Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A group of property owners sued Columbia County over stormwater drainage issues that caused damage to their property. The property, purchased in 1996, contained a metal pipe used in the County's stormwater system. Over the years, heavy rains caused the pipe to fail multiple times, leading to significant property damage. The property owners sent a notice to the County in October 2013, outlining their claims, but the County declined to make repairs. The property owners then filed a lawsuit in March 2014, seeking damages and an injunction to prevent further damage.The trial court found in favor of the property owners, ruling that the County maintained a nuisance that amounted to a taking without just compensation. The court awarded damages and issued a permanent injunction against the County. The County appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed some parts of the trial court's decision and vacated others. The Court of Appeals vacated the damages award for harms incurred after the October 2013 notice and reversed the award of attorneys' fees. However, it upheld the injunction against the County.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Appeals' decision to uphold the injunction, ruling that it exceeded the bounds of the Georgia Constitution's limited waiver of sovereign immunity. The Court directed the Court of Appeals to remand the case to the trial court to consider a new injunction within the constitutional limits. The Supreme Court also concluded that it should not have granted certiorari on the issue of damages for harms incurred after the October 2013 notice, as the Court of Appeals' ruling was specific to the facts of this case and did not establish a general rule of law. The petition for certiorari on this issue was therefore denied. View "Satcher v. Columbia County" on Justia Law

Ryan Milliron submitted an Open Records Act request to Manos Antonakakis, a professor at Georgia Tech, seeking records related to Antonakakis’s services to Georgia Tech as a private contractor. Milliron also sent a similar request to Georgia Tech. Antonakakis did not respond individually, but Georgia Tech provided some documents. Unsatisfied, Milliron sued Antonakakis, alleging he held additional public records in his capacity as a private contractor. Milliron claimed Antonakakis’s companies, formed to receive DARPA funding for Georgia Tech, maintained relevant records.The trial court dismissed Milliron’s complaint, ruling that only agencies, not individual employees or private contractors, are obligated to produce public records under the Open Records Act. The court also found that Milliron’s request to Antonakakis was improper because Georgia Tech had a designated open records officer. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, agreeing that Milliron’s request was not properly submitted to the designated officer.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the Open Records Act applies to records held by private contractors performing services for public agencies. The Court held that requests for such records can be made directly to the custodian of the records, including private contractors, even if the agency has a designated open records officer. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine what records Antonakakis may hold and whether they are public records under the Act. View "Milliron v. Antonakakis" on Justia Law

The case involves John R. Tibbetts, a teacher, and his employer, the Worth County School District. The District offered Tibbetts a contract for the upcoming school year, but Tibbetts did not return the signed contract within the stipulated time. The District then informed Tibbetts that his employment would end when his current contract expired. Tibbetts sued the District for breach of contract, arguing that the offered contract did not comply with Georgia's statutory requirements for teacher contracts because it was missing terms and contained blanks. Therefore, he contended, his employment contract for the prior school year was renewed by operation of law.The trial court granted the District's motion for summary judgment, holding that there was no existing written contract between the parties that operated to waive sovereign immunity under the ex contractu clause of the Constitution of the State of Georgia. The trial court found that the District offered Tibbetts a contract that complied with the statutory requirements, but that Tibbetts did not timely accept that offer.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It determined that the contract the District offered Tibbetts for the upcoming school year failed to comply with the requirements of the statute; therefore, Tibbetts’s contract for the previous school year was renewed by operation of law and constituted a contract in writing. The Court of Appeals reasoned that Tibbetts’s claim was one for breach of a written contract, and sovereign immunity was waived pursuant to the ex contractu clause.The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. It held that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the grant of summary judgment in favor of the District because the employment contract the District offered Tibbetts for the upcoming school year satisfied the requirements of the statute. Because Tibbetts failed to timely accept this offer, no written contract exists to support Tibbetts’s claim for breach of a written contract. Absent such a claim, there is no waiver of sovereign immunity pursuant to the ex contractu clause. View "WORTH COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT v. TIBBETTS" on Justia Law

