Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The trustee of a testamentary trust that was a beneficiary of the last will and testament of the late Edgar Hollis filed an action seeking an accounting, the removal of appellant who was the executor of the estate, and damages resulting from appellant's purported breach of his fiduciary duty. Appellant subsequently appealed the grant of summary judgment. The court held that it agreed with the trial court's construction of the Hollis will where the executor breached his fiduciary duties when he offered the Newnan-Coweta Historical Society a bequest declined by the City of Newnan. The court also held that the fact that appellant gathered some of the estate's assets did not preclude a finding of breach of fiduciary duty based on the fact that he did not gather all of the assets; that the trial court erred in determining that the trustee and temporary administrator were entitled to expenses of litigation pursuant to OCGA 13-6-11; and that the record appendix submitted to the court did not contain a request for oral hearing and the trial court was not required to hear oral argument on the motion prior to ruling on it. The court further held that the trial court did not err when it allowed petitioners, the City of Newnan and the Newnan-Coweta Historial Society, to intervene where appellant consented to the intervention and it appeared that petitioners were named in the Hollis will as a beneficiary and a successor beneficiary. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Defendant appealed his convictions for felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of the victim. Defendant raised several issues of error on appeal. The court held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to conclude that defendant and his co-conspirator intended to rob the victim using a deadly weapon, that the victim was reasonably apprehensive of receiving a violent injury as a result of their intentional acts, and that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, defendant possessed the intent required to commit the predicate felonies for his felony murder conviction. The court also held that the record fully supported the court's findings that defendant's incriminating statement was voluntary and that he was advised of but did not invoke his right to counsel or his right to remain silent until well into the interview, which the officers then properly ended their questioning. The court also held that the trial court had broad discretion in dismissing a juror who failed to provide accurate information during voir dire and thus, defendant's claim lacked merit. The court further held that the trial court erred in overruling defendant's hearsay objection but the error was harmless. The court finally held that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a close-up crime photograph of the victim and admitting the brown jumpsuit the police obtained from the motel. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of burglary and criminal trespass when defendant asserted that he entered a home through an unlocked door because he thought he saw a "for sale by owner" and "open house" signs posted in front of the home and was assisting his mother in looking for a house. At issue was whether the court of appeals properly found no error in the trial court's failure to charge the jury as to the defense of mistake of fact. The court held that, if in connection with defendant's defense to burglary, defendant presented evidence that the act that he committed that would have otherwise constituted burglary was induced by a misapprehension of fact that would have made him innocent of the charges, the trial court was required to charge the jury on "mistake of fact" unless the charge given otherwise fairly presented all of the issues to the jury. The court also held that the trial court's error in failing to charge the jury was not harmless and therefore, the judgment was reversed.

Plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against defendant alleging, inter alia, negligence in that plaintiff made numerous telephone calls to the motel the night before her husband died, and when she was unable to reach him, she alerted the motel operators of the possibility that her husband was in need of medical aid. However, the motel operators refused to comply with her requests to check on him. At issue was whether the court of appeals erred in concluding as a matter of law that defendant had no duty to comply with plaintiff's requests to attempt a rescue of her husband from his medical peril. The court held that innkeepers did not have a duty to investigate or check on their guests to determine if they were in medical need. Therefore, the court need not determine whether any duty to render or summon medical aid under section 314(A)(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts should be adopted in Georgia. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed.

Appellants, former sworn officers of the Atlanta Police Department, appealed the grant of summary judgment to the Policemen's Pension Fund Board of Trustees (Board) in appellants' action seeking a writ of mandamus and an award of damages. While appellants were receiving disability pensions, the Atlanta City Council increased the multiplier used in calculating pensions from two percent to three percent in Ordinance 00-O-1099 and the ordinance was "applicable to all active sworn police officers employed as of the effective date" of the ordinance. At issue was whether the Board should use the three percent multiplier in calculating appellants' pension entitlements. The court held that there was no evidence presented that appellants were "active sworn officers" on the effective date of the new ordinance and in fact, it was alleged in the complaint that they were not. Accordingly, appellants were not entitled to the three percent multiplier and the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. At issue was whether defendant's public defender had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest inhering in his representation of defendant. The court held that defendant failed to establish how counsel's past employment as city attorney and solicitor actually affected his representation in any way. The court also rejected defendant's other claims. Therefore, the court held that defendant's motion for a new trial should have been denied in its entirety. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant, a limited liability company that speculated in real estate, brought this appeal to challenge the ruling of the trial court upholding the constitutionality of OCGA 9-13-172.1, authorizing the rescission of foreclosure sales under certain conditions, in its suit against appellee, Countrywide Home Loans (Countrywide), in which appellant asserted it was entitled as high bidder to delivery of the Deed Under Power to the home of appellees, James and Tammi Garland. The court held that the trial court properly upheld the constitutionality of OCGA 9-13-172.1 and correctly found that Countrywide was authorized to and properly rescinded the sale to appellant. The court did not address appellant's remaining arguments.

Defendant challenged his 2005 convictions for murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting deaths of two victims. The court held that the trial court did not err in concluding that defendant's statements made to the police were made freely and voluntarily and that the trial court did not violate Brown v. Illinois by admitting defendant's statements to the officers. The court also held that defendant's remaining enumerations of error were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiffs appealed from an order granting summary judgment to defendant for the alleged breach of an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) entered into by the parties for the distribution of funds generated by a special sales tax instituted pursuant to the Homestead Option Sales and Use Tax Act (HOST), OCGA 48-8-100 et seq. At issue was whether the IGA was unconstitutional as violative of the Intergovernmental Contracts Clause of the Georgia Constitution, 1983 Ga. Const., Art. IX, Sec. III, Par. I(a). The court held that the IGA was not a valid intergovernmental contract where the IGA was neither a contract for services or one for the use of facilities, but a revenue-sharing contract. Therefore, summary judgment was properly granted to defendant.

Appellee filed a post-judgment garnishment action against a bank in Athens, Georgia, that purportedly held assets of the judgment debtor. At issue was whether the court of appeals erred in holding that substantial compliance with the notice requirements of OCGA 18-4-64(a) was sufficient. The court held that the court of appeals erred when it held that appellee's untimely notification of appellant substantially complied with the requirements of OCGA 18-4-64(a) where the rules of statutory construction were not applicable when the statute was plain and unambiguous.