Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Clayton County Board of Commissioners and its individual members appeal from a writ of mandamus directing the County to give an unspecified job to Joseph Murphy, whom the County previously had employed as Assistant Director of its Department of Community Development. The Board contends, among other things, that the writ is premised on a misunderstanding and misapplication of the County's civil service rules and regulations. As Assistant Director, Murphy was responsible for building inspections to ensure compliance with the County housing code. On the side, Murphy owned a business that did electrical work, and the County had warned him not to inspect any work that his business had done. In 2007, the Director of Community Development terminated Murphy for failing to heed the warning. Murphy appealed his firing to the Civil Service Board ("CSB"), which found that the termination was not supported by sufficient cause, as required by the County's civil service rules. The CSB ordered that Murphy be reinstated, and the County appealed. In the meantime, the Board implemented a reduction in force, which led to the elimination of several positions, including that of Assistant Director. The superior court then dismissed the County's appeal from the reinstatement order, and the County offered Murphy back pay for the period between his termination and the reduction in force. Murphy declined this offer, however, and demanded a job with the County. When he was refused re-employment, Murphy filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the County to offer him employment. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of mandamus relief, finding that Murphy did not have a clear legal right to require the Board to recreate the position of Assistant Director under either Rule 9.204 (which was the Rule raised before the trial court) or Rule 11.310 (as advanced by Murphy on appeal): "While there may have been available jobs 'of the nature' of Murphy's job as Assistant Director, we see nothing in the record establishing that an available job was sufficiently similar to Murphy's prior job as to provide him with a 'clear legal right' to that job. And because the grant of a writ of mandamus requires the petitioner to establish a clear legal right, the trial court erred when it granted the writ." View "Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Murphy" on Justia Law

The issue central to consolidated appeals and cross-appeals was the question of whether property owners were violating a zoning ordinance by operating their property as an event venue. In 2010, East Beach residents began raising complaints to the community homeowners' association and local law enforcement regarding noise, traffic, and parking issues arising from events held at "Villa de Suenos." From that time, Glynn County police investigated more than 20 noise complaints related to the property, many resulting in the issuance of citations or warnings. The property was situated within a single-family residential zoning district classified as “R-6” under the Glynn County Zoning Ordinance. the trial court issued an order on December 20, 2013, adopting the County’s interpretation of its zoning ordinance and directing the owners, Thomas and Lee Burton, to comply with the ordinance, so interpreted, in their future use of the property. The court also denied the Burtons’ equal protection claim, finding that they had presented no evidence of other residential properties in Glynn County that were operated in the same manner as the Burtons’ property but were treated differently by the County. The Burtons appealed, challenging the trial court’s interpretation of the zoning ordinance and its rejection of their equal protection claim; the County cross-appealed, seeking to clarify the nature of the relief the trial court had granted. Subsequently, with the appeal and cross-appeal pending, the County filed a motion for contempt in the trial court, alleging that the Burtons were continuing to promote Villa de Suenos as an event venue and accept bookings for this purpose, in violation of the trial court’s order. Upon review of the arguments made on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly found that the owners were violating the ordinance, and that the court properly issued a declaratory judgment to that effect. View "Burton v. Glynn County" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was a trial court’s order granting a writ of quo warranto based on that court’s conclusion that appellant Ronny Jones was not appointed as attorney for the City of Gordon in accordance with the City’s charter. The quo warranto action was initiated by appellee Joseph Boone, who prior to May 21, 2014, had held the position of city attorney in Gordon for 35 years. At a meeting presided over by Mayor Mary Ann Whipple Lue, a motion was made to terminate Boone’s services for the City as city attorney. The vote on the motion by the council members in attendance was three to two in favor, with one abstention. In the absence of the requisite four votes by council members, the mayor voted in favor of the motion, resulting in a vote of four to two. After some discussion about the immediacy of pending legal matters, Boone’s continuing legal and ethical obligations to the City, and the necessity of transferring Boone’s files, a motion was made to authorize Mayor Lue to appoint an interim city attorney. The vote on this motion was again three to two in favor, with one abstention; the mayor again concluded that she was authorized to vote and cast her vote in favor of the motion. The following day, Mayor Lue announced that she had appointed Jones as the new city attorney. Jones challenged the procedural posture of Boone’s petition for writ of quo warranto, arguing both that Boone did not have standing to seek the writ and that the trial court did not grant Boone the necessary leave to file his petition. Further, Jones argued that the trial court erred in holding that the mayor was without authority to appoint a city attorney, and that she had authority to treat an abstention as a negative vote. The Supreme Court found Boone indeed had standing to bring his petition, and that the abstention by one member was no vote. The sole authority to appoint a city attorney remained with the city council, and Jones' appointment as city attorney by the mayor was invalid. View "Jones v. Boone" on Justia Law