In a dispute between the City of Winder and Barrow County, Georgia, the Supreme Court of Georgia addressed the interpretation of the Services Delivery Strategy (SDS) Act, with regard to the delivery of services to county and city residents and property owners and the funding of these services. The case initially revolved around three main issues: the maintenance of county roads and who benefits from them, the funding of services that primarily benefit the unincorporated area of the county, and whether the County could challenge the water rates charged by the City as an illegal tax.The court concluded that determining whether the maintenance of county roads primarily benefits the unincorporated area of a county cannot be resolved as a matter of law and requires analysis of the totality of the circumstances involved. The court held that services that primarily benefit the unincorporated area of the county should be funded through the mechanisms delineated in the Act, limiting the sources within a special district that can be used for funding.Finally, the court decided that a superior court adjudicating a petition under the SDS Act is not authorized to determine whether the City’s usage rates charged to water customers in unincorporated areas of the County are an illegal tax. The court reversed the rulings of the lower courts and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "CITY OF WINDER v. BARROW COUNTY" on Justia Law

This case concerns the standard of review that the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Community Health must apply when reviewing the decision of a hearing officer on an application for a certificate of need to establish a new health service. The Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment, set forth the standard applicable to the Commissioner’s review, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court clarified that "competent substantial evidence" in the context of the Commissioner's review means evidence that is "relevant" such that "a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support" a finding of fact, and that is admissible. The court also determined that the Commissioner must provide sufficient detail in his order from which a reviewing court can determine whether the Commissioner has or has not improperly substituted his judgment for the findings of fact of the hearing officer. View "VANTAGE CANCER CENTERS OF GEORGIA, LLC v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY HEALTH" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Windy Hill Hospital's request to change from a long-term care hospital to a short-term care hospital in Georgia, without obtaining a new Certificate of Need (CON) from the Department of Community Health. The case addresses two preliminary questions: whether a CON confers a private right or a public right on a hospital, and the proper framework for interpreting the Department's CON regulations.The Supreme Court of Georgia held that a CON confers a private right as it provides the individual, usually a corporate entity, with the right to operate a particular kind of hospital. This is because the right to use one's property in a particular way is a traditional property right. The Court also clarified the framework for interpreting administrative rules, stating that courts may defer to an agency's interpretation of its own rule only if the rule's meaning is ambiguous. In this case, the Court did not definitively determine if the Court of Appeals had applied this framework correctly in interpreting the Department's regulations relevant to this case.The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, without deciding several other issues that could be dispositive of this case. The Court did not rule on whether Windy Hill Hospital ever held a CON to operate as a long-term care hospital, whether the hospital's 1996 correspondence with the State Health Planning Agency constituted a "CON process", and whether any rights purportedly conferred by a CON ultimately vested. View "KENNESTONE HOSPITAL, INC. v. EMORY UNIVERSITY" on Justia Law

In Georgia, plaintiffs Kristen Lovell, Lori Tullos, and Virginia McFaddin filed complaints against Brad Raffensperger (in his official capacity as the Secretary of State of Georgia), the Columbia County Board of Elections, the Morgan County Board of Elections and Registration, and various individuals associated with these entities, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The superior courts dismissed the actions, reasoning that they were barred by sovereign immunity as they failed to name the proper defendants as required by the Georgia Constitution.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the lower courts' dismissal of the actions. The court ruled that under the Georgia Constitution's Paragraph V, which provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for actions seeking declaratory relief from acts of the state, actions must be brought exclusively against the state and in the name of the State of Georgia or against the relevant local government entities. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to comply with this requirement as they named as defendants the Secretary of State (not the State of Georgia) and their local boards of election and their board members (not the relevant counties). Due to this failure to comply, the trial courts were correct to dismiss the actions. View "LOVELL v. RAFFENSPERGER" on Justia Law

