Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol per se based on evidence from the Intoxilyzer 5000 that her blood alcohol level was .156 grams, over the legal limit of .08 grams. Defendant appealed the trial court's refusal to issue an order requesting issuance of a summons to the Kentucky corporation which employed the individual defendant sought to have summoned to Georgia where defendant was seeking the source code of the Intoxilyzer 5000. At issue was whether the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial court's refusal to issue an order requesting issuance of a summons to the Kentucky resident where the trial court had not abused its discretion in declining to issue the order because defendant had not carried her burden of showing that the out-of-state person was "a necessary and material witness to the case." The court held that, in light of OCGA 24-10-97, the court construed "material witness" as a "witness who could testify about matters having some logical connection with the consequential facts, esp. if few others, if any, know about these matters." Since the proper statute was not applied to this case, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence per se based on evidence that the Intoxilyzer 5000 recorded her blood alcohol concentration as .179 grams, a result over the legal limit of .08 grams. Defendant argued that the trial court erred when it denied her pre-trial motion to obtain the source code for the Intoxilyzer 5000 possessed by a Kentucky corporation because the evidence was neither material nor relevant. At issue was whether the Court of Appeals properly upheld the trial court's ruling under the "right for any reason rule" and affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the Uniform Act, OCGA 24-10-90, et seq., could be used to obtain the presence and testimony of an out-of-state witness and evidence in the possession of the witness, but it could not be used to request only the production of evidence located in another state. The court held that the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that a request under the Uniform Act, that an out-of-state corporation be required to produce purportedly material evidence in its possession, must be accompanied by the identification as a material witness of the corporate agent through which the corporation was to act. Should the certificate of materiality be issued by the Georgia court, it was for the Kentucky corporation to identify the human agent through whom it would act, perhaps in conjunction with the hearing that would be held in Kentucky upon receipt of the Georgia certificate of materiality. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed his 1984 conviction of malice murder. At issue was whether defendant's guilty plea was invalid under Boykin v. Alabama because the State failed to meet its burden of showing that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right against self-incrimination. The court held that the State did not fulfill its duty to ensure that defendant's guilty plea was constitutionally valid; it apparently did not ensure that he was advised of and had effective representation regarding his right to appeal his conviction; and it did not litigate the merits of defendant's guilty plea in his habeas corpus hearings, where the record might have been expanded. Consequently, defendant's conviction must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant owned and operated the Sewell Creek Energy Facility, a "peaking" power plant that began operating in 2000. Appellees, neighbors of the power plant, filed suit in 2007 alleging that the power plant constituted a nuisance. At issue was whether appellants were entitled to summary judgment where the power plant was either a permanent nuisance or continuing nuisance that could be abated. The court found that the power plant's exhaust silencing system, which was an integral part of the gas turbines that generated power, was an enduring feature of the power plant's plan of construction and the noise emanating from the exhaust stacks resulted from the essential method of the plant's operation. Consequently, the exhaust stacks were a permanent nuisance. Thus, the court held that the Court of Appeals erred when it omitted any consideration of whether the nuisance resulted from an enduring feature of the power plant's plan of construction or an essential method of its operation and grappled only with whether the nuisance could be abated at "slight expense." The court held that appellees' action was barred under the statute of limitation for permanent nuisances because they did not file their lawsuit until almost seven years after the plant became operational, unless some new harm that was not previously observable occurred within the four years preceding the filing of their cause of action. The court also held that, to the extent the trial court found that a factual issue remained concerning whether there was an "adverse change in the nature" of the noises and vibrations coming from the plant after the start of the 2004 operating season, the denial of summary judgment was appropriate. By contrast, to the extent that the trial court found that a factual issue remained concerning whether there was an "adverse change in the... extent and amount" of the noises and vibrations after the 2004 operating season, the denial of summary judgment was inappropriate. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Appellant sued appellees for breach of contract where the parties entered into a contract for appellant to build a house for appellees. After trial, the jury found that appellees did not breach the contract and awarded no actual damages but $16,552 in attorney fees. Appellant appealed the trial court's denial of its motion to amend the verdict to strike the attorney fee award on the grounds that it was improper under OCGA 13-6-11. The court held that, to the extent the attorney fee award was based on OCGA 13-6-11, the Court of Appeals erred in relying on waiver to affirm the award. The court also held that, because the Court of Appeals did not address appellees' alternative argument that the award was properly based on the parties contract rather than OCGA 13-6-11, the court declined to address the alternative argument. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded.

