Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

James Whitfield filed suit against the City of Atlanta and Secure Parking Enforcement, LLC (SPE) after his car was booted in Northeast Atlanta while illegally parked in a lot reserved for customers of a dry cleaning business. In his complaint, Whitfield sought a declaration that the City ordinance authorizing and regulating vehicle immobilization was unconstitutional and that the practice of booting was thus unlawful. In the alternative, Whitfield contended that the signage in the parking lot where SPE had booted his car failed to comply with certain specifications prescribed in the immobilization ordinance, thus entitling him to recover as damages the cost of removing the immobilization device. The trial court granted the City's motion to dismiss and ordered SPE, whose answer had been filed by its owner (a non-lawyer), to obtain counsel by a certain date. When SPE failed to do so, the trial court struck SPE's answer and entered a default judgment against SPE for the cost of removing the boot plus court costs. The trial court rejected Whitfield's contention that the ordinance was unconstitutional. Despite prevailing on his damages claim, Whitfield appealed, contending that the trial court erred in dismissing the City from the suit, and determining that the vehicle immobilization ordinance was constitutional. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred by not considering the merits of Whitfield's constitutional challenge. The Court vacated that portion of the trial court's judgment, but affirmed in all other respects. View "Whitfield v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

East Georgia Land and Development Company, LLC sued Newton County and several of its officers for a writ of mandamus, arguing that a zoning ordinance adopted by the County in May1985 was invalid. The trial court agreed that the zoning ordinance is invalid, it awarded summary judgment to East Georgia. The County appealed. The zoning ordinance at issue referred to (and purported to incorporate by reference) a set of maps identified in the ordinance as the "Official Zoning District Maps for Newton County." These maps are an integral part of the zoning ordinance. The only such maps that appeared in the record, however, were adopted by the County on July 2, 1985, and nothing in the record showed that those maps even were in existence in May 1985. "A map not yet in existence cannot have been 'made a public record' and certainly is not 'accessible to members of the public who are, or may be, affected by it.'" The trial court found, and as a result, concluded that the ordinance was void at the moment of its enactment. The Supreme Court saw no error in the findings of the trial court on this point, nor in its conclusion that the ordinance was void from its inception. View "Newton County v. East Georgia Land & Development Cp., LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was an “ante litem notice.” Kimberly Myers arrived for class at Dalton State College and allegedly stepped on the edge of an unrepaired pothole in the parking lot and was injured. She received emergency medical treatment that day, had follow-up orthopedic doctor visits, and began physical therapy. Myers sent an ante litem notice to the Georgia Department of Administrative Services, stating she intended to sue the Board of Regents for negligence based on the allegedly unsafe condition of the parking lot that led to her fractured left ankle and torn tendons. Under a provision of the Georgia Tort Claims Act, the State government may not be sued in a civil action without first being given notice of the claim. In her ante litem notice, Myers’ attorney provided details of what had happened to her and stated: “The amount of Ms. Myers’ loss is yet to be determined as she is still incurring medical bills and does not yet know the full extent of her injury.” The question in this case centered on whether the language in the ante litem notice was a sufficient statement of the amount of loss claimed. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court correctly recognized Myers "failed entirely to comply with a requirement despite having knowledge.” View "Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia v. Myers" on Justia Law

In 2010, Judge C. Donald Peppers, Sr. was reelected to the State Court of Walker County for a term of office from Jan. 1, 2011 through Dec. 31, 2014. Peppers decided to retire after the term began, effective June 30, 2011. On Oct. 3, 2011, the governor appointed Bruce Roberts for the remainder of Judge Peppers' term. On Sept. 30, 2011, prior to taking office, Roberts met with Bebe Heiskell, the sole Commissioner of Walker County, to discuss his salary. Heiskell explained that $60,000 was the minimum salary set by local statute but she didn’t want him to make less than he was presently earning. She asked Roberts what he currently made; he said $94,000; and she said she would start him at $100,000. He asked for $110,000 but she said budget constraints would prevent that. Roberts claims he never agreed to this salary and objected to it several times, recognizing that Peppers had earned $172,102.80. Roberts was sworn into office on Oct. 3, 2011 and had to run for election in the nonpartisan primary in July 2012, but he lost, meaning that his term of office was set to end Dec. 31, 2012. Following his defeat, Roberts sued Heiskell and Walker County, seeking a “writ of mandamus” to force the County to pay him $89,881.88 for the difference between what it would have paid Peppers and what it had paid him. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in concluding that Roberts was entitled to the same compensation his predecessor received because he had been appointed to the previous judge’s “unexpired term:” “[u]nlike persons appointed to fill vacancies in most other public offices, appointees to state, superior, and appellate judgeships do not serve out the ‘unexpired term’ of their predecessors.” Roberts relied on cases involving the salaries of magistrate judges who were appointed to fill vacancies. Roberts did not be View "Heiskell v. Roberts" on Justia Law

