Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After their property in DeKalb County was annexed by the City of Atlanta, two parents sought to enroll their children in Atlanta Public Schools (APS). APS, however, denied enrollment, citing a 2021 Georgia law (SB 209) that prevents the expansion of APS boundaries to include newly annexed areas unless specifically authorized. The City of Atlanta had approved the annexation and expressed its intent for the APS boundaries to expand accordingly, but APS maintained that SB 209 prohibited such an extension.The parents and the City of Atlanta filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief against the State of Georgia, arguing that SB 209 was unconstitutional under the Georgia Constitution’s Single Subject Rule. The case was initially filed in Fulton County, transferred to DeKalb County, and then refiled in Fulton County against the State after the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the DeKalb action. The DeKalb County School District (DCSD) was allowed to intervene as a plaintiff. The trial court denied motions to dismiss, found that the plaintiffs had standing, determined there was a justiciable controversy, and ruled that SB 209 violated the Single Subject Rule, granting declaratory and injunctive relief to the plaintiffs.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed whether the trial court had jurisdiction to grant relief. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the plaintiffs failed to establish an actual or justiciable controversy with the State, as the alleged harm stemmed from APS’s actions, not from any enforcement by the State. Because the dispute did not involve the parties before the court, the Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the petition. View "PILATO v. STATE OF GEORGIA" on Justia Law

Owners of developed commercial and residential properties in Athens-Clarke County challenged the county’s stormwater utility charge, arguing that it was an unconstitutional tax rather than a fee. The charge, established by county ordinances in 2004, funds stormwater management services required by federal law, with the amount assessed based on impervious surface area and land-use classification. The ordinance exempts certain properties, such as public roads and sidewalks, and offers credits for on-site stormwater management. The funds collected are used for flood prevention, pollution minimization, and compliance with federal regulations.Previously, the Superior Court of Athens-Clarke County granted summary judgment to the county, finding that the stormwater utility charge was a fee, not a tax, and thus not subject to the Georgia Constitution’s taxation uniformity provision. This decision relied on the Georgia Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in Homewood Village, LLC v. Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County, which had addressed the same ordinance and held it imposed a fee rather than a tax. The appellants also pursued related claims in federal court, but those were dismissed on abstention grounds.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that its prior decision in Homewood Village, LLC v. Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County controlled, reaffirming that the stormwater utility charge is a fee and not a tax, and therefore the uniformity provision does not apply. The court also rejected the appellants’ arguments that the charge constituted an unconstitutional taking under the Georgia and United States Constitutions, finding no basis for such a claim. Finally, the court found that the trial court had properly applied the summary judgment standard and had not improperly resolved factual disputes. The judgment in favor of the county was affirmed. View "HOMEWOOD ASSOCIATES INC. v. UNIFIED GOVERNMENT OF ATHENS-CLARKE COUNTY" on Justia Law

A group of broadband internet providers in Georgia entered into contracts with the Georgia Department of Transportation to install and maintain their equipment along public rights of way. These contracts set annual permit fees and included a clause stating that the contracts would remain in effect until the parties entered into a new agreement. In 2021, the Department amended its rules, increasing permit fees and requiring providers to sign new contracts. The providers refused, and the Department notified them that, absent new agreements, they would be subject to the new rules. The providers then filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that their contracts were enforceable, not terminable at will, and that the Department’s actions impaired their contractual rights in violation of the United States and Georgia Constitutions.The Superior Court denied the State’s motion to dismiss, finding that sovereign immunity was waived under Article I, Section II, Paragraph V(b) of the Georgia Constitution because the providers sought declaratory relief from alleged unconstitutional acts. The court granted summary judgment to the providers, holding that the contracts were enforceable and not terminable at will by the Department.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. The Court agreed with the lower court that sovereign immunity was waived for this declaratory judgment action, as the providers sought relief from acts allegedly violating constitutional provisions. However, the Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed with the trial court’s interpretation of the contracts. It held that the contracts were of indefinite duration and, under longstanding Georgia law, were terminable at will by either party with notice. The Court affirmed the waiver of sovereign immunity but vacated the judgment granting declaratory and injunctive relief, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Dovetel Communication, LLC" on Justia Law