Cobb Electric Membership Corporation ("Cobb EMC") members filed a derivative action against Cobb EMC and the parties subsequently entered into a settlement agreement. At issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred by failing to defer to the trial court's determination that Cobb EMC's Board of Directors ("Board") was authorized to adopt the proxy voting bylaw agreement. Also at issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the use of the proxy voting pursuant to the Board's bylaw amendment violated the provision of the settlement agreement. The court held that although the Court of Appeals mischaracterized the nature of the issue on appeal, it did utilize the correct standard for reviewing the trial court's legal conclusions, i.e., de novo review. The court also held that while it agreed with the conclusion that the Board's proxy voting bylaw amendment violated the terms of the settlement agreement, the Court of Appeal's reasoning was not the basis upon which the court's conclusion rested. The court held, nevertheless, that the Board's proxy voting bylaw amendment violated the trial court order approving the settlement agreement because it significantly changed the conditions under the parties' agreed-upon plan for proposing the option of proxy voting. The court finally held that, because the trial court's May 2009 order did not address the "full cooperation" requirement of its previous order, the Court of Appeals erred in considering the issue. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Defendant was convicted of two counts each of murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault and was sentenced to death for each of the murders. At issue was whether the trial court erred in its order addressing what burden and standard of proof should apply to defendant's claim that he was mentally retarded; regarding the order of opening statements and closing arguments in the mental retardation phase; and by ruling that it lacked authority to accept a plea of guilty but mentally retarded. The court held that the trial court erred regarding the burden of proof where Georgia's statutory definition of mental retardation, with its requirement that only mental deficiencies capable of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, was not unconstitutional under Atkins v. Virginia; that the trial court did not err by ruling that standard criminal procedures would apply to defendant's retrial on the issue of mental retardation pursuant to OCGA 17-8-71; and that the trial court erred by ruling that it lacked the authority to consider any plea bargain that the parties might be willing to enter into. The court declined to address any additional issues defendant had raised and affirmed the judgment in part and reversed in part.

These related appeals concern the rights of certain sign companies to construct billboards in areas formerly located in unincorporated Fulton County that are now located in the recently created cities of Sandy Springs, Milton, and Johns Creek and a recently annexed portion of the city of Alpharetta (collectively, "cities"). At issue was whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the sign companies based on its determination that the companies had a vested right to erect the billboards as of the date of their applications were filed. The court rejected the county and cities' arguments and held that the sign companies had vested rights to construct the billboards at issue where there were no valid ordinances regulating the construction of billboards at the time the applications were filed and the sign companies were entitled to construct, maintain, and operate all signs for which they submitted applications. Accordingly, the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the sign companies was affirmed.

Nu-Day Partnership, LLLP, ("Nu-Day"), a family limited partnership, filed an action against Norma Day for, among other things, quiet title in an attempt to clarify that Nu-Day was still the owner of certain property in Atlanta ("Bishop Street property"). At issue was whether Lon Day's 2001 transfer of his interest in LLD Management to his children was an ultra vires act and therefore void. The court held that an ultra vires act had nothing to do with the actions of an individual who simply chose to transfer his own interest in a company to other individuals, as such actions had nothing to do with the corporation itself acting beyond the scope of its legal authority. The court also held that the record indicated that Lon Day clearly intended to, and did, in fact, execute legal documents that transferred all of his interest in LLD Management to his children, who served as sole owners of Nu-Day.

Appellee filed an application for contempt after appellant failed to make the first installment payment on the lake house the parties owned and missed the July and August child support and home maintenance payments pursuant to a Divorce Agreement Settlement. At issue was whether the trial court impermissibly modified the divorce decree by requiring appellant to put the lake house on the market and pay appellee the money he owed her from the proceeds of the sale. The court held that the record supported the trial court's finding that appellant willfully failed to meet the extended deadline of the final consent order and therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in holding him in contempt of the final consent order. The court held, however, that the court erred in ordering appellant to sell the lake house in order to pay appellee. The court further held that the trial court did not err by requiring appellant to pay appellee for interest in the lake house and rejected appellant's claim that the attorney fee award was erroneous.