Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue on appeal in this case involved the use of local school taxes for general redevelopment purposes following the Supreme Court's February 2008 decision interpreting the Georgia Constitution's Educational Purpose Clause in "Woodham v. City of Atlanta," (657 SE2d 528 (2008)); the subsequent amendment to the Constitution's Redevelopment Powers Clause in November 2008; and the repeal and reenactment of the statutory Redevelopment Powers Law in April 2009. Appellant John S. Sherman argued that the Court's holding in "Woodham" violated the Educational Purpose clause, rendered the resolutions, redevelopment plans, and intergovernmental agreements approving the City's Perry-Bolton and BeltLine tax allocation districts ("TADs") unconstitutional in their entirety, void ab initio, and unamendable. Appellees the Atlanta Independent School System, City of Atlanta, and Atlanta Development Authority, argued that Woodham invalidated only a particular bond issuance for the BeltLine project and had no effect at all on the constitutional validity of the local government approvals for the BeltLine TAD, much less the Perry-Bolton TAD. Upon review of the arguments, the Supreme Court concluded Appellees were wrong. "It is clear that, under the law when we decided Woodham in February 2008, the local government approvals for the Perry-Bolton and BeltLine TADs would have been ruled unconstitutional to the same extent that this Court held that the proposed funding for the BeltLine bonds was unconstitutional; at that time, local school taxes could not be used for general redevelopment purposes. But Sherman is also wrong . . . because the subsequent constitutional amendment and revision of the statute governing TADs changed the applicable law, and those changes were expressly made retroactive with respect to the county, city, and local board of education approvals needed to use school taxes for redevelopment purposes. Thus, Sherman's constitutional challenges to the Perry-Bolton and BeltLine TADs lack merit." Sherman's other arguments, were also found meritless. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Appellees and its denial of partial summary judgment to Sherman. View "Sherman v. Atlanta Independent School System" on Justia Law

Woodard & Curran, Inc. ("W&C") sued the City of Baldwin seeking damages on claims of breach of contract and quantum meruit. After a trial, a jury awarded W&C $203,000 in a general verdict that did not specify the basis for the damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider two issues: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that quantum meruit was an available remedy against a municipality when the claim is based on a municipal contract that is ultra vires; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the jury was properly allowed to consider the breach of contract claim based on an agreement the parties entered in May 2009. Upon review, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in both respects, and therefore reversed its judgment. View "City of Baldwin v. Woodard & Curran, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal ultimately concerned the constitutionality of OCGA 32-6-75.3. Although the Supreme Court originally found that a prior version of the statute violated the gratuities clause of the state constitution, the Court later found the statute to be constitutional after it was amended by the Legislature to indicate that "outdoor advertising provides a substantial service and benefit to Georgia and Georgia's citizens as well as the traveling public." In 2007, the City of Columbus, Gateways Foundation, Inc., and Trees Columbus, Inc. challenged applications for vegetation maintenance permits submitted by CBS Outdoor, Inc., to the Georgia Department of Transportation ("GDOT"). In 2011, the Legislature passed HB 179, which amended 32-6-75.3 by enlarging the "viewing zone" that an advertiser may clear around a billboard and altered the number and type of trees which may be removed. After the passage of HB 179, Columbus filed an amended petition, challenging the constitutionality of the revised statute and GDOT's Manual of Guidance ("MOG") which established the tree-valuation procedure to determine amounts to be paid to the State to allow removal of trees blocking the visibility of existing billboards. In January 2012, the Superior Court entered an interlocutory injunction enjoining GDOT from issuing any vegetation management permits throughout the State until a final adjudication of the pertinent issues. The parties then filed cross motions for summary judgment. The Superior Court rulings generated three appeals. In Case No. S13A0079, Columbus argued that the trial court erred by determining that OCGA 32-6-75.3 and the valuation methods employed in the MOG were constitutional. In Case No. S13A0080, CBS Outdoor and Outdoor Advertising Association of Georgia, Inc. ("OAAG"), an intervenor in these cases, challenged the trial court's decisions to continue a statewide injunction against the issuance of vegetation permits and to defer a ruling on Columbus's equal protection claim. In Case No. S13X0081, GDOT contended, among other things, that the trial court erred by determining that take-down credits extended under the statute violate the gratuities clause. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rulings in Case No. S13A0079 and Case No. S13A0080, but, in Case No. S13X0081, the Court reversed the trial court's determination that the take-down credits violated the gratuities clause. View "City of Columbus v. Georgia Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Defendants Pike County, its county manager, and members of its board of commissioners (collectively, "County") appealed a superior court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiff Marcia Callaway-Ingram, who was appointed Chief Magistrate of Pike County. Callaway-Ingram filed suit seeking, inter alia, a writ of mandamus and a permanent injunction in this dispute involving her salary and the funding and operation of the magistrate court. Finding no error in the superior court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pike County v. Callaway-Ingram" on Justia Law

