Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose out of the passage of two weapons related bills passed by the Georgia General Assembly during the 2013-2014 legislative session. Appellant GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc., (“GCO”) filed a complaint against the Code Revision Commission and its members, David Ralston, in his official capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives of Georgia, Lowell Cagle, in his official capacity as President of the Senate of Georgia, and Governor Nathan Deal, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Code Revision Commission (CRC) to amend the text of OCGA 16-11-127.1 and a judgment declaring that it was not a crime for a person with a weapons carry license to carry a firearm within a school safety zone. After motions to dismiss filed by both the Governor and CRC were granted in separate orders, GCO appealed the order granting CRC’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court found that GCO was not entitled to relief under "any state of provable facts" alleged in its amended complaint, there was no actual controversy which would have authorized a declaratory judgment, and the trial did not err in granting CRC's motion to dismiss. View "Georgiacarry.org v. Code Revision Comm'n" on Justia Law

Georgiacarry.org (“Georgia Carry”) filed an “Application for Leave to File an Information in the Nature of Quo Warranto,” against members of the Code Revision Commission in an effort to challenge the right of every individual Commission member to continue serving on the Commission. The superior court denied the application, finding that Georgia Carry lacked standing to pursue a writ of quo warranto, and Georgia Carry appealed that ruling. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court found that because the trial court correctly concluded that Georgia Carry did not have individual standing or associational standing on behalf of its members to pursue a writ of quo warranto, it affirmed the trial court's ruling. View "Georgiacarry.org, Inc. v. Allen" on Justia Law

In 2015, the City of Atlanta proposed to annex property in unincorporated Fulton County that the City recently had acquired, but the County objected. The property at issue was part of the Fulton County Industrial District, and the County pointed the City to a local constitutional amendment, which prohibited the annexation of property within the District. The City then filed a lawsuit against the County, alleging: (1) that the local amendment was never constitutionally adopted; (2) it was repealed in any event by operation of the Constitution of 1983; and (3) local laws purporting to continue the amendment were themselves unconstitutional. The City sought a declaratory judgment that its proposed annexation would be lawful. The trial court entered a declaratory judgment for the City, and the County appealed. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the declaratory judgment for the City, and remanded for the trial court to dismiss the case as nonjusticiable. View "Fulton County v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

Appellee Daniel Massey, who was serving his third consecutive term as Chatham County Superior Court Clerk, filed a writ of mandamus against Chatham County and its Board of Commissioners, and later amended the petition to add a claim for declaratory judgment. The petition sought, among other things, an order declaring him to be entitled to cost-of-living adjustments (“COLAs”) to his salary as provided by general statute (“State COLAs”) as well as by special local legislation (“County COLAs”), and to longevity increases as provided by statute. Massey argued the County deprived him of some of the compensation increases to which he was entitled over his years of service by setting off the COLAs the County claims it paid to him by improperly decreasing, in a corresponding sum, the amount the County was paying to supplement his salary over the statutory minimum. In response, the County argued, among other things, that since it was paying Massey in excess of the statutory minimum, he was not entitled to County COLAs in addition to State COLAs and longevity increases. The County asserted in its counterclaim that Massey had, in fact, been overpaid. The parties agreed that the sole issue in dispute was a matter of statutory interpretation regarding Massey’s entitlement to County COLAs. After reviewing the evidence and arguments presented, the trial court entered an order finding Massey was entitled not only to state-mandated longevity increases and State COLAs provided by general statute but also to County COLAs provided by local legislation. The County appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Chatham County v. Massey" on Justia Law

