providing for the welfare of the couple's children. The court held that, under the unique circumstances of the case, the parties' minor children qualified here as innocent third parties whose interests were adversely affected by the entry of the visitation provision nunc pro tunc because that action eliminated a provision expressly meant for the children's best welfare. Accordingly, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion when it made the visitation period nunc pro tunc to April 13, 2010. The court held that it was unnecessary to address wife's remaining enumerations of error.

Appellant appealed his murder conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find appellant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also held that trial counsel was not ineffective and rejected appellant's contention that counsel insufficiently disputed that the attack proximately caused the victim's death; counsel gave appellant bad advice about the risks of testifying at trial; counsel should have called a certain witness; counsel did not prepare adequately to impeach certain testimony; and counsel failed to request a jury charge on the defense of abandonment. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed his convictions for felony murder while in the commission of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with a fatal shooting. On appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. The court held that defendant was not denied a fair and impartial trial and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike the entire jury panel. The court also held that there was no merit to defendant's remaining contention that the trial court erred in not directing verdicts of acquittal as to all counts in the indictment which were submitted to the jury because the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty on those charges. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted.

Appellant was convicted of felony murder during the commission of aggravated assault, as well as a weapons charge. A motion for a new trial was denied and appellant appealed. The court rejected appellant's contention that the trial court violated Edge v. State by failing to make clear in its jury instructions that the jurors were to consider voluntary manslaughter before considering whether appellant was guilty of felony murder. The court also rejected appellant's contention that the trial court erred in failing to admonish the jurors that if they found that the killing occurred as a result of provocation and passion, then they could not find appellant guilty of felony murder. Accordingly, in light of the court's precedents, the court affirmed the judgments.