P&J Beverage Corporation filed a lawsuit against the City of Columbus, seeking to prevent the city from issuing an alcoholic beverage license to The Bottle Shop, LLC, and later sought to revoke the license after it was issued. P&J argued that The Bottle Shop’s location was too close to a daycare, which it claimed qualified as a “school” under city ordinances. The trial court granted summary judgment to P&J, invalidating The Bottle Shop’s license and enjoining its operation. The Bottle Shop’s attorney then emailed P&J’s attorney, referencing a potential claim for wrongful injunction if the appellate court reversed the trial court’s order, and requested a stay of the injunction pending appeal. P&J declined, and The Bottle Shop’s motion for a stay was denied by the trial court but later granted by the Court of Appeals, which ultimately reversed the trial court’s decision on the merits.Subsequently, The Bottle Shop sued P&J for both abusive litigation and wrongful injunction, seeking damages, attorney fees, and punitive damages. At trial, The Bottle Shop presented evidence of lost revenue, overhead costs, and attorney fees incurred during the period it was closed. The jury awarded substantial damages, attorney fees, and punitive damages. The trial court entered judgment accordingly. P&J moved for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing, among other things, that The Bottle Shop failed to provide the statutory notice required for an abusive litigation claim. The trial court denied these motions, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the email satisfied the statutory notice requirement.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that the email sent by The Bottle Shop did not satisfy the statutory notice requirement under OCGA § 51-7-84 (a) for an abusive litigation claim, as it failed to identify the civil proceeding as abusive litigation. The Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine what portion of the damages, if any, remain valid. View "P& J BEVERAGE CORPORATION v. THE BOTTLE SHOP, LLC" on Justia Law

A local housing authority, authorized by state statute and activated by city government, faced a personal injury lawsuit. The plaintiff alleged that the authority negligently failed to ensure the safety of the apartment complex where she was shot. The authority claimed sovereign immunity, arguing it was an instrumentality of the state, a municipal corporation, and an instrumentality of the municipality.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the housing authority, concluding it was protected by sovereign immunity under all three claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed, focusing on the authority's status as an instrumentality of the municipality. The appellate court relied on case law regarding state instrumentalities and concluded that the authority was entitled to sovereign immunity.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the Court of Appeals had incorrectly applied state instrumentality case law to determine municipal instrumentality immunity. The Supreme Court noted that the Georgia Constitution does not explicitly extend sovereign immunity to municipalities or their instrumentalities, and any such immunity must be derived from common law as of 1776. The Court found that neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals had conducted the necessary common law analysis to determine if the housing authority was entitled to sovereign immunity as an instrumentality of the municipality.The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further consideration under the proper analytical approach, specifically examining the common law scope and nature of sovereign immunity as it applied to municipal instrumentalities. View "GUY v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF AUGUSTA" on Justia Law

In 2020, Georgia ratified an amendment to its Constitution waiving sovereign immunity for actions seeking declaratory relief from unlawful acts by the State or local governments. This amendment included a procedural requirement that such actions must be brought against and in the name of only the State or the relevant local government, or they would be dismissed. The case at hand questions whether a complaint that does not comply with this naming requirement can be cured by dropping or adding parties to avoid dismissal.Warbler Investments, LLC sued the City of Social Circle, its mayor, and three City Council members in their individual capacities, alleging unlawful rezoning of Warbler's property and violations of the Open Records Act. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that the complaint violated the naming requirement of the Georgia Constitution. Warbler then moved to amend the complaint to drop the individual defendants, which the trial court allowed. However, after the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in State v. SASS Group, LLC, which mandated dismissal of cases not complying with the naming requirement, the City renewed its motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the motion, dismissing the case despite the amendment.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the procedural defect of not complying with the naming requirement could be cured by amending the complaint to drop or add parties. The court held that the waiver of sovereign immunity was not affected by the initial failure to comply with the naming requirement, and the amended complaint, which complied with the requirement, should not be dismissed. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded. View "WARBLER INVESTMENTS, LLC v. CITY OF SOCIAL CIRCLE" on Justia Law

In 2019, Nestle Purina Petcare Company sought to switch its electric supplier for its facility in Hartwell, Georgia, from Georgia Power Company to Walton Electric Membership Corporation. Georgia Power objected, citing the Territorial Electric Service Act, arguing that the premises were not new and did not meet the requirements to switch suppliers. Georgia Power contended that the premises had long been a manufacturing and warehousing facility and that the changes made by Nestle did not amount to the premises being "destroyed or dismantled" as required by the Act.The Georgia Public Service Commission (the "Commission") ruled in favor of Nestle, concluding that the premises were "destroyed or dismantled" and not "reconstructed in substantial kind," allowing Nestle to switch to Walton EMC. The superior court reversed this decision, finding that the premises were not "destroyed or dismantled" and that the modifications did not meet the statutory requirements. The Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court's decision.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the appropriate standard of review was abuse of discretion. The Court determined that the Commission's decision should have been upheld. The Court held that "destroyed or dismantled" does not require complete destruction but can include substantial dismantling or stripping away of significant components. The Court also found that the premises were not "reconstructed in substantial kind" due to the significant differences in structure and function between the old and new facilities. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, allowing Nestle to switch its electric supplier to Walton EMC. View "WALTON ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION v. GEORGIA POWER COMPANY" on Justia Law