Appellants Larry Savage, Richard Pellegrino, and Tucker Hobgood challenged a trial court’s validation of revenue bonds that will be used to help finance a new stadium in Cobb County for the Atlanta Braves major league baseball team. The bonds for the stadium project were to be issued pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement between Cobb County and the Cobb-Marietta Coliseum and Exhibit Hall Authority, under which the Authority agreed to issue bonds to cover much of the cost of constructing the stadium and the County agreed to pay amounts sufficient to cover the bond payments not covered by the licensing fees paid by the team. In consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court concluded that the intergovernmental contract was valid; that the issuance of the bonds would not violate the Georgia Constitution’s debt limitation clause, gratuities clause, or lending clause or Georgia’s revenue bond laws; and that the process used to validate the bonds was not deficient. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s judgment validating the stadium project bonds. View "Savage v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted a discretionary appeal of Elbert County, its Board of Commissioners, and the County Manager (collectively, “the County”) of a superior court order that, inter alia, granted a declaratory judgment to the effect that the Elbert County Solid Waste Disposal Ordinance was unconstitutional, denied the County’s motion to dismiss, and issued a writ of mandamus requiring the County to reasonably consider the site proposed by Sweet City Landfill, LLC and its members for a solid waste landfill. Taking each of the County's contentions of error in turn, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in its decision as to all. The case was remanded therefore for further proceedings. View "Elbert County v. Sweet City Landfill, LLC" on Justia Law

Lynn Eshleman was employed with the DeKalb County Police Department as a law enforcement officer and dog handler, and in connection with her employment, she took care of Andor, a police dog trained to assist in the apprehension of persons suspected of criminal activity. When Eshleman was off-duty, Andor lived with her at her Walton County home, down the street from Benjamin Key. One day in 2011, Eshleman put Andor into a portable kennel outside her home, but she evidently failed to secure the kennel door. As a result, Andor escaped into the neighborhood, where the dog encountered Key’s eleven-year-old son. According to Key, the dog attacked his son, causing the child to sustain serious injuries to his arm. Key sued Eshleman, alleging that she failed to restrain Andor, and Eshleman moved for summary judgment on the ground of official immunity. The trial court denied her motion, Eshleman appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. In this case, there was no evidence that DeKalb County gave specific direction to Eshleman about the extent to which she was to keep Andor restrained when she was not working. Key argued that the law imposed an absolute and sufficiently specific duty upon Eshleman to keep the dog under restraint, and in support of this contention, pointed to OCGA 51-2-7 and a Walton County ordinance. The statute recognized that "the keeper of an animal known to have vicious or dangerous propensities owed a duty of care with respect to the management and restraint of the animal for the protection of those who may come into contact with it." But the question, in the context of official immunity, was not merely whether an officer owed a duty of care, but rather, whether the official owed a duty that was particularized and certain enough to render her duty a ministerial one. "The duties that Eshleman was alleged to have violated were not ministerial ones because, although the duties reflected in OCGA 51-2-7 and the county ordinance may be definite, they do not require merely the carrying out of a specified task. [. . .] They require, instead, an exercise of personal deliberation and judgment about what is reasonable in the particular circumstances presented." The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred when it denied the motion for summary judgment on the ground of official immunity, and the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that denial was also reversed. View "Eshelman v. Key" on Justia Law

