Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from a motor vehicle collision in which six people were killed and several were injured. The driver of one of the vehicles drove with a passenger to a convenient store while intoxicated and purchased a 12 pack of beer. The driver and the passenger consumed the beer and subsequently ran head-on into a van going the opposite way. At issue was whether Georgia's Dram Shop Act (Act), OCGA 51-1-40, applied when a convenience store sold closed or packaged containers of alcohol not intended for consumption on the premises to a noticeably intoxicated adult. The court held that the Act did apply where, if a convenience store sold alcohol to such a customer, it was foreseeable that the customer would drive while intoxicated and injure an innocent third party and where, if the plaintiff could prove that such sale of alcohol was a proximate cause of any injuries, the convenience store would be held liable. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.

Plaintiff, a prisoner who was incarcerated 22 months past his release date, sued appellants alleging that they failed to comply with OCGA 42-5-50(a) by notifying the Department of Corrections (DOC) of his amended sentence. At issue was whether the court of appeals correctly found that appellants, in their respective individual capacities as Clerk of the Superior Court of Fulton County and an employee in that office, were entitled to official immunity for their actions in regard to OCGA 42-5-50(a). The court held that because the specific actions mandated by OCGA 42-5-50(a) were ministerial and were unambiguously triggered by the amended order, the court of appeals correctly concluded they were not within the scope of official immunity and reversed the trial court's ruling to the contrary. The court disapproved, however, of the court of appeal's holding to the extent that it was based upon the law of the case doctrine.

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant seeking a declaratory injunction that defendant did not have an easement on their property, damages for trespass and conversion for a 2007 and 2008 incident, an injunction against further trespass, and attorney fees. Defendant asserted as a defense that the lawsuit was filed after the one-year statute of limitations under OCGA 46-3-204. At issue was whether summary judgment against plaintiffs was proper. The court affirmed the trial court's rejection of plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to the one-year statute of limitations. The court then affirmed in part and reversed in part the grant of summary judgment because issues of material fact remained regarding the existence of a valid prescriptive easement and plaintiffs' trespass and conversion claims based on defendant's 2008 actions were not barred by OCGA 46-3-204.

Defendant was convicted for aggravated assault, concealing the death of another, and possession of a firearm in the commission of a crime. At issue was whether the jury instruction on aggravated assault must include an instruction on simple assault. The court held that there was no need for the trial court to instruct the jury on simple assault in connection with its charge on aggravated assault where, as here, the jury had already been properly instructed on general intent and there was no question regarding the perpetrator's intent in shooting the victim (and then shooting him three more times after that). Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder, burglary and other crimes arising out of the shotgun killing of the victim. Defendant appealed from the denial of his motion for a new trial challenging the admission of the co-indictee's videotaped statements to police officers, the effectiveness of his trial counsel, and the trial court's charge to the jury. The court held that, under the circumstances, it was highly probable that any error in admitting the co-indictee's prior statements did not contribute to the verdict and was therefore, harmless. The court also held that defendant failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel or that the trial court erred in its charge to the jury. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion for a new trial.

After an automobile driven by defendant struck and killed the victim, a grand jury returned a two-count indictment against defendant. At issue was whether Count I of the indictment was properly dismissed because it lacked any specific facts supporting the reckless driving allegation. The court held that the trial court's order dismissing Count I of the indictment was not a final order and that Count II remained in the trial court. Accordingly, by the plain terms of OCGA 5-7-2, a certificate of immediate review was required. The court also held that the State did not secure the required certificate, and the order granting the special demurrer as to Count I was thus not appealable. Consequently, it was error for the Court of Appeals to affirm the trial court where the appeal should have been dismissed by that court and therefore, the judgment was vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

Appellants filed a petition to quiet title against all the world as to two parcels of land (Tracts 1 and 1A) in Lavonia, asserting a claim of slander of title against Hartwell Railroad Company (Hartwell). Hartwell only disputed appellants' title to the .67 acres of land comprising Tract 1A, claiming that the property was within the 100-foot right-of-way it held on either side of its railroad running through Lavonia. An appointed special master issued an order subsequently adopted by the trial court granting Hartwell's motion and denying appellants' motion. Appellants appealed, arguing that the trial court erroneously concluded that Hartwell held undisputed record and prescriptive title to Tract 1A by relying on certain inadmissible evidence. The court held that, even if the court determined that the trial court erred by concluding that Hartwell had title to Tract 1A as a matter of law, appellants would not be entitled to a reversal of the summary judgment entered in Hartwell's favor in view of the trial court's unchallenged rulings that appellants, as a matter of law, could not prove their own title to the property. As such, appellants could not benefit from resolution of the issues on appeal and the appeal was dismissed as moot.

Appellant was convicted of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of his stepson. Appellant raised several issues of error on appeal. The court held that the trial court did not err by failing to give the jury appellant's request to charge the jury on defense of habitation; by failing to charge the jury on the defense of justification; by denying the motions for mistrial; and by charging the jury on voluntary intoxication. The court also held that appellant did not have ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

In November 2003, defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity of several crimes, including aggravated assault, and subsequently involuntarily committed to the Northwest Georgia Regional Hospital (hospital). In August 2009, the hospital petitioned the committing court for defendant's unconditional release, alleging that he no longer met "the civil commitment criteria under Chapter 3 of Title 37," OCGA 17-7-131(f). The committing court denied the petition and the Superior Court denied defendant's petition for habeas corpus. At issue was whether the habeas court erred in denying defendant's release where defendant met the standard for involuntary inpatient treatment. The court held that the evidence in the record supported the habeas court's finding that defendant was not entitled to unconditional release where defendant's personality disorders and his schizo-affective disorder qualified as mental illnesses under OCGA 37-1-1(12); where defendant's paranoid and antisocial personality disorders made him an imminent threat of harm to others if he were released; and where defendant had recently committed a violent act toward another patient.

Defendant appealed from his convictions for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. At issue was whether the evidence was insufficient and whether the trial court erred in admitting similar transaction evidence. The court held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to reject defendant's claim of self-defense and to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. The court also held that the trial court gave a proper limiting instruction regarding the jury's use of the evidence where both shootings occurred in a vehicle and involved the same gun, which defendant took from his roommate without permission and hid from the police after each shooting, and where, on both occasions, defendant gave false statements to the police. Therefore, the admission of the similar transaction was clearly not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.