Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After the Merle and Lesia Long and their business Water Park Properties, LLC dismissed their most recent lawsuit against the City of Helen with prejudice, the trial court awarded more than $17,000 to the City for attorney fees and litigation expenses pursuant to OCGA 9-15-14. The Longs and Water Park appealed, contending that the award of fees and expenses was improper because those fees and expenses actually were borne by the City’s insurer, not the City itself. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the award. View "Long v. City of Helen" on Justia Law

Oscar Blalock sought access to records held by the City of Lovejoy under the Georgia Open Records Act. After failing to receive those records, or any response from the City, Blalock filed a mandamus action seeking to compel compliance with the Act. The trial court dismissed Blalock’s petition, finding that mandamus was unavailable because the Act’s civil penalties provision affords Blalock a remedy “as complete and convenient as mandamus.” Although the Supreme Court did not agree with the trial court’s conclusion regarding the remedial adequacy of civil penalties, that did not save Blalock’s claim: because the Act provided its own cause of action for enforcement in OCGA 50-18-73 (a), that provision was plainly a “complete and convenient” alternative to mandamus. View "Blalock v. Cartwright" on Justia Law

This case centered on the procedure by which a local zoning board’s quasi-judicial decision on a variance request could be appealed to the superior court. Kerley Family Homes, LLC was granted a variance by the City of Cumming’s Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”). Neighboring homeowners aggrieved by the variance sought to appeal the BZA’s decision by filing a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus and an injunction with the superior court. The defendants argued that they were entitled to summary judgment against the homeowners because the zoning variance decision was a quasi-judicial decision that could be challenged in the superior court only by a petition for certiorari under OCGA 5-4-1. The Supreme Court concluded they were right, and therefore reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment. View "City of Cumming v. Flowers" on Justia Law

Searless West was a former employee of the City of Albany who filed a complaint in federal court against the City and two individuals setting forth, among other things, a claim under the Georgia Whistleblower Act (“GWA”). With respect to West’s claims under the GWA, she sought economic and non-economic damages resulting from alleged retaliation for disclosing what she deemed to be certain financial irregularities in the City’s utility department. The City filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings with regard to the whistleblower claim, asserting it failed as a matter of law because West did not provide ante litem notice prior to filing the complaint. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, in an order finding no controlling precedent from the Georgia Supreme Court that addressed the legal issue raised by the City, certified a question of Georgia law to the Georgia Supreme Court: "is a plaintiff required to provide a municipal corporation with ante litem notice pursuant to OCGA 36-33-5 in order to pursue a claim against it for money damages under the [GWA]?" The Supreme Court answered this question in the negative. View "West v. City of Albany" on Justia Law

This was the third appeal of this case arising from the efforts of appellee Southern LNG, Inc. (“Southern”) to compel State Revenue Commissioner Lynnette Riley (“the Commissioner”) to recognize Southern as a “public utility” under OCGA 48-5-511 and to accept Southern’s ad valorem property tax returns. On remand, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Commissioner on a mandamus claim, holding that Southern had an adequate alternative remedy. In a prior appeal, the Supreme Court laid out for the parties in considerable detail the potential legal and procedural issues bearing on the question of whether the Commissioner could become a party or be bound by a judgment rendered in the tax appeals. On remand, Southern and the Commissioner filed renewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Southern, holding that it had no “equally convenient, complete and beneficial” remedy other than mandamus, and denied the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, and directed the Commissioner “to accept [Southern’s] ad valorem property tax returns pursuant to OCGA 48-5-511(a) instanter.” The Commissioner appealed, and the Supreme Court this time reversed, finding Southern did not show the Commissioner, in refusing to accept Southern’s ad valorem tax returns, violated a “clear legal duty,” that she failed to act, or that her actions were arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, amounting to a gross abuse of discretion, so as to entitle Southern to a writ of mandamus. View "Riley v. Southern LNG, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case centered on the potential effects on the territory of school systems and the ownership of school property stemming from the annexation of parts of Fulton County by the City of Atlanta. In 1950, the Georgia General Assembly passed a local constitutional amendment addressing these issues (1950 LCA). In 1950, the independent school system of Atlanta (APS) was part of the City’s municipal government, not a separate political entity. In 1973, however, the General Assembly separated APS from the City’s municipal government by enacting separate charters for the two entities and removing most educational powers and responsibilities from the City government. In 2015, the City initiated this case by filing a declaratory judgment action in which it sought guidance on whether: (1) the City could annex Fulton County property without also expanding the boundaries of APS to cover the newly annexed area; and (2) the City could exercise its own delegated authority to determine if it wanted to expand the boundaries of APS after the City annexed new property. The City argued that HB 1620 (the pertinent legislation) did not properly continue the 1950 LCA, and, as a result, it stood repealed. The Fulton County School District (“FCS”) intervened, then the City moved for summary judgment, APS moved for judgment in its favor on the pleadings, and FCS moved to dismiss the City’s action. The trial court entered a final order denying the City’s motion, granting APS’s motion, and granting FCS’s motion, treating all of them as summary judgment motions. Ultimately, the trial court determined that: (1) the City’s declaratory action, in part, was not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity; and (2) the 1950 LCA was properly continued by HB 1620. The City appealed the trial court’s ruling that the 1950 LCA was properly continued, and APS has cross-appealed to contend that the trial court erred by not finding that the City’s declaratory judgment action was barred in its entirety by sovereign immunity. Because this matter was not ripe for consideration at the time that the trial court considered the City’s action, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s opinion. View "City of Atlanta v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys." on Justia Law

