Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Alfred Fuciarelli was a tenured faculty member at Valdosta State University (“VSU”). Fuciarelli was at one time also assistant vice president for research and a dean of the graduate school. After he complained about VSU’s “noncompliance with laws, rules and regulations,” VSU terminated Fuciarelli’s contract to serve as an assistant vice president and dean. Although Fuciarelli remained as a member of the faculty, his salary and benefits were reduced. Fuciarelli appealed his termination to the Board of Regents which affirmed VSU’s decision. Thereafter, Fuciarelli filed suit against the Board of Regents, William McKinney, individually and in his official capacity as president of VSU, and Karla Hull, individually and in her official capacity as a former acting vice president of VSU, seeking damages under both the Public Employee Whistleblower Retaliation Act, and the Taxpayer Protection Against False Claims Act (“TPAFCA”). The trial court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the public employee whistleblower retaliation claim, but granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the taxpayer retaliation claim on the ground that Fuciarelli failed to obtain the approval of the Attorney General before filing suit. The Georgia Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals to determine whether it correctly held that the TPAFCA did not require the Attorney General to approve taxpayer retaliation claims brought under subsection (l) of the Act. Because the plain language of the statute required the Attorney General to approve a taxpayer retaliation claim prior to filing suit, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals' holding to the contrary. View "McKinney v. Fuciarelli" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case were providers and recipients of Medicaid services for individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities who claimed that the defendant administrative agencies and their commissioners failed to follow the required procedures before reducing the reimbursement rates paid to the providers and limiting the services available to the recipients. The plaintiffs did not submit their claims to the agencies for administrative review, instead filing their lawsuit with the trial court. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, but the Court of Appeals reversed that ruling. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to to decide whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the defendants’ alleged failure to give the plaintiffs proper notice of adverse agency decisions excused the plaintiffs from the exhaustion requirement. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the plaintiffs were required to raise their defective notice claims in the administrative review process in the first instance. View "Georgia Dept. of Behavioral Health Developmental Disabilities v. United Cerebral Palsy of Georgia, Inc." on Justia Law

Although these two cases arose separately, they posed a singular legal issue for the Supreme Court’s review, and thus were addressed in the same opinion. In S15G0887, Akeem Washington, who was on probation for speeding, sued Shannon Rivera, a probation officer, and her administrative assistant, alleging that they failed to perform their ministerial duties when they swore out a warrant for Washington’s arrest for failure to pay a fine that Washington already had paid in fulfillment of the conditions of his probation. Rivera moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing she was immune from liability in Washington’s suit because her alleged actions were protected by either quasi-judicial immunity or sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that it was possible that facts could be shown in discovery that would establish that neither quasi-judicial immunity nor sovereign immunity applied. Rivera did not attempt to file an application for interlocutory appeal from that order but filed a notice of appeal, asserting that she had authority to file a direct appeal under the collateral order doctrine. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. In S15G0912, Dan and Arlene Appelrouth sued their neighbors, Cesar and Janice Rodriguez, also naming Forsyth County and other unknown persons as defendants. The Appelrouths alleged that actions taken on the Rodriguezes’ property, as well as on the County’s road right of way and associated drainage ditch, caused water damage to the Appelrouths’ property, and raised claims of, inter alia, breach of legal duty, negligence per se, trespass, nuisance, and inverse condemnation. The Rodriguezes filed a cross-claim against the County, which filed motions to dismiss both the complaint and cross-claim, asserting sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motions, ruling that it was possible that evidence could be established which would allow the Appelrouths and the Rodriguezes to prevail against the County’s claim of sovereign immunity. The County, like Rivera did not seek interlocutory appeal, and again the Court of Appeals dismissed on direct appeal, citing the collateral order doctrine as grounds for dismissal. Although the Court of Appeals applied incorrect analyses in these cases, the Supreme Court concluded it reached the correct results in dismissing the direct appeals filed by Rivera and Forsyth County. View "Rivera v. Washington" on Justia Law

Aster Zeru Gebrekidan filed an application for discretionary appeal to challenge her conviction and fine for violating a City of Clarkston ordinance that prohibited certain retailers of packaged alcoholic beverages from allowing on their premises any form of electronic or mechanical game machine or coin-operated device that may be used for entertainment or amusement purposes. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Gebrekidan’s application to decide whether the State’s detailed statutory scheme regulating coin operated amusement machines (COAMs) and COAM businesses in Georgia, preempted the City’s ordinance under the Uniformity Clause of the Georgia Constitution. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State’s COAM Laws preempted the City’s ordinance at least insofar as the ordinance applied to COAMs as defined by the state statutes. The Court therefore reversed Gebrekidan’s conviction and fine. View "Gebrekidan v. City of Clarkston" on Justia Law

