Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Wife and husband were married in 1993 and, after a bench trial, were awarded a final decree of divorce on July 14, 2010. The court granted wife's application for discretionary review under this court's previously instituted Pilot Project for domestic relations cases. On appeal, wife contended that the trial court erred when it improperly designated her Scottrade account as marital property; improperly applied the source of funds rule, improperly made an erroneous finding of fact, improperly valued husband's separate property, and improperly valued property adjacent to the marital home. The court held that the trial court erred in designating the Scottrade account as marital property and the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the order denying the motion for new trial was reversed as to this issue and the matter remanded for the marital property to be equitably divided. The court also held that the trial court did not commit reversible error in its varied treatment of husband's office and of the $210,000 funds from wife's Scottrade account. The court further held that there was no merit in wife's claim that husband's testimony, regarding his contribution, was insufficient proof where the trial court had the right to credit husband's testimony on that matter. The court finally held that the trial court did not err in applying the source funds rule where wife had acquiesced to the trial court's use of county tax records to determine the value of the various real estate properties at issue. The court sustained the trial court's denial of the motion for new trial where wife's remaining enumeration of error was without merit.

Defendant sought reversal of his convictions for malice murder, three counts of aggravated assault, and four counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion where defendant had not shown the requisite prejudice from the denial of his motion to sever. The trial court further held that trial counsel's failure to renew the motion to sever did not constitute deficient performance. The court finally held that the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance that defendant had requested the morning the trial was scheduled to commence was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed from the denial of his motion for new trial following his conviction of malice murder and other related crimes. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court reversed defendant's conviction on the charge of conspiracy to violate the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, OCGA 16-4-8, because the language of the indictment could be read to charge individuals with conspiracy who, under Georgia law, could not conspire with one another to violate the Act and because the trial court failed to eliminate the possibility for error by instructing jurors that they would not be authorized to convict defendant of conspiracy based merely on his participation with the sellers in the drug transaction. The court also held that defendant's assertion that the trial court improperly expanded the indictment was moot because defendant's felony murder conviction was vacated by operation of law based on his conviction for the charge of malice murder. The court rejected defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The warden appealed the grant of defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus where the petition was granted on the basis that defendant had ineffective assistance of counsel at his probation revocation and re-adjudication hearing due to what it characterized as counsel's failure to investigate defendant's mental health condition. The court held that the determination that counsel was guilty of failure to investigate defendant's mental health condition, and that such ostensible failure constituted a profession deficiency failed as a matter of fact and law. The court held that the habeas court erred in finding actual prejudice under Strickland where defendant did not offer any evidence to establish prejudice. Accordingly, the habeas court's finding of ineffectiveness was contrary to law and the court reversed the grant of defendant's petition.

Plaintiff filed a suit against two county police officers in their individual capacities, contending that the officers negligently operated their vehicles by causing plaintiff to lose control of his vehicle and crash. Plaintiff sustained bodily injuries and plaintiff's son was killed in the crash. At issue was whether OCGA 36-92-3 was unconstitutional because it was not part of the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA), OCGA 50-21-20 et seq. The court held that the trial court properly denied plaintiff's claim and properly granted summary judgment in favor of the officers where the Legislature was not limited to waiver of immunity solely in the GTCA and where the Legislature extended immunity to county employees like the officers in a section of the Georgia Code specifically applicable to counties, demonstrating that it had the constitutional authority to enact OCGA 36-92-3.

Defendant was convicted of and sentenced for the malice murder, aggravated assault, and armed robbery of the victim, as well as possession of a knife during the commission of an armed robbery. Defendant appealed his convictions, contending that the aggravated assault and armed robbery convictions merged into the malice murder conviction and the sentences imposed for aggravated assault and armed robbery should be vacated. The court agreed that the aggravated assault merged into the malice murder conviction and vacated the sentence imposed for aggravated assault. However, using the "required evidence" test of Drinkard v. Walker, the court held that armed robbery did not merge into malice murder because malice murder had an element that must be proven that armed robbery did not, and armed robbery had an element that malice murder did not. Therefore, defendant's conviction and sentence for armed robbery was affirmed.

Defendant was found guilty of malice murder, possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant appealed after the denial of a motion for new trial. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court concluded that it was error for the trial court to refuse defendant's request to charge the jury on unlawful act involuntary manslaughter. The court held, however, that the error was harmless where there was overwhelming evidence inconsistent with defendant's version of events, but supportive of the jury's finding that defendant was guilty of malice murder. The court held that defendant's contention that the trial court erred by not excluding from evidence inculpatory statements made by defendant to the police on the ground that they were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given, was without merit where the officer's comment at issue was simply an encouragement to tell the truth, which did not amount to a "hope of benefit" under OCGA 24-3-50. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendants appealed convictions related to the starvation and extreme malnourishment of their infant son. The court held that evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that both defendants were guilty of the crimes for which they were convicted. The court also held that defendants waived their claim of prosecutorial misconduct when the prosecutor elicited testimony during cross-examination of a medical expert because neither defendant made any objection at the time of the testimony. The court further held that defendants failed to meet their burden of demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed from a murder conviction in connection with a stabbing death. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions on all counts. The court also held that, because the record showed that every police officer that was on duty that day had actual knowledge of facts sufficient to support a finding of probable cause, the seizure of defendant's bloody clothes after arrest was proper. The court further held that defendant's right against self-incrimination was not violated where defendant did not perform any act against his will to incriminate himself. On the contrary, defendant surrendered his clothes when asked to do so and moreover, the police were entitled to seize the clothes, which were in his immediate possession, because he had already been lawfully arrested. The court finally held that defendant's requested charge was an incorrect statement of law and the trial court did not err in failing to give the requested charge. The court rejected defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Defendant was convicted in 2003 of murder and other crimes. In 2010, defendant filed a post-conviction motion in which he asked the trial court to amend his transcript to reflect that defendant had been restrained during his trial by the use of a stun belt. The court held that defendant never adduced any evidence to support his assertion that he actually wore a stun belt at his trial. Therefore, the court held that because defendant failed to carry his burden of proving by the record that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to amend the trial transcript, the court affirmed the judgment.