Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Lou Ann Cassell inherited $220,000 from a relative. After consulting with advisors, she used the inherited funds to purchase a single-premium fixed annuity from National Life Insurance Company. Cassell was 65 years old at the time she purchased the annuity. The annuity agreement provided monthly annuity payments of $1,389.14, and guaranteed payments for 10 years regardless of when Cassell died, naming her children as beneficiaries should she die within the guaranteed payment period. Cassell was not authorized to withdraw any funds from the annuity, cancel the annuity, or change the payment terms of the agreement. She was authorized to assign the right to the annuity payments and to change the name of her beneficiaries during the guaranteed period. In May 2010, Cassell filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the Bankruptcy Court and included the annuity as an asset. However, she also listed the annuity as exempt property under OCGA 44-13-100 (a) (2) (E). The trustee objected, arguing the annuity payments did not meet two of the requirements necessary to qualify for the statutory exemption, specifically that the annuity was not funded by employment related wages or benefits and the payments due under the annuity were not "on account of age." The bankruptcy court disagreed and entered an order concluding that the two challenged requirements were met. It did not make a ruling with regard to the third requirement, that the payments be reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor or her dependents, because it concluded the parties had provided insufficient evidence pertaining to that issue. The United States District Court affirmed on appeal and remanded to the bankruptcy court for it to rule on the issue not addressed in its original order. Rather than litigate that issue in the bankruptcy court, the trustee conceded the annuity was reasonably necessary for the support of Cassell and appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. After briefing and oral argument by the parties, the Eleventh Circuit recognized the absence of precedent on the dispositive issues of state law and certified its questions to the Georgia Supreme Court: (1) is a single-premium fixed annuity purchased with inherited funds an "annuity" for purposes of OCGA 44-13-100 (a) (2) (E); and (2) is a debtor's right to receive a payment from an annuity "on account of . . .age" for the purposes of OCGA 44-13-100 (a) (2) (E) if the annuity payments are subject to age-based federal tax treatment, if the annuitant purchased the annuity because of age, or if the annuity payments are calculated based on the age of the annuitant at the time the annuity was purchased. The Supreme Court found that a single-premium fixed annuity purchased with inherited funds may qualify as an exempt annuity under 44-13-100 (a) (2) (E) and that the determination of whether a right to receive payment from an annuity is "on account of" age for purposes of 44-13-100 (a) (2) (E) is not necessarily based on the existence of a single factor but requires consideration of a variety of factors pointing to the existence of a causal connection between the payee's age and the right to payment. View "Silliman v. Cassell" on Justia Law

Appellant Association of Guineans in Atlanta, Inc. applied to the DeKalb County Board of Commissioners (BOC) for a special land use permit (SLUP) for a single-family house located in a residential area of DeKalb County and zoned as a single-family residence. In its permit application, appellant stated an intent to use the property as a "place of worship and family life center." The BOC denied appellant's application and appellant appealed to the superior court seeking a declaratory judgment, an injunction, and a writ of mandamus. After several hearings, the trial court granted the BOC's motions to dismiss and denied appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus on the merits. Appellant argued to the Supreme Court that the trial court erred when it dismissed its constitutional challenges to the zoning statute. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part and remanded with direction. The Court concluded that the trial court's ruling that appellant failed to make a prima facie case showing a violation of "RLUIPA" was in error. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ass'n of Guineans in Atlanta, Inc. v. Dekalb County" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned who was legally authorized to select the drug or drugs to be used in executions in Georgia and how that choice may be made-- an issue which the Court felt impacted the management of prisons and inmates in Georgia: "this case could also affect the remaining myriad of management decisions made throughout Georgia’s prison system, and . . . when those decisions must be made directly by the Board of Corrections in its policymaking role versus when they may by left to the statutorily-granted management prerogatives of the Commissioner of Corrections and the Department of Corrections that he manages." Warren Lee Hill was convicted of murdering a fellow inmate in the Lee County Correctional Institute by beating the victim with a board embedded with nails. Hill received the death sentence, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Hill was unsuccessful in his state and federal habeas proceedings. The execution was originally scheduled for July 18, 2012, but it was rescheduled for July 23, 2012. The change in the specific execution date was announced by the Department of Corrections at approximately the same time that the Department of Corrections announced that it was changing from a three-drug execution procedure to a one-drug procedure. In response to the announcement of the new execution procedure, Hill filed a complaint against the Board of Corrections, the Department of Corrections, and the Commissioner of Corrections, alleging that the defendants failed to comply with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act in adopting Georgia’s new execution procedure, and he sought a declaratory judgment, an injunction, a stay of execution, and a writ of mandamus. The Superior Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Hill’s complaint on the ground that the Administrative Procedure Act did not apply to the new execution procedure, and the Supreme Court granted Hill’s application for discretionary appeal and his motion for a stay of his scheduled execution. But upon review of the applicable statutory authority, the Supreme Court affirmed that dismissal. View "Hill v. Owens" on Justia Law