In 2014, appellant Iziah Smith applied to appellee Harry James, III, Judge of the Probate Court of Richmond County, for a renewal Georgia weapons carry license; he requested the issuance of a temporary renewal license as well. At that time, Smith had fewer than 90 days remaining before his carry license expired. Although Smith initially was refused a temporary renewal license, he was issued a weapons carry license within 30 days of the filing of his application for a license, and before his previously issued license expired. Several weeks later, Smith and appellant GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. (“GCO”) brought this mandamus action against James in the Superior Court of Richmond County, alleging James was wrongly refusing to issue temporary renewal licenses. James answered, denying the material allegations of the complaint. Appellants then filed a motion for recusal, asserting that a Richmond County Superior Court Judge should not be presiding over a case in which the Richmond County Probate Court Judge was named as the defendant. The trial court denied the motion to recuse. Following discovery, both sides moved for summary judgment. Recognizing that, at some point, James had begun issuing temporary renewal licenses to other applicants, appellants acknowledged they were no longer entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus. They asserted, nevertheless, that they were entitled to costs and attorney’s fees as the “prevailing party” in the lawsuit. The trial court granted James’ summary judgment motion and denied appellants’ summary judgment motion. The Supreme Court found that It follows that GCO lacked standing to recover costs and attorney fees pursuant to Georgia law. Because Smith’s claim was moot and GCO lacked standing, it was incumbent upon the trial court to enter an order dismissing appellants’ claims. Accordingly, the Court remanded this case to the trial court with direction that it vacate the grant of summary judgment to James and enter an order of dismissal. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Georgiacarry.org v. James" on Justia Law

The Department of Driver Services issued a driver’s license to Gambian national Abdou Barrow. In April 2010, the Department canceled that license, finding that Barrow was not lawfully present in the United States and was not, therefore, eligible to have a driver’s license. More than three-and-a-half years later, Barrow applied for a new license, claiming that his immigration status had changed since the cancellation of his earlier license. The Department denied his application. Barrow then filed a petition in the Superior Court of Fulton County, seeking judicial review of the denial of his application for a new license. The trial court dismissed his petition as untimely, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Department canceled, but did not revoke, Barrow's license. Barrow was entitled by the plain terms of the applicable statute to make an application for a new license at any time after the cancellation. He did so, and the Department denied his application. He petitioned for judicial review of that denial, and he filed his petition within thirty days of the denial. His petition was timely, and the trial court and Court of Appeals erred when they concluded otherwise. View "Barrow v. Mikell" on Justia Law

In this case, a group of college students, including Miguel Olvera, who were not United States citizens and who were grant beneficiaries of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA) filed a declaratory judgment action against the University System of Georgia’s Board of Regents and its members in their official capacities seeking a declaration that they were entitled to in-state tuition at schools in the University System of Georgia. The trial court granted the Board’s motion to dismiss on the ground that sovereign immunity barred the action, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Olvera v. University System of Georgia's Board of Regents" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Georgia Supreme Court’s review came from a class action challenging a 2011 City of Atlanta ordinance and the subsequent amendment by the City of its three defined benefit pension plans. The Ordinance and Amendment increased the percentage of salary required as the annual contributions of the members of the Plans. The action filed against the City, the Mayor, and members of the Atlanta City Council (collectively “Defendants”), was on behalf of City employees who participated in the Plans prior to November 1, 2011, and had not retired prior to that date, which was the start date for the increase, and were otherwise subject to the Amendment. The complaint alleged that Defendants breached Plaintiffs’ employment contracts and violated the impairment clause of the State Constitution when Defendants passed the portions of the Ordinance which increased the amounts that the Plaintiffs were required to contribute to the Plans, even though Plaintiffs would receive the same amount of retirement benefits to which they were already entitled prior to passage of the Ordinance. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the subject portions of the Ordinance violated the Impairment Clause and that Plaintiffs were not required to continue to make the increased contributions to the Plans, and an order enjoining and restraining Defendants from collecting or attempting to collect the increased contributions. After review of the parties’ arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ claims of breach of contract and unconstitutional impairment of contract and their consequent requests for declaratory and injunctive relief. View "Borders v. Atlanta" on Justia Law

This case returned to the Georgia Supreme Court for a second time. The central issue to this case involved a long-running boundary line dispute between Monroe County and Bibb County. In the prior appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of mandamus relief and remanded the case with direction for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. On remand, the trial court entered an order directing Secretary of State Brian Kemp to consider certain evidence and to preclude him from the consideration of other evidence in determining the true boundary line between the counties. Both the Secretary and Bibb County appealed the trial court’s order. The Supreme Court concluded, after review, that the trial court misapplied the Supreme Court's mandate, and accordingly, reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Kemp v. Monroe Cty." on Justia Law

Mike Layer built a sewer pumping station for Barrow County, and he allegedly entered into an agreement with the County pursuant to which he would retain an interest in a portion of the pumping capacity at the station. Layer, however, failed to get this alleged agreement in writing. After he was refused his alleged interest in the pumping capacity, Layer sued Barrow County, the City of Auburn, and a host of county and city officials (in both their official and individual capacities), asserting breach of contract, unjust enrichment, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, and an unconstitutional taking of his property without just compensation. The trial court dismissed his lawsuit, and Layer appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Layer v. Barrow County" on Justia Law