In May 2012, the International Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan applied to participate in the "Adopt-A-Highway" program, seeking to adopt a one-mile stretch of State Route 515 in Union County. The Department of Transportation, who administered the program, denied their application. The case came to the Georgia Supreme Court as an appeal of right. The appeal was taken, however, from a judgment of a superior court reviewing a decision of a state administrative agency, and under OCGA 5-6-35 (a) (1), there was no appeal of right from such a judgment. An appeal from a judgment of that sort must come instead by way of an application for discretionary review. No such application was filed in this case, and that left the Supreme Court without jurisdiction. For that reason, this appeal was dismissed. View "Georgia v. Int'l Keystone Knights fo the Ku Klux Klan, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved a written contract between a vendor and a state agency that contained form language stipulating that amendments had to be in writing and executed by the agency and the contractor. Appellant Georgia Department of Labor (DOL) entered into the contract in question with appellee RTT Associates, Inc. (RTT) to have some computer software developed for the agency. RTT asserted that the contract was extended by course of conduct as well as by certain internal writings created by the agency. By the terms of Georgia’s constitution, the state waived its sovereign immunity for breach of contract when it enters into a written contract. At issue was whether an agency’s waiver of immunity from a breach of contract claim as a result of entering into a written contract remained intact in the event the contract was extended without a written document signed by both parties expressly amending the contract, as required by its terms. The trial court concluded sovereign immunity was not waived beyond the required completion date of the contract, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding RTT failed to complete its contractual obligations before the contract expired. "Even if the parties’ conduct after the expiration of the contract could be found to demonstrate an agreement between the parties to continue to perform under the original contract, as a matter of law neither that conduct nor the internal documents created by DOL after the contract expired establishes a written contract to do so. Without a written contract, the state’s sovereign immunity from a contract action is not waived." View "Georgia Dept. of Labor v. RTT Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Alfred Fuciarelli was a tenured faculty member at Valdosta State University (“VSU”). Fuciarelli was at one time also assistant vice president for research and a dean of the graduate school. After he complained about VSU’s “noncompliance with laws, rules and regulations,” VSU terminated Fuciarelli’s contract to serve as an assistant vice president and dean. Although Fuciarelli remained as a member of the faculty, his salary and benefits were reduced. Fuciarelli appealed his termination to the Board of Regents which affirmed VSU’s decision. Thereafter, Fuciarelli filed suit against the Board of Regents, William McKinney, individually and in his official capacity as president of VSU, and Karla Hull, individually and in her official capacity as a former acting vice president of VSU, seeking damages under both the Public Employee Whistleblower Retaliation Act, and the Taxpayer Protection Against False Claims Act (“TPAFCA”). The trial court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the public employee whistleblower retaliation claim, but granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the taxpayer retaliation claim on the ground that Fuciarelli failed to obtain the approval of the Attorney General before filing suit. The Georgia Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals to determine whether it correctly held that the TPAFCA did not require the Attorney General to approve taxpayer retaliation claims brought under subsection (l) of the Act. Because the plain language of the statute required the Attorney General to approve a taxpayer retaliation claim prior to filing suit, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals' holding to the contrary. View "McKinney v. Fuciarelli" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case were providers and recipients of Medicaid services for individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities who claimed that the defendant administrative agencies and their commissioners failed to follow the required procedures before reducing the reimbursement rates paid to the providers and limiting the services available to the recipients. The plaintiffs did not submit their claims to the agencies for administrative review, instead filing their lawsuit with the trial court. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, but the Court of Appeals reversed that ruling. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to to decide whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the defendants’ alleged failure to give the plaintiffs proper notice of adverse agency decisions excused the plaintiffs from the exhaustion requirement. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the plaintiffs were required to raise their defective notice claims in the administrative review process in the first instance. View "Georgia Dept. of Behavioral Health Developmental Disabilities v. United Cerebral Palsy of Georgia, Inc." on Justia Law

Although these two cases arose separately, they posed a singular legal issue for the Supreme Court’s review, and thus were addressed in the same opinion. In S15G0887, Akeem Washington, who was on probation for speeding, sued Shannon Rivera, a probation officer, and her administrative assistant, alleging that they failed to perform their ministerial duties when they swore out a warrant for Washington’s arrest for failure to pay a fine that Washington already had paid in fulfillment of the conditions of his probation. Rivera moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing she was immune from liability in Washington’s suit because her alleged actions were protected by either quasi-judicial immunity or sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that it was possible that facts could be shown in discovery that would establish that neither quasi-judicial immunity nor sovereign immunity applied. Rivera did not attempt to file an application for interlocutory appeal from that order but filed a notice of appeal, asserting that she had authority to file a direct appeal under the collateral order doctrine. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. In S15G0912, Dan and Arlene Appelrouth sued their neighbors, Cesar and Janice Rodriguez, also naming Forsyth County and other unknown persons as defendants. The Appelrouths alleged that actions taken on the Rodriguezes’ property, as well as on the County’s road right of way and associated drainage ditch, caused water damage to the Appelrouths’ property, and raised claims of, inter alia, breach of legal duty, negligence per se, trespass, nuisance, and inverse condemnation. The Rodriguezes filed a cross-claim against the County, which filed motions to dismiss both the complaint and cross-claim, asserting sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motions, ruling that it was possible that evidence could be established which would allow the Appelrouths and the Rodriguezes to prevail against the County’s claim of sovereign immunity. The County, like Rivera did not seek interlocutory appeal, and again the Court of Appeals dismissed on direct appeal, citing the collateral order doctrine as grounds for dismissal. Although the Court of Appeals applied incorrect analyses in these cases, the Supreme Court concluded it reached the correct results in dismissing the direct appeals filed by Rivera and Forsyth County. View "Rivera v. Washington" on Justia Law

Aster Zeru Gebrekidan filed an application for discretionary appeal to challenge her conviction and fine for violating a City of Clarkston ordinance that prohibited certain retailers of packaged alcoholic beverages from allowing on their premises any form of electronic or mechanical game machine or coin-operated device that may be used for entertainment or amusement purposes. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Gebrekidan’s application to decide whether the State’s detailed statutory scheme regulating coin operated amusement machines (COAMs) and COAM businesses in Georgia, preempted the City’s ordinance under the Uniformity Clause of the Georgia Constitution. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State’s COAM Laws preempted the City’s ordinance at least insofar as the ordinance applied to COAMs as defined by the state statutes. The Court therefore reversed Gebrekidan’s conviction and fine. View "Gebrekidan v. City of Clarkston" on Justia Law