In 1969, the Cities of Atlanta and College Park entered into an agreement for purposes of expanding Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport. One of the provisions of the granted Atlanta the exclusive right to collect and levy occupation taxes from businesses located at the Airport that were within the city limits of College Park. In 2007, after commissioning a study for the purpose of reassessing this relationship, College Park informed Atlanta and Airport businesses that it would no longer honor the 1969 Agreement and that it would seek to collect occupation taxes from the Airport businesses including Atlanta's proprietary business operations. Atlanta filed a declaratory action in seeking a judgment that the 1969 Agreement controlled the collection of occupation taxes from businesses operating at the Airport within College Park. Both Atlanta and College Park moved for partial summary judgment, and, in ruling on the cross motions, the trial court found that Atlanta and College Park's 1969 Agreement was unenforceable. The trial court further ruled that OCGA 48-13-13 (5), which prohibited local governments from levying an occupation tax on any "local authority," precluded College Park from levying an occupation tax on Atlanta's proprietary operations because Atlanta met the definition of a "local authority" under the statute. Both parties appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment invalidating the 1969 Agreement, but reversed the trial court's finding that the term "local authority" as used in OCGA 48-13-13 (5) included smunicipalities. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals was correct in its determination that the City of Atlanta was not a "local authority" as that term is used in the statute. View "City of Atlanta v. City of College Park" on Justia Law

Robert Mesteller brought suit to challenge Gwinnett County and its Board of Commissioners' (County) Solid Waste Ordinance. He appealed a superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the County. Relying upon the Home Rule provision of the Georgia Constitution (among others), the County adopted the Solid Waste Collection and Disposal Ordinance of 2010. Under the Ordinance, the County was divided into five zones, each to be serviced by a private waste management company. The County collected fees for the waste collection services through annual tax assessment notices, which it then remits to the five service providers, minus the service fee. Mesteller received a property tax bill that showed a fee for solid waste collection services. Acting pro se, he sued the County and the members of its Board of Commissioners, individually and as members of the Board, alleging the assessment and collection of the fee violated the Georgia Constitution. After notice and a hearing, the superior court granted the County's motion for summary judgment. Mesteller contended on appeal that the County was without authority to use the annual property tax bill to assess or collect fees for solid waste services because by contracting with private waste management companies to collect solid waste, the County was not, in fact, "provid[ing] solid waste collection services" within the meaning of OCGA 12-8-39.3 (a), and therefore not authorized to place the collection fee on the tax bill of a property owner or to enforce the collection of the fee as set forth in the statute. The Supreme Court concluded that Mestellar's argument "reveal[ed] a misunderstanding of the precedents of [the] Court." As such, the Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the County. View "Mestellar v. Gwinnett County" on Justia Law