In 2022, the Georgia General Assembly enacted House Bill 839 (HB 839), which incorporated the City of Mableton within unincorporated Cobb County and provided for the creation of one or more community improvement districts (CIDs) within Mableton. Deidre White and other residents of Cobb County challenged the constitutionality of HB 839, arguing that it violated the "Single Subject Rule" of the Georgia Constitution by creating more than one unit of government, specifically Mableton and the CIDs.The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court found that HB 839 did not violate the Single Subject Rule, as the creation of CIDs within Mableton was germane to the overall objective of incorporating the city. The Appellants then appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's dismissal. The court held that HB 839 did not violate the Single Subject Rule because the creation of CIDs within Mableton had a logical and natural connection to the incorporation of the city. The court also rejected the argument that the ballot question for HB 839 contravened the precedent set in Rea v. City of LaFayette, as the creation of CIDs was related to the single objective of establishing Mableton. Thus, the court concluded that HB 839 was constitutional and upheld the trial court's decision. View "WHITE v. CITY OF MABLETON" on Justia Law

Appellant A. Thomas Jones challenged the City of Atlanta's imposition of charges through two ordinances, arguing that these charges, levied on the Department of Watershed Management (DWM) customers, are unlawful taxes. The ordinances in question impose a franchise fee on DWM's gross revenue and a payment in lieu of taxes (PILOT) on DWM's real property, with the collected sums deposited into the City's General Fund. Jones contended that these charges exceed the costs they purportedly cover and are instead used to generate general revenue, violating various constitutional and statutory provisions.The trial court initially dismissed Jones's suit on procedural grounds, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision in part. Upon remand, the City moved for judgment on the pleadings, and Jones filed motions for partial summary judgment. The trial court granted the City's motion and denied Jones's motions, leading to this appeal. Jones argued that the trial court erred in its application of the standard of review and in its conclusions regarding the nature of the charges.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the trial court erred in granting the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Court held that the trial court failed to treat Jones's allegations as true, particularly his claims that he paid the disputed charges, that the revenue generated from these charges grossly exceeded the associated costs, and that these costs were covered by other transfers from DWM to the City's General Fund. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's judgment on the pleadings and remanded the case for further proceedings.However, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Jones's motions for partial summary judgment. The Court concluded that Jones failed to demonstrate the absence of genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the charges were taxes or fees and whether the revenue generated exceeded the associated costs. The case was remanded for reconsideration of Jones's claims under the proper standard of review. View "Jones v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

Jarrod Miller, a resident of Athens-Clarke County, filed a complaint against Deborah Gonzalez, the District Attorney for the Western Judicial Circuit, alleging violations of the Open Records Act (ORA). Miller claimed that Gonzalez, in her official capacity as district attorney and custodian of public records, failed to produce requested public records related to the district attorney’s office. Gonzalez argued that neither she nor her office is subject to the ORA because district attorneys are constitutional officers of the judicial branch. She also contended that Miller lacked standing to bring the enforcement action and that prosecutorial immunity barred the suit.The Superior Court of Clarke County denied Gonzalez’s motion to dismiss Miller’s complaint. The court rejected Gonzalez’s argument that district attorneys are judicial officers exempt from the ORA, concluding that district attorneys perform executive functions. The court also found that Miller had standing to bring the enforcement action and that prosecutorial immunity did not bar Miller’s claims. Gonzalez then sought an interlocutory appeal, which was granted.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that the ORA applies to district attorneys’ offices, as they are considered “offices” under the statute. The court also determined that district attorneys exercise executive power, not judicial power, and thus are subject to the ORA. Additionally, the court found that Miller had standing to sue because he directed his attorney to make the records requests on his behalf. The court further held that prosecutorial immunity does not bar official-capacity claims under the ORA, as the statute waives sovereign immunity for such claims. The court did not address the merits of Miller’s individual-capacity claims against Gonzalez. View "GONZALEZ v. MILLER" on Justia Law