Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Georgia Supreme Court granted a discretionary appeal of Elbert County, its Board of Commissioners, and the County Manager (collectively, “the County”) of a superior court order that, inter alia, granted a declaratory judgment to the effect that the Elbert County Solid Waste Disposal Ordinance was unconstitutional, denied the County’s motion to dismiss, and issued a writ of mandamus requiring the County to reasonably consider the site proposed by Sweet City Landfill, LLC and its members for a solid waste landfill. Taking each of the County's contentions of error in turn, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in its decision as to all. The case was remanded therefore for further proceedings. View "Elbert County v. Sweet City Landfill, LLC" on Justia Law

Lynn Eshleman was employed with the DeKalb County Police Department as a law enforcement officer and dog handler, and in connection with her employment, she took care of Andor, a police dog trained to assist in the apprehension of persons suspected of criminal activity. When Eshleman was off-duty, Andor lived with her at her Walton County home, down the street from Benjamin Key. One day in 2011, Eshleman put Andor into a portable kennel outside her home, but she evidently failed to secure the kennel door. As a result, Andor escaped into the neighborhood, where the dog encountered Key’s eleven-year-old son. According to Key, the dog attacked his son, causing the child to sustain serious injuries to his arm. Key sued Eshleman, alleging that she failed to restrain Andor, and Eshleman moved for summary judgment on the ground of official immunity. The trial court denied her motion, Eshleman appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. In this case, there was no evidence that DeKalb County gave specific direction to Eshleman about the extent to which she was to keep Andor restrained when she was not working. Key argued that the law imposed an absolute and sufficiently specific duty upon Eshleman to keep the dog under restraint, and in support of this contention, pointed to OCGA 51-2-7 and a Walton County ordinance. The statute recognized that "the keeper of an animal known to have vicious or dangerous propensities owed a duty of care with respect to the management and restraint of the animal for the protection of those who may come into contact with it." But the question, in the context of official immunity, was not merely whether an officer owed a duty of care, but rather, whether the official owed a duty that was particularized and certain enough to render her duty a ministerial one. "The duties that Eshleman was alleged to have violated were not ministerial ones because, although the duties reflected in OCGA 51-2-7 and the county ordinance may be definite, they do not require merely the carrying out of a specified task. [. . .] They require, instead, an exercise of personal deliberation and judgment about what is reasonable in the particular circumstances presented." The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred when it denied the motion for summary judgment on the ground of official immunity, and the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that denial was also reversed. View "Eshelman v. Key" on Justia Law

This case involved a highly contentious dispute over certain official actions of Mary Ann Whipple Lue, Mayor of the City of Gordon. Mayor Lue was the first African-American to be elected mayor of Gordon, sworn into office in 2014. Barely two months after being sworn in, two members of the city council and five other citizens filed a complaint against Mayor Lue in her official capacity, which was later amended, seeking removal of Mayor Lue for various actions alleged to be examples of conduct demonstrating incompetence, misfeasance, and malfeasance in office, which, according to the complaint, provide grounds for removal from office pursuant to the City of Gordon Charter. According to the complaint, these actions fell into three categories: alleged violations of the Georgia Open Meetings Act; alleged violations of the city charter, city code, and city personnel policy; and alleged financial malfeasance. The trial court denied Mayor Lue's motions to dismiss the complaint. Shortly thereafter, the trial court granted the motion for a temporary restraining order filed by plaintiffs, pursuant to which the mayor was temporarily suspended from office until such time as a hearing could be held on plaintiffs' motion for interlocutory injunction. Mayor Lue filed a motion to recuse the trial court judge, alleging improper ex parte communications between the judge and plaintiffs' counsel with respect to the temporary restraining order hearing, and that motion was denied. After a hearing on plaintiffs' motion for interlocutory injunction, the trial court granted the motion and entered an order, which was later amended, by which Mayor Lue was reinstated to office, subject to certain conditions imposed on her, including a prohibition from her meeting privately with three or more council members to discuss city business and a requirement that any such meetings must be open to the public with notice provided to the public as required by law. Mayor Lue appealed the denial of her motions to dismiss, the denial of her motion to recuse the trial court judge, and certain terms of the interlocutory injunction order and amended order. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court found no error in the trial court's denial of the motion to recuse. To the extent that the trial court order enjoined the mayor from meeting privately with three city council members, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court's grant of the injunction with respect to the mayor's participation in such meetings was based upon an erroneous interpretation of the Charter. Consequently, the trial court erred in denying Mayor Lue's motion to dismiss that portion of the complaint seeking to nullify certain city council decisions on the ground they were made in violation of the Open Meetings Act. View "Lue v. Eady" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted petitions for certiorari filed by appellants Judson Turner, the Director of the Environmental Protection Division (EPD) of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (DNR), and the Grady County Board of Commissioners. They appealed the Court of Appeals' decision in "Georgia River Network v. Turner," (762 SE2d 123 (2014)). In 2010, Grady County received federal approval to construct a 960-acre fishing lake. The project also entailed building a large dam and inundating wetlands and nine miles of streams to create the lake. To proceed with the project, Grady County was required to apply for a buffer variance through the EPD in order to disturb the stream waters that would be affected by the project. Non-profit appellees Georgia River Network and American Rivers challenged the variance, arguing that Grady County's application was deficient because it failed to address buffers for the wetlands that would also be affected by the project. The Director granted the variance over appellees' objections. In a separate letter, the EPD advised appellees that wetlands did not require buffers because they generally lack wrested vegetation and were not subject to a variance request. An ALJ overturned the variance, reasoning that OCGA 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A) of the Erosion and Sedimentation Act required a buffer for all state waters, including wetlands. The Director and Grady County filed challenged the ALJ's decision in the superior courts of Fulton County and Grady County, respectively. On the substantive issue of the construction and interpretation of OCGA 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A), both trial courts determined that the Director's construction of the statute was correct and that the buffer requirement only applies to state waters that have wrested vegetation. Appellees then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals found the ALJ had not erred and reversed the decisions of the trial courts. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in its judgment, and reversed. View "Turner v. Georgia River Network" on Justia Law

Kelly Kautz, the mayor of Snellville, filed a declaratory action against the members of the Snellville city council, seeking a declaration that she, as mayor, had sole authority to terminate the employment of the city attorney. The trial court ruled against her, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the city council, rather than the mayor, retained the sole power to remove the city attorney. The Supreme Court reversed, finding in the Snellville city charter that "[t]he mayor shall appoint the city attorney, together with such assistant city attorneys as may be authorized, and shall provide for the payment of such attorney or attorneys for services rendered to the city. [. . .] Once the mayor has fulfilled his or her duty to appoint a city attorney, the city attorney can thereafter serve for an indefinite time, as it is undisputed in this case that there is nothing in the Snellville city charter to restrict the city attorney's appointment to office, and the city attorney's term of office is not otherwise prescribed by law." The Court of Appeals erred in concluding otherwise. View "Kautz v. Powell" on Justia Law

In March 2011, the Chief Judge of the Clayton Judicial Circuit, at the request of the Clayton County District Attorney, issued an order authorizing the impaneling of a special purpose grand jury to investigate certain alleged public corruption. The special purpose grand jury issued subpoenas to various witnesses, including appellee John Lampl, who testified before it in June 2011. In July 2011, the special purpose grand jury returned a 16-count bill of indictment against Lampl on charges of conspiracy in restraint of free and open competition, false statements and writings, and perjury. The indictment was subsequently nolle prossed in the aftermath of the Court of Appeals’ holding in "Kenerly v. Georgia," (715 SE2d 688) (2011)), that the authority of a special purpose grand jury is limited to conducting investigations and does not include the power to issue indictments. Shortly thereafter, in September 2011, Lampl was indicted by a regular Clayton County grand jury on eight counts, including one perjury count, similar to those charged in the special purpose grand jury’s initial indictment. The conspiracy and false statements counts all pertain to alleged conduct by Lampl in his capacity as City Manager for the City of Morrow, in connection with a City real estate development project known as "Olde Towne Morrow." The Georgia Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari in this case to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the superior court’s order dismissing a particular count of the indictment and suppressing statements made by the defendant before the special purpose grand jury. While the Supreme Court agreed with the superior court’s conclusion that the special purpose grand jury exceeded the scope of its authority in its investigation, the Court held that the relief granted was improper. The Court therefore reversed. View "Georgia v. Lampl" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a contract with the Greene County Board of Education, Lake Oconee Academy, Inc. operated a public charter school. The Greene County Development Authority proposed to issue $14 million in revenue bonds to finance a new facility for the school. The Authority entered into an intergovernmental agreement with Greene County whereby the Country contracted to pay the Authority towards the indebtedness on the bonds. The County contemplated those amounts would be paid for by raising an ad valorem tax. The Authority also proposed a lease agreement with the Academy, whereby the Academy would have use of the facility so long as there was indebtedness outstanding. The State filed a petition to validate the bonds, and several Greene County residents intervened to object to the validation. After a hearing, the trial court refused validation on several grounds. The County, Authority and Academy appealed. "The trial court here did not explain in its order exactly why it found that the proposal was not sound, feasible, and reasonable, but the appellants do not appear to have asked for any detailed explanation of that finding, and we can glean from the record some concerns about the proposal that the trial court may have had.[ . . .] the record permitted the trial court to find that the proposal was not sound, feasible and reasonable," and for that reason, the Supreme Court could not say that the trial court erred when it refused to validate the bonds. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Greene County Development Authority v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a superior court's validation of roughly $200 million in municipal bonds (the "2014 NSP Bonds") that were to be issued by the Atlanta Development Authority d/b/a Invest Atlanta ("Invest Atlanta"). Invest Atlanta and the Geo. L. Smith II Georgia World Congress Center Authority (collectively, the "New Stadium Entities") proposed to have the 2014 NSP Bonds issued for the purpose of funding a portion of the cost of developing, constructing, and operating a new stadium facility in downtown Atlanta for the Atlanta Falcons professional football team. Additional funding for the NSP would have been provided by the Atlanta Falcons Stadium Company, LLC ("StadCo"), a company associated with the Atlanta Falcons Football Club, LLC, as well as through the sale of personal seat licenses. On February 4, 2014, the State filed a Petition for Bond Validation in the superior court to authorize the issuance of the 2014 NSP Bonds. Several individuals moved to intervene in the proceedings to file objections to the bond validation, and the trial court allowed them to do so. Among other things, the intervenors contended that OCGA 48-13-51 (a) (5) (B) was an unconstitutional special law. The trial court ultimately entered a Validation Order and Final Judgment validating the 2014 NSP Bonds and overruling all objections. One of the intervenors appealed that ruling. However, finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cottrell v. Atlanta Dev. Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted appellant Paul Kanitra’s application to address whether, as a holdover member of the City of Greensboro Planning and Zoning Board (the “Board”), he could only be removed for cause or whether the City Council of the City of Greensboro had the authority to replace him with a successor without regard to cause. After review, the Supreme Court concluded (as did the trial court) that the City Council had authority to appoint someone to replace appellant without regard to cause. View "Kanitra v. City of Greensboro" on Justia Law

Lucious Primas was injured while driving a prison work-detail van owned by the City of Milledgeville. The van was leased to the Georgia Department of Corrections but pursuant to contract, the City was responsible for maintaining the vehicle and purchasing insurance policies. On the day of the accident, as Primas approached an intersection, the brake line failed. Primas was able to steer the car off the road, but he was injured when he collided with a utility pole. Primas sued the City, alleging it was negligent by failing to inspect and maintain the vehicle’s brake lines. The trial court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment in which it claimed the maintenance and inspection of a brake line was a discretionary act for which its sovereign immunity had not been waived. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Primas’ claim against the City was barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity because the alleged negligent act was a discretionary act for which sovereign immunity had not been waived under Georgia law. Because the Supreme Court found that the proper analysis was not applied, it vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for reconsideration. View "Primas v. City of Milledgeville" on Justia Law