Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of felony possession of a controlled substance and felony possession of drugs not in their original container where, during a search incident to arrest, police officers found in defendant's pockets three loose tablets of a substance which proved to be Zolpidem Tartrate, a prescription sleeping aid also known by the brand name Ambien. At issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred "in affirming the defendant's convictions for possession of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance not in its original container, and in particular, in construing OCGA 16-13-30(a) and 16-13-75 not to require the defendant to know that the pills he possessed were a controlled substance." The court held that the criminal intent required by OCGA 16-13-30(a) and 16-13-75 was intent to possess a drug with knowledge of the chemical identity of that drug. Therefore, the court held that defendant's knowledge of the chemical identity of the substance in his possession was purely a question of fact and as such, it should have been a question for the jury and the jury should have been instructed to consider the defense of mistake of fact. Accordingly, because defendant's request for such an instruction was erroneously denied by the trial court, defendant was entitled to a new trial and the judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed.

Defendant was found guilty of felony murder, the underlying felony of aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. After a motion for a new trial was filed by defendant and denied by the trial court, he appealed to the Court of Appeals, which transferred the case to this court. The court held that the evidence was more than sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court held however, that the count that alleged aggravated assault upon the person of his co-defendant must merge into the felony murder count, which alleged that defendant caused the death of the victim while in the commission of aggravated assault upon the person of the co-defendant. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims that the trial court set pre-trial bond in an excessive and unreasonable amount; that the trial court erred in allowing the joinder of his case and the co-defendant's case over objection; that the trial court erred in failing to give a cautionary instruction; that certain statements made to the jury by the trial court were prejudicial; and that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in part and vacated in part.

Husband and wife were married in 1983 and wife filed a petition for an uncontested divorce on April 26, 2000. The trial court signed a final decree granting a divorce on June 1, but the decree was not filed with the clerk until August 1, 2002. In the meantime, husband and wife, believing they had already been divorced, were married again on June 25, 2000. Wife filed a complaint for divorce on June 29, 2010 where the parties, soon thereafter, learned that the final decree of divorce was not filed in the previous action until August 1, 2002. At issue was whether a nunc pro tunc order could be used to backdate the entry of a divorce decree. The court held that the entry of the divorce decree nunc pro tunc to the date of the signing of the decree was advantageous to husband, as well as wife, because it accurately reflected his intention to re-enter the bond of marriage on June 25, 2000. Accordingly, the court held that the trial court did not err in asking wife's counsel to prepare the nunc pro tunc order and the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual battery, cruelty to children, and four counts of child molestation. At issue was whether two police officers' interview with defendant was properly admitted into evidence where defendant alleged that the officers failed to cease interrogation after he invoked his right to counsel. The court held that defendant's first statement referencing an attorney constituted only a limited request for an attorney. The court held, however, that the second statement requesting an attorney without any limitation or selective waiver, indicated that, based upon the seriousness of the charges, defendant needed to discuss his case with a lawyer before talking with the officers. Therefore, because the erroneous admission at trial of defendant's recorded statements to the officers was not harmless, the Court of Appeal's affirmance of the trial court's judgments was reversed.