A group of firefighters brought a class action lawsuit against the City of Atlanta alleging that the city breached its employment contracts with the firefighters as well as its statutory obligation to provide a fair and impartial promotional process by failing to prevent cheating on a fire lieutenant promotional exam. The trial court issued an interlocutory injunction prohibiting the city from making any permanent promotions based on the results of the challenged exam and providing that all appointments would be temporary pending a final decision on the merits of the case. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, the trial court crafted a permanent injunction that contained mandatory instructions regarding how the city must re-test. Appellants, all of whom are firefighters who scored 90 or higher on the first exam, appealed the permanent injunction to challenge provisions of the injunction that treated them as "probable cheaters." Appellees (named plaintiffs in the class action), moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that appellants lacked standing to challenge the trial court’s judgment because they were not parties to the original action and because the judgment was not entered against them. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found appellants had standing to appeal the judgment in this case. Further, the Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in fashioning injunctive relief specific to appellants and erred in entering judgment against them. Accordingly, the Court vacated those portions of the permanent injunction that required the city to treat appellants differently from class members. View "Barham v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

After Mack Pitts was killed in a construction accident at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, his estate and minor children sued the City of Atlanta and several contractors for breaches of contracts concerning the construction project on which Pitts had been working. Although Pitts was not a party to these contracts, his estate and children asserted that he was an intended beneficiary and that they, therefore, had standing to sue for breach of the contracts. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court found that Pitts was not an intended beneficiary, denied summary judgment to the estate and children, and awarded summary judgment to the City and contractors. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court should have awarded summary judgment on the claims for breach of contract to the estate and children, not to the City and contractors. The Court of Appeals determined that Pitts was, in fact, an intended beneficiary of the contracts, and it found that the evidence was undisputed that the City and contractors had breached the contracts. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals misapplied or failed to apply several fundamental principles of contract law in its consideration of these cases. Accordingly, the Court vacated the appellate court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Holder Construction Company v. Estate of Pitts" on Justia Law

Following the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool (GIIP), Lumpkin County appealed, contending that following the insolvency of the County's regular insurer, GIIP was required to step in and cover the pending workers' compensation claims against the County. Specifically, the County argued that the trial court erred in finding that it was not entitled to coverage under the GIIP because the County's net worth exceeded $25 million. Alternatively, the County argued OCGA 33-36-3 unconstitutionally violated the County's due process rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "The County contend[ed] that this ruling was erroneous because the term 'net worth' is inapplicable to government entities, and, instead, the applicability of the twenty-five million dollar exemption under the Act should be assessed based on the County's 'net assets.' The County argue[d] that the bulk of its assets, including land, roads, bridges, and government buildings are restricted from use and are thus unavailable to meet its obligations or satisfy liabilities. Based on the County's calculation of its own net assets, it only has $5.6 million dollars with which to meet these obligations. As a result, the County maintain[ed] that it should receive coverage for its claims from the GIIP. This argument is misplaced." Therefore, the Court held that the trial court did not err in excluding the County from GIIP protection based on the net worth exemption. Furthermore, the County does not possess due process rights by which to challenge the constitutionality of the Act, and its argument premised on any such right necessarily failed. View "Lumpkin Co. v. Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool" on Justia Law