The Georgia Department of Corrections (GDOC) entered into a construction contract with Lewis Walker Roofing (Walker Roofing) to re-roof several buildings at Valdosta State Prison. The Contract contained two “no assignment” clauses, and as a prerequisite to contracting with GDOC, Walker Roofing was required to obtain payment and performance bonds. It obtained such payment and performance bonds from Developers Surety and Indemnity Company. Walker Roofing did not complete its work within the time frame required by the Contract, and GDOC declared Walker Roofing in default. Developers Surety did not notify GDOC within 25 days of receipt of GDOC's notice of default regarding whether it would remedy the default or perform the contract. However, approximately three months after the declaration of default, Developers Surety gave GDOC the option of entering into a contract with another company for the completion of the work. GDOC then contracted with that company to finish the project. Under the payment and performance bonds and prior to Walker Roofing's default, Developers Surety had provided financial assistance to Walker Roofing. Developers Surety filed suit against GDOC for breach of contract and for a declaratory judgment that it had no obligation under the payment and performance bond it issued to Walker Roofing on behalf of GDOC. GDOC filed a counterclaim for breach of contract. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the trial court determined that Developers Surety's claims were not barred by sovereign immunity and that GDOC had breached the construction contract as a matter of law. It concluded that GDOC waived its sovereign immunity by entering into the contract with Walker Roofing, and that the doctrine of equitable subrogation gave Developers Surety the ability to file suit against GDOC once it incurred liability and paid the obligations of its principal under the bond. Consequently, the trial court granted summary judgment to Developers Surety and denied it to GDOC; in the same order, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Developers Surety in the amount equal to the "financial assistance" Developers Surety provided to Walker Roofing. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the State’s sovereign immunity was waived for the claim Developers Surety made on its contract with the State. The Supreme Court found that immunity was indeed waived in this instance, and accordingly, it affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Georgia Dept. of Corrections v. Developers Surety & Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