In 2014, Brooks Keel, president of Georgia Southern University, terminated the employment contract of tenured professor Lorne Wolfe for violation of University policies, and the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia denied Wolfe’s application for review of his termination. Wolfe then filed a complaint for breach of contract and mandamus against the Board and Keel seeking reinstatement and other relief. The superior court granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment, and Wolfe again appealed. The Supreme Court found that this appeal fell within the scope of OCGA 5-6-35 (a) (1), and an application to appeal was therefore required. Because Wolfe did not file a discretionary application, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of his case. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal. View "Wolfe v. Regents of the University Sys. of Georgia" on Justia Law

The City of Waycross (the “City”), situated primarily in Ware County, annexed property in Pierce County (the “County”) in the 1980's. The City constructed a component of its wastewater treatment facility in the annexed area, and entered into service delivery strategy agreements with the County in 1999. The agreements provided that the City would provide water and sewer services in the annexed area; they did not contain an expiration date. The City provided the agreed upon services and collected fees from the users of the services. The fees covered the costs of providing water and sewer services in the annexed area. Residents of the City did not subsidize the costs of the services. In 2015, the legislature passed House Bill 523, which was signed into law effective July 1, 2015, amending the City’s charter so that no portion of the City would “include any territory within the boundaries of Pierce County.” The City brought suit to enjoin enforcement of House Bill 523 and have it declared unconstitutional. The trial court denied interlocutory relief, partly because it determined the City was still authorized to provide water and sewer services to the formerly annexed area. In July 2015, the City notified businesses and homeowners located in the de-annexed area that new, higher user fees would be charged. The County filed a counterclaim alleging that the new fees were arbitrarily higher than fees charged Ware County residents, and therefore violated the Georgia Service Delivery Strategy Act. In August 2015, the City passed a resolution to halt the delivery of water and sewer services in the formerly annexed area. At that point, the County filed an amended counterclaim requesting the City be enjoined from discontinuing its water and sewer services. After a hearing, the trial court granted the County’s request for an interlocutory injunction. Finding no reversible error in the decision to issue an injunction, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment and remanded this matter for further proceedings. View "City of Waycross v. Pierce Cty. Bd. of Commr's" on Justia Law

Appellee Daniel Massey, Chatham County Superior Court Clerk, filed a writ of mandamus against Chatham County and its Board of Commissioners, seeking, among other things, an order declaring him to be entitled to cost-of-living adjustments (“COLAs”) to his salary as provided by general statute (“State COLAs”) as well as by special local legislation (“County COLAs”), and to longevity increases as provided by statute. Massey argued the County deprived him of some of the compensation increases to which he was entitled over his years of service by setting off the COLAs the County claimed it paid him by improperly decreasing, in a corresponding sum, the amount the County was paying to supplement his salary over the statutory minimum. In response, the County argued, among other things, that since it was paying Massey in excess of the statutory minimum, he was not entitled to County COLAs in addition to State COLAs and longevity increases. After reviewing the evidence and arguments presented, the trial court entered an order finding Massey was entitled not only to state-mandated longevity increases and State COLAs provided by general statute but also to County COLAs provided by local legislation. The County appealed that decision to the Supreme Court, but finding no reversible error, the Court affirmed. View "Chatham Cty. v. Massey" on Justia Law

In cases consolidated for review, the issues presented for the Supreme Court involved the scope of the State’s authority to regulate so-called “payday loans” pursuant to OCGA 16-17-1, et seq., known as the Payday Lending Act. Pursuant to the statute, the State filed suit alleging that CashCall, Inc. (“CashCall”), Delbert Services Corporation (“Delbert Services”), Western Sky Financial, LLC (“Western Sky”), and Martin A. Webb (collectively “Defendants”) violated OCGA 16-17-2 (a) by engaging in a small-dollar lending enterprise that collected illegal usurious interest from Georgia borrowers. Defendants operated outside the State of Georgia and their dealings with Georgia borrowers occurred telephonically or over the Internet, and when a loan is funded, the funds are transferred to the borrower via electronic transfer to the borrower’s bank account. The State sought civil penalties and injunctive and other equitable relief. Defendants filed motions to compel arbitration and to dismiss the action. The trial court referred the case to a special master who recommended the case be dismissed, but the trial court rejected the special master’s recommendation and denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the State’s claim was not barred by the language of OCGA 16-17-1 (d). Because the trial court found a substantial likelihood that the State would prevail on the merits of the claim at trial, and found a substantial threat existed that the State would suffer irreparable injury in that there might not be sufficient funds available to satisfy a judgment should the State prevail at trial, the trial court ordered Defendants to deposit a $15 million sum into the court’s registry and to make quarterly deposits of any additional amounts that could be collected from Georgia borrowers in the future. The trial court, however, agreed to stay the granted relief during an appeal, upon the Defendants’ deposit of an additional $1 million into the escrow account created following entry of the consent order requiring the deposit of $200,000. In a separate order, the trial court denied the State’s motion to add as defendants J. Paul Reddam and WS Funding, LLC (“WS Funding”). Defendants filed a notice of appeal and the State filed a notice of cross-appeal. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the order denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss, affirmed the modification of the injunction order, and reversed the order denying the State’s motion to add defendants. View "Western Sky Financial, LLC v. Georgia" on Justia Law