Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jamie Inagawa, the Solicitor-General of Fayette County, filed a mandamus action against Fayette County and its Commissioners in their official capacities asserting that since July 1, 2007 his compensation had been incorrectly calculated. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Inagawa and partial summary judgment to the County, and each party appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly held that Inagawa was improperly compensated beginning in July 2007. The Court disagreed with the trial court's conclusion that the County properly compensated Inagawa as of January 1, 2009 in accordance with an amended local law, because the Court found that amendment invalid. Accordingly, the Court reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Inagawa v. Fayette County" on Justia Law

The DeKalb County district attorney brought a declaratory judgment action against the county's magistrate judges seeking guidance regarding a dispute on the proper evidentiary standards for establishing probable cause at preliminary hearings. The trial court issued a declaratory judgment in the district attorney's favor, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari to consider whether declaratory judgment was an appropriate remedy for challenging evidentiary policies or practices at preliminary hearings. Because this dispute was not a civil case that presented a justiciable controversy and declaratory relief would not provide any more guidance or certainty than current case law, the Court concluded that declaratory relief was not an appropriate remedy. Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "Leitch v. Flemming" on Justia Law

The superior court denied the writ of mandamus in this case where a taxpayer requested that a school district to return "excess proceeds" collected pursuant to an educational sales and use tax approved by referendum. In 2001, voters in the Clarke County School District approved a one percent educational sales and use tax (ELOST) for a period of five years beginning immediately upon the expiration of an ELOST that had been approved in 1997. The purpose of the referendum was to provide funds to pay the cost of specified, authorized projects totaling $87,849,000. The total amount of taxes collected pursuant to the 2001 ELOST was $93,413,789, which was $5,564,789 more than the amount of taxes the school district intended to collect, but less than the amount the school district actually spent on the authorized projects. In 2006, voters again approved a one percent ELOST for an additional five years. In spite of these referendums and taxes, as of September 1, 2012, the school district had debt totaling at least $10,855,000. In denying the writ, the superior court found, inter alia, appellant did not show a clear legal right to relief because the school district did not violate the "excess proceeds" provision. The Supreme Court agreed with the superior court and affirmed the lower court's ruling. View "Marsh v. Clarke County Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

SPI Club, Inc. operates two nightclubs in Atlanta, and in July 2010, the City issued an alcohol license for each club. Daniel Corporation contended that SPI Club failed to open either club for business within nine months of the issue of these licenses, and in April 2011, Daniel sued City officials, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel these officials to recognize an automatic forfeiture of the licenses. The trial court found that SPI Club had, in fact, opened the clubs for business within the required time, and it denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. Daniel appealed, and after review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Daniel Corp. v. Reed" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether an employee who filed an injury claim against his employer under the State Workers' Compensation Act and receives compensation in exchange for a "no liability" settlement with his employer that is approved by the State Board of Workers' Compensation may then turn around and sue the co-employee who caused the injury in a tort action. Ten years ago, the Court of Appeals answered this question no, holding that the Act's exclusive remedy provision bars such a lawsuit based on the same injury for which the employee has already received a remedy. In this appeal, however, the Court of Appeals was equally divided as to whether the underlying case law should be overruled, and the case was sent to the Supreme Court for resolution. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that "Ridley" was correctly decided. Thus, appellant Joseph Smith, having previously entered a Board-approved settlement with his employer in exchange for compensation, would be barred from suing appellee John Ellis for the same injury in tort if Ellis qualified as an "employee of the same employer" as Smith, rather than a "third-party tort-feasor," as those phrases are used in the applicable statutory authority. However, the evidence did not establish that Ellis was acting as "an employee of the same employer" in the course of his employment, at the time he injured Smith. The trial court therefore erred in granting summary judgment to Ellis, and that judgment was reversed. View "Smith v. Ellis" on Justia Law

