Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Harvey Strother, who was domiciled in Georgia, bequeathed a Florida condominium to his long time mistress, Anne Melican, but prior to his death, he entered into a contract to sell the condominium. Although Strother died before the closing date, the condominium was nevertheless eventually sold pursuant to the agreement he had entered into before he died. When Melican filed an action to collect the proceeds from the sale, the executor and trustee of the testamentary marital trust and the Strother's grandson and beneficiary under the will, filed a response as caveators to the will. At issue was whether the bequest of the real property in question had been adeemed based on the sale and whether Melican therefore was not entitled to the proceeds of the sale. The court held that pursuant to Fla. Stat. 732.606(2)(a), Melican, as the specific devisee of the Florida condominium under the will, was entitled to the proceeds from the sale after Strother's death, as these proceeds had not yet been paid to decedent before he died.

Plaintiff, who was employed as the City of McDonough's ("city") chief building inspector, brought suit against the city when the city refused to pay him severance under an employment agreement contract. At issue was whether the contract was binding to a successor municipal council in violation of OCGA 36-30-3(a). The court held that the contract was ultra vires and void because the contract was renewed automatically and the severance package required the city to pay plaintiff his salary and benefits for an entire year after the year in which the contract was terminated.

Defendant was arrested on September 11, 2007 for murder and his motion to dismiss was filed on August 27, 2010, almost three years later. At issue was whether the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the charges against him for a constitutional speedy trial violation. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of his constitutional speedy trial rights where, under the circumstances, defendant had not shown that he was prejudiced.

Defendant appealed his convictions for felony murder and violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act ("VGCSA"), Title 16, Chapter 13, in connection with the death of a young man. Defendant asserted that the evidence was insufficient to authorize the jury to find him guilty of violating the VGCSA by distributing controlled substances; felony murder; and VGSA by keeping a dwelling for the purposes of using controlled substances. The court held that the evidence authorized the jury to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of multiple counts of distributing controlled substances by prescribing them in a manner that was not in the usual course of his professional practice and was not for a legitimate medical purpose in violation of OCGA 16-13-41(f). The court also held that defendant's felonies of illegally providing controlled substances through prescriptions were dangerous felonies and the young man's death was a foreseeable result within the meaning of the felony murder statute. The court further held that, while the jury could infer that controlled substances had been kept and used at defendant's home on more than one occasion by the young man, without a showing that a purpose of defendant's maintaining a house was for such use by the young man, a guilty verdict was not authorized. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence on this count was vacated. The court finally held that the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony of two other young men who had formed relationships with defendant and that the trial court did not err in failing to give the exact "good faith" jury instructions defendant requested.

Appellant, a 15-year-old, was convicted of murdering her mother and sentenced to life imprisonment plus a consecutive five-year term for firearm possession. At issue was whether the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the State to introduce, over defense counsel's objections, various items of evidence seized from appellant's bedroom during the police investigation, including photographs of her with dyed black hair and dark make-up; a document bearing the words of a "curse;" and seven different inscriptions of song lyrics and quotations attributed to various singers and other artists bearing themes of anguish, enslavement, atheism, and violence. The court held that the evidence was improper prejudicial character evidence where the nature of the evidence was highly inflammatory and evidence of appellant's guilt was entirely circumstantial and not overwhelming. Accordingly, the court could not say that it was highly probable that the error did not contribute to the jury's verdict and therefore, reversed appellant's conviction.

While on probation in Douglas County, defendant was charged with drug-related offenses in Paulding County. The Douglas County Court issued a probation warrant for his arrest based on the Paulding County charges and defendant was arrested on the probation warrant in October 2007. While executing the warrant, officers saw methamphetamine on a table and then obtained and executed a search warrant and found more methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized both in March and October in the Paulding County criminal case. At issue was whether the exclusionary rule applied in probation revocation proceedings. The court held that because application of the exclusionary rule to probation revocation proceedings would achieve only marginal deterrent effects and would significantly alter and affect the proper administration of the probation system in the state, the court found the deterrence benefits of the exclusionary rule did not outweigh the costs of the system. Therefore, under the proper balancing test, neither the federal nor state constitutions required application of the exclusionary rule in state probation revocation proceedings.

Mother and father were divorced in March 2007 and father was awarded primary physical custody of the parties' two young children and mother was awarded substantial visitation and was required to pay child support. Mother subsequently filed an action seeking to hold father in contempt of the final divorce decree, to obtain sole custody of the children, and to obtain child support in the event child custody was given to her. Mother appealed the trial court's ruling in favor of husband and contended that the trial court erred by adding the visitation provision and in awarding attorney fees. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion in adopting a provision that restricted against "any overnight male guests" which would prohibit mother from having visitors with whom she had no romantic relationship and for whom the record did not support a finding of harmful effect on her children. The court also held that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees when it failed to specify the statutory basis for its award either at the final hearing or in its written order. Accordingly, the court vacated the award of attorney fees and remanded the issue to the trial court to explain the statutory basis of the award and make any findings necessary to support it.

Appellant appealed pro se the denial of his pre-trial petition for a writ of habeas corpus where he was indicted on charges of aggravated assault, obstruction of a law enforcement officer, criminal damage to property, and simple battery against a pregnant person. At issue was whether the denial of bail constituted excessive bail and was prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of the United States and Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVII of the Georgia Constitution. The court held that nothing in the record suggested that the trial court abused its discretion in denying bail and thus it was not error for the habeas court to deny appellant's petition where the trial court specifically concluded that he was a flight risk and the habeas court noted that under recidivist treatment, he faced incarceration for a significant period of time.

Appellant was convicted of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. At issue was whether appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and whether he was entitled to a new trial. The court affirmed the trial court's rejection of appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims and held that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to object to admissible evidence; failing to object to testimony that appellant was part of a gang; failing to contemporaneously object to testimony of a witness who said she visited him in jail; failing to object to in-court identification testimony and had it stricken from the record; and strategically refusing the trial court's offer to give a curative instruction regarding certain testimony. The court also held that, based on the facts and absence of any evidence of specific harm or prejudice to appellant, the trial court did not err when it denied appellant's motion for new trial on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct. Likewise, appellant's claim that the prosecution violated OCGA 17-16-4(a)(1) by failing to turn over the records of his conversations was unavailing. The court also held that where counsel strategically refused the trial court's proffer of a curative instruction regarding testimony about a juvenile court disposition, the trial court's failure to grant a mistrial generally was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it denied appellant's motion for a new trial.

Mother and father were divorced in 2003 and these appeals were from their most recent post-divorce litigation. At issue, inter alia, was whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the award on attorney fees in May 2010 while an application for discretionary appeal was pending in this court, and whether mother had a right to appeal directly the trial court's denial of her motion to set aside the attorney-fee award. The court affirmed and held that the trial court did not err when it denied mother's motion to set aside the award of attorney fees since its underlying judgment was final and the trial court's award of attorney fees did not supplement, amend, alter or modify the April 2010 order and judgment, which were the subjects of the pending discretionary application and notice of appeal. Therefore, the supercedeas of the May 20 application and notice of appeal did not deprive the trial court jurisdiction to enter the award of attorney fees. The court also held that mother was required to file an application for discretionary appeal since OCGA 5-6-35(a)(8) required that review of an order denying a motion to set aside be preceded by an application for discretionary review.