Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mother and Father were divorced pursuant to a Final Decree in March 2009 which gave the parties joint legal custody of their minor child and named Mother as the primary legal custodian. Father then filed a complaint to modify child custody in June 2009 and the trial court transferred primary legal and physical custody of the child to him. Mother appealed from the ruling and contended that the trial court erred by transferring primary custody to Father based on Mother's planned move to New York. Mother also claimed that the trial court erred by failing to make written findings of fact regarding the material change in circumstances that justified the change in custody to Father. The court held that, in light of the trial court's consideration of the evidence and the best interest of the child, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by changing primary custody to the Father. The court also held that the record was devoid of any request by either party for written findings. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court awarding primary custody to Father was affirmed.

Appellant was convicted of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with a March 2004 shooting. At issue was whether the district court erred when it denied appellant's motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did not act in self-defense and that he was guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. The court also held that defendant, while alleging that counsel was ineffective in a number of respects, failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that counsel was deficient and that a reasonable probability existed that the outcome would have been different. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was indicted for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and two counts of burglary and rejected the State's plea agreement. At issue was whether defendant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to advise him that if he rejected the State's plea offer, he would face a mandatory sentence of life without parole if convicted on the armed robbery count. The court concluded that, if trial counsel, before the expiration of the State's plea offer, had investigated the facts of the case, informed defendant that his alibi witnesses would not testify, advised defendant that he faced a mandatory sentence of life without parole if convicted at trial, and proffered his own informed opinion as to whether defendant should accept or reject the plea offer, it was quite evident that defendant not only would have been amenable to the State's plea offer but actually would have accepted it. Therefore, the court held that defendant demonstrated that he received ineffective assistance of counsel where defendant had shown both that his trial counsel was deficient and that he was prejudiced by these deficiencies. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was convicted of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. At issue was whether the trial court erred by not exercising its discretion in its review of the motion for new trial when assessing whether the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence and whether a miscarriage of justice may have resulted. The court vacated the judgment and remanded to the trial court for consideration of the motion for new trial under the appropriate discretionary standard where the sufficiency of the evidence standard and the discretionary standard addressed two distinct legal issues and where the trial court erred by not exercising its discretion pursuant to OCGA 5-5-21.

Husband appealed the final judgment of divorce and of an order, which he claimed held him in contempt of a temporary order. At issue was whether the trial court erred in awarding wife alimony because husband alleged that wife failed to show a need for alimony; husband had no ability to pay alimony because he was disabled and unemployed; and wife's misconduct and the short duration of the marriage made alimony inappropriate. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding wife alimony because there was some evidence in the record to support the award and it was not made pursuant to an erroneous legal analysis where wife was disabled due to her medical problems and needed alimony; where both husband's living expenses and costs to keep wife on his health insurance were lower than he claimed; and where husband's long-term disability income, future earnings, and personal property would enable him to keep wife on his health insurance for two years and make her car payments for one year. The court also reviewed the record and concluded that the trial court did not err in dividing the parties' property. The court further held that the trial court, in fact, did not hold husband in contempt. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of divorce.

Appellant was indicted on charges of rape, aggravated assault, and two counts of cruelty to children. At issue was whether the habeas court erred by finding that appellant's guilty plea was valid in light of the multiple statements made by the trial court during the plea proceedings. The court held that the judicial participation in appellant's plea negotiations was so great as to render his guilty plea involuntary where the trial court repeatedly stated that it would impose a longer sentence if appellant went to trial and, indeed would prefer that he go to trial so that the trial judge could "give [appellant] what I would really like to give him." Accordingly, the court reversed the habeas court's denial of appellant's petition where he agreed to enter a guilty plea with terms far less favorable than those originally negotiated after hearing such statements from the trial court.

Defendant was indicted for homicide by vehicle in July 2008 where he was accused of causing the other occupant of the car's death by recklessly speeding and failing to maintain his lane. When defendant's attorney hired an investigator to find the car, the car had been purchased by a salvager in January 2008 who cleaned, repaired, repainted, and resold the vehicle. At issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred in its application of OCGA 17-5-56(a) and in holding that the State committed a due process violation in failing to preserve evidence. The court held that, by holding that OCGA 17-5-56(a) would require governmental entities to maintain not only biological materials but also the sources of such biological materials, the Court of Appeals had gone beyond the plain language of the statute and offered an interpretation that lead to an absurd result. The court also held that there was simply no evidence of record that the police were acting in bad faith when they followed the standard policy of releasing evidence in vehicular homicide cases that they considered to be solved. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals had no basis in the record for disturbing the factual findings of the trial court and judgment was reversed.

Appellee was convicted of numerous felonies stemming from a 1993 bank robbery and was sentenced as a recidivist for life in prison and a number of years to serve consecutively, all without parole. At issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the ruling in King v. State was applicable in cases where the defendant had been convicted of firearm possession under OCGA 16-11-131 and where the State had sought sentence enhancement under OCGA 17-10-7. The court held that since the sentencing range in OCGA 16-11-131 was not eviscerated by the application of OCGA 17-10-7(c), there was no basis to extend the holding in King to that subsection. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed.

Defendant appealed his convictions and sentences for malice murder, aggravated assault, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. At issue was whether the State engaged in unconstitutional gender-based discrimination by using seven of its eight peremptory strikes against women; whether the State engaged in unconstitutional race-based discrimination by using three of its eight peremptory strikes against African-Americans; whether defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel; and whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress his statement to the police. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose based on gender; that the record supported the trial court's finding that reasons offered for the three strikes against African-American jurors were race neutral and not pretextual; that defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel where defendant alleged that counsel failed to elicit sufficient testimony from defendant's expert at the Jackson-Denno hearing, failed to move for mistrial, and failed to object to the State reviewing expert's notes at the Jackson-Denno hearing; and that the trial court did not err in concluding that defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions and sentences.

Lucien Cabrel died in December 1963 and Cabrel's wife and four minor children were the recipients of a joint award of year's support in 1964. In 2000, Cabrel's two daughters filed a petition to partition real property in Henry and Spalding counties in which property the daughters claimed an interest by virtue of the 1964 joint award of year's support. The daughters also sought an accounting and to recover from their mother income generated by the property between 1964-1997. In Case No. S11A0212, the mother appealed the denial of summary judgment on the partitioning issue and in Case No. S11A0214, the daughters took issue with the trial court's denial of their motion for summary judgment, its failure to conduct a hearing on their motion for attorney fees, and its determinations that they were barred from having an accounting and were not entitled to prejudgment interest. The court held that since the motion to set aside was filed more than three years after the entry of judgment of partition and that judgment was made by a court with jurisdiction, the trial court did not err when it denied the mother's motion to set aside the judgment of partition. The court held also that the partitioning judgment was not appealed and the daughters cannot now complain that they had a greater interest in the property than that which was awarded in 2004; that the trial court did not err in concluding that the daughters were not entitled to income from the property where they did not meet certain contingencies; and that the trial court did not err when it did not award attorney fees since the daughters were not awarded any damages.