We, the Taxpayers, an unincorporated association of individual taxpayer residents of Effingham County ("Taxpayers"), appealed the trial court's order dismissing Taxpayers's complaint against the Board of Tax Assessors of Effingham County ("Board"). In a separate case, the Board appealed the superior court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. Former OCGA 48-5B-1 became law in 2009, and was effective until January 2011. It placed a moratorium on increases in the assessed value of property subject to ad valorem taxation for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2009, and continuing through January 9, 2011, but provided an exception from the moratorium for any county which performed or had performed on its behalf a comprehensive county-wide revaluation of all properties in the county in 2008 or any county which in 2009 was under contract prior to February 28, 2009, to have performed on its behalf a comprehensive county-wide revaluation of all properties in the county. The Board, believing that Effingham County met the exception set forth in former OCGA 48-5B-1 (c), did not impose a moratorium on increases in assessed values in the 2009 tax year, but in fact, increased assessed values of certain property. Taxpayers, believing that the exception did not apply and that the moratorium should have been imposed, filed a complaint under OCGA 48-5-296 seeking the removal of Board members. Taxpayers amended the complaint to include the equitable relief of eliminating the 2009 assessed values and imposing instead the 2008 tax year figures; by later amendment, Taxpayers dropped the request to remove Board members, and added a request for a writ of mandamus to compel the Board to act in accordance with Taxpayers's interpretation of OCGA 48-5B-1. Taxpayers moved for summary judgment, contending that the undisputed evidence showed that the exception to the moratorium did not apply; the Board also moved for summary judgment, asserting that OCGA 48-5B-1 was unconstitutional, and, alternatively, that the undisputed facts showed that the statutory exception applied. The trial court denied both motions. The Board then filed its motion to dismiss, asserting that the Taxpayers property owners were obligated to appeal their 2009 ad valorem assessments to the county Board of Equalization, or otherwise in the manner set forth in OCGA 48-5-311, and that the failure to do so precluded the trial court's addressing the equitable and mandamus claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in denying Taxpayers's motion, and vacated the court's decision denying the Board's motion. View "We, The Taxpayers v. Bd. of Tax Assessors Effingham Cty." on Justia Law

Norma Fitzpatrick, Barry Fitzpatrick and George Elrod, (taxpayers), own parcels of land in Madison County. Following a valuation of those properties for tax purposes by the Madison County Board of Assessors, the taxpayers appealed the valuation to the Madison County Board of Equalization. The Board of Equalization denied the appeal. Subsequently, the taxpayers filed an appeal in superior court, but the Board of Assessors refused to certify the appeal to the superior court unless the taxpayers first paid the filing fee to the superior court clerk. Thereafter, the taxpayers contended that, except for appeals to an arbitrator pursuant to OCGA 48-5-311(f), a taxpayer is not required to pay any fee at all for an appeal. Based on this argument, the taxpayers filed a declaratory action seeking a ruling to this effect. The trial court issued an order finding that the taxpayers are responsible for paying the filing fee, which prompted the taxpayers to appeal to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the applicable statute, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Fitzpatrick v. Madison Co. Bd. of Tax Assessors" on Justia Law

In March 2006, appellant Michael Everett was employed as an engineer for appellee Norfolk Southern Railway Company and was tasked with using his locomotive to push a six-car train into an auto plant in Georgia. One of the employees working with appellant misinformed him that the train derailment device was in the "off" position when in fact it was in the "on" position. Acting at the direction of his supervisor, appellant moved the train forward, and, due to the position of the derailment device, three of the six cars derailed and two of the derailed cars crashed into the auto plant. Appellant’s locomotive did not derail and he suffered no physical injury from the accident, however, soon after the accident, appellant was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and he has not been able to return to work. Appellant brought a suit against appellee to recover damages for emotional distress. The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether a jury could decide whether a plaintiff in a case brought pursuant to the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) was within the "zone of danger" in order to recover for emotional distress injuries stemming from a work-related accident. Because the Court answered that question in the negative, it reversed and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Everett v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. " on Justia Law

In case number S12A0649, Burke County, its Board of Commissioners, and various members of the Board, individually and in their official capacities appealed the superior court's grant of a writ of mandamus involving the obligation to maintain roads dedicated to the County. In case number S12X0650, Otis F. Askin, Sr., and Tiger, Inc. cross-appealed the failure of the superior court to grant certain other relief that Askin had requested. As to each appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded with direction. View "Burke County v. Askin" on Justia Law