Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Stephens County Board of Commissioners decided to abandon a 3,000-foot-long, dead-end county road that ran along the side of a mountain and served no existing homes or businesses. Owners of some undeveloped lots on the Road and others sued the Board, and the trial court set aside the decision. Based on that ruling, the court issued a writ of mandamus requiring the Board to repair and maintain the Road. The court also ordered the Board to pay attorney fees and later granted summary judgment against the Board on its counterclaims. The Board appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court failed to give proper deference to the Board's decision to abandon the Road and reversed the trial court's decisions. View "Scarborough v. Hunter" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether physicians employed as faculty members at the Medical College of Georgia ("MCG") were entitled to official immunity in treating a patient at MCG's Children's Medical Center. Plaintiffs-Appellees Kenneth Jones and Clara Ramon filed a medical malpractice action against Appellants Prem Singh Shekhawat, M.D. and Wayne Mathews, M.D., along with other defendants, arising from treatment rendered to Plaintiffs' child at the Center in 2003. The trial court granted summary judgment to both Appellants, concluding that they were entitled to official immunity under the Georgia Tort Claims Act. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Appellants, in treating Plaintiffs' child, were acting within the scope of their employment with the State, using the Supreme Court's holding in "Keenan v. Plouffe," (482 SE2d 253 (1997)). After further review, the Supreme Court concluded that "Keenan" should have been overruled, because it conflated the standard for official immunity with that for sovereign immunity. Utilizing the proper analysis, the Court held that Appellants were entitled to official immunity because they were acting within the scope of their state employment in rendering the medical care at issue. View "Shekhawat v. Jones " on Justia Law

DHS, on behalf of the minor child of Johnny Wright (father), filed a complaint against him, asking the superior court to order Father to pay child support and maintain accident and health insurance, and enforce the order through an income deduction order. During a hearing on the complaint, the trial court learned that Father was currently married to Monica Wright, the mother of the child, and that no divorce or separate maintenance action had been filed. The court concluded that without an order, neither parent is the "custodial parent," and concluded that DHS therefore had no authority to pursue an award of child support. The Supreme Court, after its review, reversed, finding that DHS could seek a child support award against one parent without a divorce action. View "Georgia Dept. of Human Services v. Wright" on Justia Law

Appellants John Sherman and Christopher D. Eichler appealed a trial court’s judgment confirming and validating a bond issuance by the City of Atlanta. At the bond validation hearing, the City successfully disputed Appellants’ standing to become parties and raise objections in this case, because no competent evidence was admitted to show that either Appellant was a Georgia citizen and Atlanta resident, which were the prerequisites to becoming a party under the Revenue Bond Law. Appellants appealed, but the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sherman v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

The trial court in this case ruled that there was no conflict between the 2010 amendment to OCGA 48-5-2 (3) and a 1981 local constitutional amendment providing for the assessment of homestead property in Muscogee County for school and consolidated city-county government taxing purposes. The court further ruled that the 2010 amendment controlled the determination of the fair market value of appellee John Yeoman's recently-purchased homestead property. The Columbus Board of Tax Assessors appeals, but finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Columbus Board of Tax Assessors v. Yeoman" on Justia Law