In August 2018, Mary Collington was involved in a motor vehicle accident with Jesse Curney, a deputy with the Clayton County Sheriff’s Department, who was acting within the scope of his official duties at the time. Initially believing Deputy Curney was a Clayton County police officer, Collington sent notice of her claims to the Clayton County Chief of Police, the Clayton County Commissioners, and the District Attorney of Clayton County. Collington later filed a lawsuit against Clayton County, asserting that she suffered injuries caused by the negligence of Deputy Curney.Upon motion to dismiss by the defendants, the trial court dismissed Collington's claims, concluding that Collington's claims against the Sheriff should be dismissed as she had failed to present timely notice to the Sheriff's office under OCGA § 36-11-1. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari to determine whether OCGA § 36-11-1 applies to official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for the negligent use of a motor vehicle, and if so, whether presenting such a claim to the county commission satisfies the claimant's duty under the statute.The Supreme Court of Georgia held that OCGA § 36-11-1 does apply to official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle. Furthermore, the court decided that because a claim against a county sheriff in his official capacity for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle is a claim against a county under OCGA § 36-11-1, presenting the claim to the county governing authority satisfies the statute's presentment requirement. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "COLLINGTON v. CLAYTON COUNTY" on Justia Law

Latoya Bray filed an action against sheriff’s lieutenant Stormie Watkins, in her official and individual capacities, for damages allegedly caused by her failure to activate a tornado warning system while working in a county emergency center. The trial court granted summary judgment to Watkins, concluding in part that the public duty doctrine negated any duty owed to Bray. In a split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed: the majority opinion, the specially concurring opinion, and the dissenting opinion disagreed about whether the trial court erred by not considering whether sovereign immunity barred the official-capacity claim and whether the official capacity claim needed to be remanded for the trial court to resolve the sovereign immunity issue in the first instance. In her petition for certiorari to the Georgia Supreme Court, Bray contended: (1) the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the public duty doctrine foreclosed her lawsuit; and (2) the court’s discussion concerning sovereign immunity was “misplaced.” Because the applicability of the public duty doctrine was a merits question, the Supreme Court determined the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling on the official-capacity claims on the ground that the public duty doctrine barred all of Bray’s claims without considering the threshold jurisdictional question of whether sovereign immunity barred Bray’s claims against Watkins in her official capacity. The Court therefore granted the petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and remanded this case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Bray, et al. v. Watkins" on Justia Law

In April 2019, Kevin Roberts applied to Judge Clarence Cuthpert, Jr., probate judge for Rockdale County, for a weapons carry license pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-129. Judge Cuthpert denied Roberts’s application, finding that Roberts’s criminal history revealed five arrests between 1992 and 2004 for aggravated assault, affray, obstruction of the judiciary, cruelty to children in the first degree, simple battery, battery, and family violence battery. Judge Cuthpert noted that Roberts’s criminal history did not list the dispositions of Roberts’s arrests for obstruction of the judiciary or simple battery, but the other arrests had dispositions of not prosecuted, dismissed, or nolle prossed. Judge Cuthpert concluded that Roberts “lack[ed] good moral character[4] . . . [d]ue to his arrest[s] for several violent offenses” and that “the court need[ed] additional information[, including police reports,] to determine if this application should be approved.” After reconsideration, Judge Cuthpert again denied the petition, concluding that, “[b]ased upon [Roberts’s] history of violent offenses and failure to comply with the Court’s instructions to provide the incident reports and dispositions for [his previous five arrests],” Roberts was “not of good moral character.” Roberts thereafter filed a complaint seeking mandamus relief against Judge Cuthpert “in his official capacity,” declaratory judgment against Judge Cuthpert “in both his official and individual capacities,” and costs and attorney’s fees. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the General Assembly waived sovereign immunity for claims brought under OCGA § 16-11-129 (j) and that the Separation of Powers Provision of the Georgia Constitution was not implicated by the recovery of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, against a probate judge pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-129 (j) because processing a weapons carry license did not involve the exercise of judicial power. The Court also concluded the probate judge in this case waived the defense of judicial immunity on the costs-and-fees claim asserted against him in his official capacity. View "Roberts v. Cuthper" on Justia Law