The State filed an in personam action pursuant to OCGA 16-14-6 (b) of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act against Hargurtag Singh and his company Rajan Singh, LLC (collectively, "Singh"), seeking equitable relief including injunctive relief to stop the alienation of Singh's property and the appointment of a receiver over Singh's business and property. The complaint also sought the forfeiture of certain property as defendants in rem pursuant to OCGA 16-14-7. The complaint alleged that Singh was engaging in illegal gambling activity at its Clayton County business, Pure Gas Station, by paying out cash winnings to persons who played electronic gaming devices located in the store. On the same day the action was brought, the trial court granted the State's request that cash and equipment be seized and that certain assets be frozen; granted the State's request for a temporary restraining order; and granted the State's request that a receiver be placed in control of the business. The State and Singh subsequently entered into a consent agreement whereby Singh was allowed to resume operating the business under certain conditions and under the receiver's supervision. Hargurtag Singh later moved to dismiss the action on two grounds: (1) that the complaint failed to state a claim under the Georgia RICO Act, and (2) that the State's in personam forfeiture claims were unconstitutional. The trial court declined to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, reasoning that the State had sufficiently alleged violations of OCGA 16-12-22 and 16-12-28. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in, inter alia, "Cisco v. Georgia," (680 SE2d 831) (2009)) the trial court dismissed the State’s in personam claims because it determined that all civil in personam claims under the RICO statute were unconstitutional. The State appealed and Singh filed a cross appeal. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Singh moved to dismiss contending that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction based on its view that the State failed to file an application for interlocutory review; the State contended that the trial court erred in dismissing the claims against the in personam defendant on grounds that claims under Georgia's RICO act were unconstitutional; and in the cross appeal, Singh contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) it had jurisdiction over this case; (2) the Court reversed the decision pertaining to the in personam defendants, finding none of the subsections of OCGA 16-14-6 require proof of criminal conduct on the part of the in personam defendants, but allowed the superior court to enjoin any violations of OCGA 16-14-4 until the case was resolved; and, (3) Singh failed to show that there was no set of provable facts that would entitle the State to relief. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss pursuant to OCGA 9-11-12(b)(6) was sustained. View "Georgia v. Singh" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether application of OCGA 32-3-11(c) pertaining to appellants' motion to set aside or vacate a declaration of taking violated their due process rights, and whether that statute imposed upon appellant the responsibility to obtain a timely hearing on their motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the statute as properly applied does not violate a condemnee's due process rights but reversed and remanded the case to the trial court with direction that it hold a hearing pursuant to the mandate of 32-3-11(c) because it is the duty of the trial court, not the condemnee, to schedule the required hearing. View "Adkins v. Cobb County" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the superior court improperly affirmed a damages award to Petitioner Valencia Scott on her workers' compensation claim because the ALJ erred in ruling Petitioner's deniability resulted from a fictional new accident as opposed to a change in condition, and that her claim for total temporary disability was thus not barred by the applicable statute of limitation. The Supreme Court granted review of the case to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a "fictional new accident" could not apply to situations where an employee who suffered a compensable injury and subsequently suffers a progressive worsening of that condition whereby she must cease working completely. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Petitioner sustained a foot injury and was awarded compensation. She subsequently returned to work in a new position that required no strenuous activity, but she developed knee and gait problems as a result of the wear and tear of ordinary life. This gradual worsening constituted a change of condition, not a new accident. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision. View "Scott v. Shaw Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted discretionary appeal to Haralson County to review a superior court's grant of the writ of mandamus. In 2008, Taylor Junkyard of Bremen, Inc. sought to purchase a piece of property in a residential area. Before doing so, it wanted confirmation that the property had a permitted nonconforming use, so Taylor Junkyard asked for, and was issued, a letter written by the County Zoning Administrator, which stated that the business operated by Trawick "falls under the grandfather clause." When Taylor Junkyard applied for a business license for the year 2009, Haralson County administratively rejected the application, with the stated reason that the business engaged in on the property had changed from the original nonconforming business of "used automobiles and parts" to "metal recycling and metal fabrication," and thus violated the County's zoning ordinance. Taylor Junkyard appealed to the County Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA), which, after a hearing, rejected the application for a business license, based upon found zoning violations. Taylor Junkyard then filed its petition for a writ of mandamus in superior court, which the court granted, finding that there was no evidence to support the ZBA's decision. The County contended on appeal to the Supreme Court that the superior court erred in addressing the petition for writ of mandamus, arguing that the County Zoning Ordinance provided a means for Taylor Junkyard to file an appeal from the adverse decision of the ZBA, and thus, mandamus was not an available remedy. "When local zoning ordinances do not establish a means by which an aggrieved party may gain judicial review of an adverse decision by a zoning appeal board, a petition to the appropriate superior court for a writ of mandamus is the proper remedy." Accordingly, as no provision of the Haralson County ordinances set forth an available means of judicial review, the superior court did not err in concluding that a petition for a writ of mandamus was the proper avenue for Taylor Junkyard to seek review of the ZBA's decision. View "Haralson County v. Taylor Junkyard of Bremen, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in "Glass v. Gates" to answer whether the definition of "any motor vehicle" in OCGA 33-24-51(a) continued to be the broader definition of the term provided for in prior case law, notwithstanding the 2002 passage of OCGA 36-92-1. As inmates at the Troup County Correctional facility, Jonathan Glass and Tony Smith were operating tractors when Smith's tractor got stuck in a ditch. Donrell Gates, Glass' detail supervisor, instructed the men to attach a chain to the tractors so Glass could use his tractor to pull Smith's from the ditch. As Glass did so, Smith engaged his tractor's bush hog, causing a rock to take flight and pierce Glass' throat. Glass bled profusely and died later that day. Plaintiffs, Glass' minor son and the executor of his estate, brought a wrongful death and survivor action against Troup County and Gates. The county sought summary judgment, claiming plaintiffs' claims were barred by sovereign immunity. The County asserted that by revising OCGA 33-24-51 (b) in 2002 (effective 2005), the legislature demonstrated its intent to apply the more narrow definition of "motor vehicle" found in OCGA 36-92-1 (6) in determining whether a local government waived sovereign immunity by purchasing liability insurance on a motor vehicle. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that the county did not waive sovereign immunity because neither a tractor nor a bush hog could be deemed a "motor vehicle" under OCGA 36-92-1. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the broader definition of "motor vehicle" should have been applied under 33-24-51, and that therefore, the County waived its sovereign immunity as long as it purchased insurance for the tractor and bush hog used by Smith. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals' reasoning, and affirmed by answering the appellate court's original question in the affirmative. View "Gates v. Glass" on Justia Law