Appellee Yvonne Butler was a principal at a DeKalb County elementary school. Appellant DeKalb County School District notified appellee it would be terminating her employment for: (1) incompetency; (2) insubordination; (3) wilful neglect of duties; and (4)for other good and sufficient cause. Appellee was placed on suspension while the charges were pending. A hearing was scheduled pursuant to the Fair Dismissal Act (FDA), but the parties agreed to a continuance. The record revealed the hearing never took place. Appellant offered appellee, in lieu of termination, a contract for a classroom teaching position for the 2011- 2012 school year and required that she sign and return the contract before May 19, 2011, if she chose to accept the offer. On May 31, 2011, appellee responded to the May 11 letter by asserting that she had a right to an FDA hearing. In her May 31 response, appellee never indicated she would be accepting the offered position of classroom teacher. On June 30, 2011, upon hiring new counsel, appellee returned the signed teaching contract "under protest." In July, appellant issued appellee a separation notice indicating appellee’s employment had ended as of June 30, 2011. The following March, appellee filed this mandamus action, requesting an FDA hearing, a name-clearing hearing, and damages for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in regard to the proffered 2011-2012 teaching contract. Both parties moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted and denied in part both parties’ motions: the decision effectively granted appellee’s petition for a writ of mandamus and held that appellee was entitled to an FDA hearing because she was a tenured employee and had been demoted from an administrator to a teacher. In addition, the trial court held that the request for a separate name-clearing hearing was moot as appellee could clear her name at the FDA hearing. Finally, the trial court denied appellee’s claim of damages for breach because it found that appellee had not timely accepted the contract to be a classroom teacher for the 2011-2012 school year. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that since appellee had earned tenure as a teacher, at the time of her suspension from the position as principal in 2010, the only right she had under the FDA was continued employment as a teacher. Therefore, the School District complied with the FDA when it offered appellee a teaching position for the 2011-2012 school year rather than insisting upon her termination. At that point, the FDA did not require any additional action by appellant. Thus, it was error for the trial court to conclude that appellant was required to hold a demotion hearing pursuant to the FDA in addition to offering appellee continued employment as a teacher. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court in all other respects. View "Dekalb County Sch. Dist. v. Butler" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from complaints filed by appellants Advanced Disposal Services Middle Georgia, LLC and Lowndes County, seeking injunctions prohibiting appellee Deep South Sanitation, LLC from providing solid waste collection and disposal services in the unincorporated areas of Lowndes County in violation of a newly enacted Lowndes County ordinance. The trial court denied appellants' requests for injunctive relief, and they appealed. The trial court determined that injunctive relief could not be granted in favor of appellants because enforcement of the Ordinance would violate Deep South's due process rights by interfering with its right to conduct business in the same manner as before enactment of the Ordinance. Because Deep South's substantive due process defense involved neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right, the Supreme Court applied a rational relationship test to determine whether enforcement of the Ordinance against Deep South would violate due process. Applying this test, the Court concluded the trial court erred by holding that enforcement of the Ordinance against Deep South would violate its due process rights. Furthermore, the Court found the trial court erred that the County's enforcement of the Ordinance through an injunction would have violated Deep South's substantive due process rights. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Advanced Disposal Services Middle Georgia, LLC v. Deep South Sanitation, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2010, the City of Sandy Springs and two individual homeowners, John E. Balsam and Jerry Burnstein, filed suit against Fulton County, its Board of Commissioners, and its Director of Public Works. Sandy Springs sought a declaratory judgment, mandamus, and injunctive relief on whether Fulton County retained ownership of and responsibility for two drainage retention ponds and a dam located within Sandy Springs. Following a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of Sandy Springs, and Fulton County appealed, contending that it was prohibited from maintaining the detention ponds pursuant to the Georgia constitution. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court found that Fulton County retained current ownership of and responsibility for the easements it held over the dam and retention ponds located in Sandy Springs. However, any concomitant responsibility continued only until the easements at issue were legally transferred, terminated, or prospectively abandoned. As a result, to the extent that the trial court's order could be read to indicate that Fulton County had to maintain the easements in perpetuity, the Court reversed. View "Fulton County v. City of Sandy Springs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals properly applied the principle of "priority jurisdiction" when it held that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to terminate Emmanuel Alizota's parental rights and erred in granting Ryan and Melissa Stanfield's petition for the adoption of S.K. The Court of Appeals determined that because the juvenile court had previously exercised jurisdiction over a deprivation proceeding involving Alizota and S.K. and had entered a temporary long-term custody agreement, the doctrine of priority jurisdiction deprived the superior court of jurisdiction over the termination proceeding. Based on that, the Court of Appeals vacated the superior court’s order and declined to consider Alizota's appeal on the merits. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in holding the superior court lacked jurisdiction over the termination proceeding. View "Standfield v. Alizota" on Justia Law

Monroe and Bibb Counties have fought over the true boundary line separating the two. At some time during the fight, the Superior Court attempted to resolve the dispute by ordering the Secretary of State to accept a line identified by a State-appointed land surveyor as the true boundary. The Supreme Court granted applications for discretionary appeal (filed separately by Bibb County and the Secretary of State) to address the Superior Court's order. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court lacked the authority to require the Secretary of State to accept a particular line as the true boundary. "Specifically, while mandamus is authorized to compel the Secretary to consider the relevant law and evidence, to determine the true boundary line between the counties, and to record the survey and plat reflecting that boundary line, mandamus is not authorized to dictate where the boundary line is to be located. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings." View "Bibb County v. Monroe County" on Justia Law