In 1999, a jury awarded monetary damages and equitable relief to homeowner Kenneth Barngrover. The damages were paid to the trial court's registry shortly after entry of judgment on the verdict, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in favor of Barngrover in 2001. In its 1999 judgment, the trial court ordered the City of Columbus to abate all nuisances created, maintained and in existence on Barngrover's property, and directed the City to restore the property to its undamaged condition. The trial court expressly retained jurisdiction pursuant to its equitable power to ensure completion of this equitable remedy. A week later, the trial court issued an order clarifying the nuisances to be abated as only those identified by the jury in its verdict. After several years of entering various orders in an effort to provide the equitable relief required by the jury's verdict, the trial court appointed a special master in 2007 to enforce the 1999 judgment. In 2011, the special master concluded that the structures on Barngrover's property were beyond repair, and recommended new ones be built. Further, the special master recommended implementation of the last of the City's abatement plans. Barngrover filed objections to the special master's report and moved to replace the special master. Over his objections, the trial court adopted the special master's report. This appeal to the Supreme Court followed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error with the trial court's orders, and affirmed. View "Barngrover v. City of Columbus" on Justia Law

The Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County adopted a Stormwater Utility Ordinance in 2004. Pursuant to the Ordinance, a stormwater utility and stormwater enterprise fund took effect in 2005, and landowners were required to pay certain fees based on their estimated relative contribution to stormwater runoff problems. Despite Unified Government sending Homewood Village, LLC a quarterly stormwater utility bill, Homewood Village did not pay any of their bills since the inception of the program. In 2010, Unified Government sued Homewood Village to recover, among other things, the unpaid fees. In 2011, Homewood Village filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment, arguing that the Ordinance was an unconstitutional tax which could not be assessed involuntarily. The Superior Court granted Homewood Village's motion for partial summary on its contentions that : (1) Unified Government could not collect unpaid fees under a theory of unpaid account; and (2) Unified Government had not established any of the elements necessary to establish a claim for quantum meruit. In Case No. S12A1836, Homewood Village appealed the trial court's ruling that the Unified Government was authorized to collect stormwater fees from Homewood Village pursuant to its Ordinance, and in Case No. S12X1837 the Unified Government appealed the trial court's rulings in favor of Homewood Village on the issues of unpaid account and quantum meruit. In Case No. S12A1836, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the Ordinance imposed a permissible fee and properly granted summary judgment to the Unified Government on its claim to collect the unpaid fees. The Court vacated the judgment in Case No. S12X1837 in light of the trial court's correct decision to grant summary judgment to the Unified Government, Homewood Village's argument relating to quantum meruit or open account was rendered moot. View "Homewood Village, LLC v. Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County" on Justia Law

Margaret Hunt, a teacher, sued her former employer, the Richmond County Board of Education for breach of her employment contract. The parties stipulated to the amount of damages, and after a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in the stipulated amount plus prejudgment interest. The Board cut two checks, one reflecting the interest and fees, and another intended to reflect the damages award. The award was treated as wage income, with various sums withheld to comply with state and federal tax laws. Hunt objected to that treatment of the damages award, contending that the second check prepared by the Board should have been for the full amount of the damages, and that the payment should be reported for tax purposes using an IRS Form 1099. The parties could not agree on the tax treatment of the damages award. As a result, the Board filed suit seeking an injunction against Hunt in the event she resorted to certain collection methods (such as garnishment of the Board's assets). The superior court grated a temporary restraining order. Hunt appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court reversed: "the mere apprehension of injury does not support the grant of an injunction." View "Hunt v. Richmond County Bd. of Education" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court granted an application for certiorari from the Court of Appeals' decision in "In re: W.L.H.," (723 SE2d 478 (2012)) to determine whether a child in a deprivation action had standing to appeal when the child was represented by counsel and the child's guardian ad litem chose not to appeal. "Because the guardian ad litem is the legal protector of a child's best interests in deprivation proceedings, we find that a child lacks standing to appeal a deprivation ruling except through a guardian ad litem." View "In the Interest of W.L.H." on Justia Law