This case involved a highly contentious dispute over certain official actions of Mary Ann Whipple Lue, Mayor of the City of Gordon. Mayor Lue was the first African-American to be elected mayor of Gordon, sworn into office in 2014. Barely two months after being sworn in, two members of the city council and five other citizens filed a complaint against Mayor Lue in her official capacity, which was later amended, seeking removal of Mayor Lue for various actions alleged to be examples of conduct demonstrating incompetence, misfeasance, and malfeasance in office, which, according to the complaint, provide grounds for removal from office pursuant to the City of Gordon Charter. According to the complaint, these actions fell into three categories: alleged violations of the Georgia Open Meetings Act; alleged violations of the city charter, city code, and city personnel policy; and alleged financial malfeasance. The trial court denied Mayor Lue's motions to dismiss the complaint. Shortly thereafter, the trial court granted the motion for a temporary restraining order filed by plaintiffs, pursuant to which the mayor was temporarily suspended from office until such time as a hearing could be held on plaintiffs' motion for interlocutory injunction. Mayor Lue filed a motion to recuse the trial court judge, alleging improper ex parte communications between the judge and plaintiffs' counsel with respect to the temporary restraining order hearing, and that motion was denied. After a hearing on plaintiffs' motion for interlocutory injunction, the trial court granted the motion and entered an order, which was later amended, by which Mayor Lue was reinstated to office, subject to certain conditions imposed on her, including a prohibition from her meeting privately with three or more council members to discuss city business and a requirement that any such meetings must be open to the public with notice provided to the public as required by law. Mayor Lue appealed the denial of her motions to dismiss, the denial of her motion to recuse the trial court judge, and certain terms of the interlocutory injunction order and amended order. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court found no error in the trial court's denial of the motion to recuse. To the extent that the trial court order enjoined the mayor from meeting privately with three city council members, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court's grant of the injunction with respect to the mayor's participation in such meetings was based upon an erroneous interpretation of the Charter. Consequently, the trial court erred in denying Mayor Lue's motion to dismiss that portion of the complaint seeking to nullify certain city council decisions on the ground they were made in violation of the Open Meetings Act. View "Lue v. Eady" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted petitions for certiorari filed by appellants Judson Turner, the Director of the Environmental Protection Division (EPD) of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (DNR), and the Grady County Board of Commissioners. They appealed the Court of Appeals' decision in "Georgia River Network v. Turner," (762 SE2d 123 (2014)). In 2010, Grady County received federal approval to construct a 960-acre fishing lake. The project also entailed building a large dam and inundating wetlands and nine miles of streams to create the lake. To proceed with the project, Grady County was required to apply for a buffer variance through the EPD in order to disturb the stream waters that would be affected by the project. Non-profit appellees Georgia River Network and American Rivers challenged the variance, arguing that Grady County's application was deficient because it failed to address buffers for the wetlands that would also be affected by the project. The Director granted the variance over appellees' objections. In a separate letter, the EPD advised appellees that wetlands did not require buffers because they generally lack wrested vegetation and were not subject to a variance request. An ALJ overturned the variance, reasoning that OCGA 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A) of the Erosion and Sedimentation Act required a buffer for all state waters, including wetlands. The Director and Grady County filed challenged the ALJ's decision in the superior courts of Fulton County and Grady County, respectively. On the substantive issue of the construction and interpretation of OCGA 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A), both trial courts determined that the Director's construction of the statute was correct and that the buffer requirement only applies to state waters that have wrested vegetation. Appellees then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals found the ALJ had not erred and reversed the decisions of the trial courts. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in its judgment, and reversed. View "Turner v. Georgia River Network" on Justia Law

Kelly Kautz, the mayor of Snellville, filed a declaratory action against the members of the Snellville city council, seeking a declaration that she, as mayor, had sole authority to terminate the employment of the city attorney. The trial court ruled against her, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the city council, rather than the mayor, retained the sole power to remove the city attorney. The Supreme Court reversed, finding in the Snellville city charter that "[t]he mayor shall appoint the city attorney, together with such assistant city attorneys as may be authorized, and shall provide for the payment of such attorney or attorneys for services rendered to the city. [. . .] Once the mayor has fulfilled his or her duty to appoint a city attorney, the city attorney can thereafter serve for an indefinite time, as it is undisputed in this case that there is nothing in the Snellville city charter to restrict the city attorney's appointment to office, and the city attorney's term of office is not otherwise prescribed by law." The Court of Appeals erred in concluding otherwise. View "Kautz v. Powell" on Justia Law

In March 2011, the Chief Judge of the Clayton Judicial Circuit, at the request of the Clayton County District Attorney, issued an order authorizing the impaneling of a special purpose grand jury to investigate certain alleged public corruption. The special purpose grand jury issued subpoenas to various witnesses, including appellee John Lampl, who testified before it in June 2011. In July 2011, the special purpose grand jury returned a 16-count bill of indictment against Lampl on charges of conspiracy in restraint of free and open competition, false statements and writings, and perjury. The indictment was subsequently nolle prossed in the aftermath of the Court of Appeals’ holding in "Kenerly v. Georgia," (715 SE2d 688) (2011)), that the authority of a special purpose grand jury is limited to conducting investigations and does not include the power to issue indictments. Shortly thereafter, in September 2011, Lampl was indicted by a regular Clayton County grand jury on eight counts, including one perjury count, similar to those charged in the special purpose grand jury’s initial indictment. The conspiracy and false statements counts all pertain to alleged conduct by Lampl in his capacity as City Manager for the City of Morrow, in connection with a City real estate development project known as "Olde Towne Morrow." The Georgia Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari in this case to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the superior court’s order dismissing a particular count of the indictment and suppressing statements made by the defendant before the special purpose grand jury. While the Supreme Court agreed with the superior court’s conclusion that the special purpose grand jury exceeded the scope of its authority in its investigation, the Court held that the relief granted was improper. The Court therefore reversed. View "Georgia v. Lampl" on Justia Law