Defendant appealed his conviction for felony murder of a homeless man (victim) in downtown Decatur, Georgia. At issue was whether the trial court should have excluded testimony of three witnesses regarding prior difficulties between defendant and the victim. Also at issue was whether the jury should have been instructed on the law regarding involuntary manslaughter and simple battery as lesser included offenses. The court held that counsel for defendant had stated that he saw no basis to exclude the testimony from the first witness and thus, the trial court correctly ruled that review of the issue was waived. In any event, the evidence was admissible where defendant adopted as his own the statement that "we" beat up the victim, and would do so again. The court also held that there was no hearsay in the testimony from the second witness where the witness testified as to his observations. The court rejected defendant's claim that the testimony of the third witness did not bear indicia of reliability where the circumstances of the victim's statements indicated otherwise and the victim had no apparent reason to lie to the third witness where his statements were part of spontaneous exchanges with the witness, and the victim's face was visibly swollen at the time he spoke to the witness. The court finally held that the trial court, noting that the evidence was undisputed that the victim was seriously disfigured, did not commit plain error in concluding that only a charge on the greater offense of aggravated battery was warranted. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff, the non-profit corporation that served as the homeowners association for the Skidway Island Community, sued defendants claiming that defendants did not own a strip of land which was located between defendants' eastern boundary line of their property and the marshlands that were located to the east of their property. At issue was whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment in part for plaintiffs, finding that the property at issue was owned by plaintiffs, in that it had been transferred by deed from The Branigar Organization (Branigar), the entity that previously owned the property, to plaintiffs and finding that defendants did not gain title to the property in question by prescription. The court held that because the undisputed evidence revealed that plaintiffs gained title to the disputed property through a proper conveyance from Branigar and that the land in question was not owned by any other entity, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on its claim of holding the valid title to the property. The court also held that there was no deadline by which the common areas had to be conveyed in order for the conveyances to be valid. The court further held that the trial court did not err in finding that defendants' claim for prescriptive title failed as a matter of law. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder, aggravated assault, hindering the apprehension of a criminal, and tampering with the evidence. Defendant raised several issues on appeal. The court held that the offense of hindering the apprehension of a criminal was the equivalent of the common law crime of being an accessory after the fact and that a party could not be convicted both of being a principal to the crime and an accessory after the fact. Therefore, the court held that defendant correctly contended that he could not be convicted of both malice murder and hindering the apprehension of a criminal, but he incorrectly argued that the remedy was to set aside his conviction for malice murder. The court held that the conviction for hindering must be set aside and therefore, affirmed defendant's conviction for malice murder. The court further held that, because defendant must be given the benefit of the doubt in construing his ambiguous verdict, the court vacated his felony tampering sentence and remanded for misdemeanor sentencing where the verdict form simply contained a finding of guilt on the tampering count, making it impossible to determine if the jury found defendant guilty of misdemeanor or felony tampering. The court finally held that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's recusal claim, did not abuse its discretion in controlling cross-examination, and the court had the authority to enter the sentences regardless of any prior convictions.

Defendant appealed his convictions for malice murder, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. At issue was whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the law regarding being a party to a crime because he was indicted alone and no other person was alleged to be a perpetrator. Also at issue was whether trial counsel failed to provide effective representation. The court held that the law was well-settled in Georgia that the state was not required to specify in the indictment that it was charging defendant as a party to the crime, the evidence was uncontroverted that defendant arranged his cousin's friend's interaction with the victims, and the evidence authorized the court to instruct the jury on the law regarding party to a crime. The court also held that defendant failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

This case stemmed from the "catchmekiller" YouTube website and videos in which defendant made and posted two videos that were part of an online murder mystery "game" for participants who could post and review comments on YouTube to learn the identity of the "catchmekiller." Defendant was convicted of violating OCGA 16-10-94 by tampering with evidence with intent to prevent the apprehension and obstruct the prosecution of another person and violating OCGA 16-10-20 by making a false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI). Defendant appealed, among other things, that OCGA 16-10-20 was unconstitutional on its face and as applied because it infringed the freedom of speech. The court held that the false statement statute, when properly construed to require that defendant make the false statement with knowledge and intent that it could come within the jurisdiction of a state or local government agency, was constitutional. The jury correctly charged on this element, the evidence was sufficient to prove it and the other elements of an OCGA 16-10-20 violation, and defendant's asserted error regarding the GBI's jurisdiction was without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the false statement conviction. The court, however, reversed defendant's tampering with evidence conviction because the evidence at trial failed to prove that he made false evidence with the specific intent to prevent the apprehension or obstruct the prosecution of another.

These appeals arose from trial court orders granting preliminary injunctions and appointing receivers to take control of the assets of certain stores and operate them. In each of the five stores, the state filed civil actions under the Georgia RICO statute, OCGA 16-14-1 et seq., and named as in personam defendants the purported owners and operators of the stores, alleging that defendants each engaged in two or more acts of illegal commercial gambling. Defendants appealed the trial court's order granting the state's motions for interlocutory injunctions, which continued in effect the terms of the temporary restraining orders and continued the receivership. The court held that a RICO forfeiture was a proceeding that could be initiated by the state pursuant to OCGA 16-14-7 and that the procedures surrounding the orders granting the injunctions and continuing the receiverships did not violate due process where defendants were afforded the opportunity to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and present arguments. The court also held that the trial court's consideration of the question of in rem forfeitures constituting unconstitutionally excessive fines was premature, and the cases must be remanded for consideration of those issues when properly presented. The court further held that the evidence presented did demonstrate a pattern of racketeering activity; that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding the issues where it recited equitable arguments of both parties; and that the trial court did not err in denying defendants' motion to recuse a judge. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings.