Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal stemmed from complaints filed by appellants Advanced Disposal Services Middle Georgia, LLC and Lowndes County, seeking injunctions prohibiting appellee Deep South Sanitation, LLC from providing solid waste collection and disposal services in the unincorporated areas of Lowndes County in violation of a newly enacted Lowndes County ordinance. The trial court denied appellants' requests for injunctive relief, and they appealed. The trial court determined that injunctive relief could not be granted in favor of appellants because enforcement of the Ordinance would violate Deep South's due process rights by interfering with its right to conduct business in the same manner as before enactment of the Ordinance. Because Deep South's substantive due process defense involved neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right, the Supreme Court applied a rational relationship test to determine whether enforcement of the Ordinance against Deep South would violate due process. Applying this test, the Court concluded the trial court erred by holding that enforcement of the Ordinance against Deep South would violate its due process rights. Furthermore, the Court found the trial court erred that the County's enforcement of the Ordinance through an injunction would have violated Deep South's substantive due process rights. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Advanced Disposal Services Middle Georgia, LLC v. Deep South Sanitation, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2010, the City of Sandy Springs and two individual homeowners, John E. Balsam and Jerry Burnstein, filed suit against Fulton County, its Board of Commissioners, and its Director of Public Works. Sandy Springs sought a declaratory judgment, mandamus, and injunctive relief on whether Fulton County retained ownership of and responsibility for two drainage retention ponds and a dam located within Sandy Springs. Following a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of Sandy Springs, and Fulton County appealed, contending that it was prohibited from maintaining the detention ponds pursuant to the Georgia constitution. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court found that Fulton County retained current ownership of and responsibility for the easements it held over the dam and retention ponds located in Sandy Springs. However, any concomitant responsibility continued only until the easements at issue were legally transferred, terminated, or prospectively abandoned. As a result, to the extent that the trial court's order could be read to indicate that Fulton County had to maintain the easements in perpetuity, the Court reversed. View "Fulton County v. City of Sandy Springs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals properly applied the principle of "priority jurisdiction" when it held that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to terminate Emmanuel Alizota's parental rights and erred in granting Ryan and Melissa Stanfield's petition for the adoption of S.K. The Court of Appeals determined that because the juvenile court had previously exercised jurisdiction over a deprivation proceeding involving Alizota and S.K. and had entered a temporary long-term custody agreement, the doctrine of priority jurisdiction deprived the superior court of jurisdiction over the termination proceeding. Based on that, the Court of Appeals vacated the superior court’s order and declined to consider Alizota's appeal on the merits. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in holding the superior court lacked jurisdiction over the termination proceeding. View "Standfield v. Alizota" on Justia Law

Monroe and Bibb Counties have fought over the true boundary line separating the two. At some time during the fight, the Superior Court attempted to resolve the dispute by ordering the Secretary of State to accept a line identified by a State-appointed land surveyor as the true boundary. The Supreme Court granted applications for discretionary appeal (filed separately by Bibb County and the Secretary of State) to address the Superior Court's order. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court lacked the authority to require the Secretary of State to accept a particular line as the true boundary. "Specifically, while mandamus is authorized to compel the Secretary to consider the relevant law and evidence, to determine the true boundary line between the counties, and to record the survey and plat reflecting that boundary line, mandamus is not authorized to dictate where the boundary line is to be located. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings." View "Bibb County v. Monroe County" on Justia Law

Landowners appealed the Superior Court of Monroe County's denial and dismissal of their petition for a writ of mandamus and related adverse rulings involving their real property tax appeals. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court. View "Newton Timber Co., L.L.L.P. v. Monroe County Bd. of Tax Assessors" on Justia Law

Burke County, its Commissioners, and members of the Commission appealed the superior court’s grant of a writ of mandamus requiring the County to repair, maintain and construct certain roads dedicated to the County. In the preceding appeal and cross-appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s grant of mandamus relief and remanded the case with direction for the court to reconsider under the proper legal standard that portion of its ruling requiring the County to construct and maintain a previously unopened section of roadway. On remand, the superior court again issued a writ of mandamus granting the relief requested and the County appeals. Upon reconsideration of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Burke County v. Askin" on Justia Law

On remand, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Georgia Revenue Commissioner on Southern LNG, Inc.'s request for the writ of mandamus, on the ground that Southern had an adequate alternative remedy in the form of tax appeals brought under OCGA 48-5-311. The court said that Southern could raise, and had raised, its statutory claim that it was a public utility required to return its property to the Commissioner rather than to Chatham County in appeals of the county’s tax assessments to the county board of equalization and then to the Chatham County Superior Court. Upon second review of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court's analysis was incomplete: "the Chatham County tax appeals, as currently constituted, appear not to provide Southern with an adequate alternative to mandamus. . . . The parties have not briefed [their] issues here or below; the trial court did not address them; and this Court should not try to resolve them in the first instance." Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Commissioner and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie" on Justia Law

Solid wate, recycling, composting and waste water processing facility appellant Wilbros, LLC is subject to the requirements of the Georgia Comprehensive Solid Waste Management Act and related regulations. By Consent Order executed by Wilbros and the Environmental Protection Division of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (EPD), Wilbros agreed to pay the Department of Natural Resources $25,000 in compromise and settlement of various disputed violations referenced in the Consent Order. A few months afterward, Wilbros was charged with violation of Stephens County ordinance sections 34-73 (3) and (4). Wilbros and the state court solicitor filed a written stipulation in the case stipulating that Wilbros had been ordered by the EPD to pay a fine for statutory violations of odor issues at the facility and that the operative dates for those violations encompassed the same dates alleged in the local ordinance violation charge. Wilbros filed a plea in bar of prosecution, raising double jeopardy, a preemption challenge, and a constitutional challenge asserting the ordinance was void for vagueness. The trial court denied Wilbros's plea, specifically concluding there was no Georgia authority that permitted a corporation to assert Fifth Amendment double jeopardy protection under the Georgia or United States constitutions, finding that the preemption argument failed, and finding that the county ordinance was constitutional. The trial court also granted Wilbros the right to pretrial appeal. The case was transferred to the Supreme Court because it raised the constitutionality of the county ordinance, an issue over which the Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction. Upon careful consideration, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Wilbros's plea in bar of prosecution. View "Wilbros, LLC v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred injunctive relief at common law. Appellees Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc. (and David and Melinda Egan) filed a declaratory judgment suit against Appellants Georgia Department of Natural Resources (DNR), and DNR's Coastal Resources Division (CRD), by and through its director A.G. "Spud" Woodward. In its suit, the Center sought to enjoin the State from issuing Letters of Permission (LOPs) to third parties authorizing land alterations to property within the jurisdiction of the Shore Protection Act. The trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss the Center's petition, finding that the Center was not entitled to declaratory relief because the State had not waived sovereign immunity, and, even if it had, there was no justiciable controversy. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the trial court had correctly dismissed the Center's declaratory judgment claim as non-justiciable but improperly dismissed the injunctive relief claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that sovereign immunity barred injunctive relief against the State at common law. View "Georgia Dept. of Nat'l Resources v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2010, the Department of Transportation (DOT) initiated condemnation proceedings for property owned by Brian McMeans. The condemnation petition named as defendants, inter alia, McMeans, and McMeans Leasing, Inc. (MLI), a corporation owned solely by McMeans. McMeans filed an answer acknowledging that he was the "owner of the property loosely described in" the condemnation petition, and alleging damages of at least $1.3 million. MLI filed an amendment to the answer McMeans filed in order "to provide that said Answer was for [MLI], a corporation solely owned by Brian K. McMeans." This pleading stated that McMeans was the owner of the property, that MLI was a leasehold tenant, and that MLI would sustain damages for business losses resulting from its removal from the property. At the same time, McMeans filed a pleading, "Answer of Brian K. McMeans," in which he alleged damages of at least $1.3 million as a result of lost uses of the property, interruption in his business income, loss of business, and damage to his business in addition to the value of the condemned real estate. Following a hearing, the trial court granted DOT’s motion and struck both pleadings. MLI filed a direct appeal, which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals on jurisdictional grounds because it was not an appeal from a final judgment; McMeans filed an application for interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals, which was granted, and he appealed the trial court’s order striking his "First Amendment" to his answer. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that it erred to the extent it ruled that McMeans could not plead a business loss based on his failure to include it earlier and that he could not plead a loss from the business he owns and operates on the condemned property. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the appellate court erred in its decision. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals indeed erred in its decision, and reversed. View "Dept. of Transportation v. McMeans" on Justia Law