Appellant Dana Meade and Appellee Tim Williamson were the candidates on the ballot in a run-off election in the Democratic primary for Sheriff of Baker County. Meade was the incumbent in the race and was, at the time of the election, serving as Sheriff. Meade was declared the winner by a margin of 39 votes. Williamson contested the results of the election. After a bench trial, the trial court issued an order setting forth findings of fact and reaching the conclusion that sufficient irregularities in voting and in the election process were shown to cast doubt upon the election result. The election was declared invalid and a new election was ordered. The Supreme Court has set aside elections under two different circumstances: where the evidence showed that a sufficient number of electors voted illegally or were irregularly recorded in the contest being challenged to change or cast doubt upon the election; or where systemic irregularities in the process of the election were sufficiently egregious to cast doubt on the result. The evidence presented at trial met neither of these standards. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order invalidating the August 21, 2012 run-off election in the Democratic primary for Sheriff of Baker County. View "Meade v. Williamson" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case involved the use of local school taxes for general redevelopment purposes following the Supreme Court's February 2008 decision interpreting the Georgia Constitution's Educational Purpose Clause in "Woodham v. City of Atlanta," (657 SE2d 528 (2008)); the subsequent amendment to the Constitution's Redevelopment Powers Clause in November 2008; and the repeal and reenactment of the statutory Redevelopment Powers Law in April 2009. Appellant John S. Sherman argued that the Court's holding in "Woodham" violated the Educational Purpose clause, rendered the resolutions, redevelopment plans, and intergovernmental agreements approving the City's Perry-Bolton and BeltLine tax allocation districts ("TADs") unconstitutional in their entirety, void ab initio, and unamendable. Appellees the Atlanta Independent School System, City of Atlanta, and Atlanta Development Authority, argued that Woodham invalidated only a particular bond issuance for the BeltLine project and had no effect at all on the constitutional validity of the local government approvals for the BeltLine TAD, much less the Perry-Bolton TAD. Upon review of the arguments, the Supreme Court concluded Appellees were wrong. "It is clear that, under the law when we decided Woodham in February 2008, the local government approvals for the Perry-Bolton and BeltLine TADs would have been ruled unconstitutional to the same extent that this Court held that the proposed funding for the BeltLine bonds was unconstitutional; at that time, local school taxes could not be used for general redevelopment purposes. But Sherman is also wrong . . . because the subsequent constitutional amendment and revision of the statute governing TADs changed the applicable law, and those changes were expressly made retroactive with respect to the county, city, and local board of education approvals needed to use school taxes for redevelopment purposes. Thus, Sherman's constitutional challenges to the Perry-Bolton and BeltLine TADs lack merit." Sherman's other arguments, were also found meritless. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Appellees and its denial of partial summary judgment to Sherman. View "Sherman v. Atlanta Independent School System" on Justia Law

Woodard & Curran, Inc. ("W&C") sued the City of Baldwin seeking damages on claims of breach of contract and quantum meruit. After a trial, a jury awarded W&C $203,000 in a general verdict that did not specify the basis for the damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider two issues: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that quantum meruit was an available remedy against a municipality when the claim is based on a municipal contract that is ultra vires; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the jury was properly allowed to consider the breach of contract claim based on an agreement the parties entered in May 2009. Upon review, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in both respects, and therefore reversed its judgment. View "City of Baldwin v. Woodard & Curran, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal ultimately concerned the constitutionality of OCGA 32-6-75.3. Although the Supreme Court originally found that a prior version of the statute violated the gratuities clause of the state constitution, the Court later found the statute to be constitutional after it was amended by the Legislature to indicate that "outdoor advertising provides a substantial service and benefit to Georgia and Georgia's citizens as well as the traveling public." In 2007, the City of Columbus, Gateways Foundation, Inc., and Trees Columbus, Inc. challenged applications for vegetation maintenance permits submitted by CBS Outdoor, Inc., to the Georgia Department of Transportation ("GDOT"). In 2011, the Legislature passed HB 179, which amended 32-6-75.3 by enlarging the "viewing zone" that an advertiser may clear around a billboard and altered the number and type of trees which may be removed. After the passage of HB 179, Columbus filed an amended petition, challenging the constitutionality of the revised statute and GDOT's Manual of Guidance ("MOG") which established the tree-valuation procedure to determine amounts to be paid to the State to allow removal of trees blocking the visibility of existing billboards. In January 2012, the Superior Court entered an interlocutory injunction enjoining GDOT from issuing any vegetation management permits throughout the State until a final adjudication of the pertinent issues. The parties then filed cross motions for summary judgment. The Superior Court rulings generated three appeals. In Case No. S13A0079, Columbus argued that the trial court erred by determining that OCGA 32-6-75.3 and the valuation methods employed in the MOG were constitutional. In Case No. S13A0080, CBS Outdoor and Outdoor Advertising Association of Georgia, Inc. ("OAAG"), an intervenor in these cases, challenged the trial court's decisions to continue a statewide injunction against the issuance of vegetation permits and to defer a ruling on Columbus's equal protection claim. In Case No. S13X0081, GDOT contended, among other things, that the trial court erred by determining that take-down credits extended under the statute violate the gratuities clause. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rulings in Case No. S13A0079 and Case No. S13A0080, but, in Case No. S13X0081, the Court reversed the trial court's determination that the take-down credits violated the gratuities clause. View "City of Columbus v. Georgia Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Defendants Pike County, its county manager, and members of its board of commissioners (collectively, "County") appealed a superior court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiff Marcia Callaway-Ingram, who was appointed Chief Magistrate of Pike County. Callaway-Ingram filed suit seeking, inter alia, a writ of mandamus and a permanent injunction in this dispute involving her salary and the funding and operation of the magistrate court. Finding no error in the superior court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pike County v. Callaway-Ingram" on Justia Law