Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After appellant, the elected mayor of the City of Springfield, refused to resign after an ethics investigation, appellees petitioned the superior court for his removal pursuant to Section 45 of the city's charter. Appellant moved to dismiss the petition for removal pursuant to OCGA 9-11-12(b)(6), arguing that the petition did not state a claim for which relief could be granted and arguing a number of theories challenging the constitutionality of Section 45. After hearing the parties' arguments, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and denied appellant's request for a certificate of immediate review. Appellant subsequently contended on appeal that the trial court erred when it failed to dismiss the petition for removal pursuant to OCGA 9-11-12(b)(6). The court agreed with appellant, holding that the trial court erred when it denied appellant's motion and allowed the case to proceed with the petition as pled. The error was not harmless because throughout the proceedings appellant was forced to guess as to what charges he would be required to defend himself. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was reversed. View "Northway v. Allen, et al." on Justia Law

Henry Cook appealed the trial court's ruling that he was not a resident of Randolph County and therefore not an elector qualified to vote in that county. The court granted Cook's application for discretionary appeal and directed the parties to address the court's jurisdiction over this appeal as well as the merits of the trial court's ruling. Because a determination of voter qualifications, not clearly linked to a particular election, did not bring an appeal within the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over "cases of election contest," and because no other basis for this court's jurisdiction appeared to exist, the court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals and did not reach the merits. View "Cook v. Board of Registrars of Randolph County" on Justia Law

Pin Ups, an adult entertainment business, brought this appeal from an order of the trial court denying its petition for an interlocutory injunction against the Board's "Hours of sale and operation" ordinances. As Pin Ups alleged a violation of free speech rights under the Georgia Constitution, the trial court erred in applying the rational basis test. Such laws could be upheld only "if it furthers an important government interest; if the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of speech; and if the incidental restriction of speech is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Therefore, the court held that, inasmuch as the trial court made its ruling based upon an incorrect legal standard, the court must reserve its decision and the court remanded the case to that court for it to evaluate Pin Ups's request for injunctive relief using the correct legal standard. View "Great American Dream, Inc., d/b/a Pin Ups Nightclub v. DeKalb County, et al." on Justia Law

EGL purchased 427 acres of land in Newton County, Georgia, for the purpose of constructing a landfill and the Board declined to issue a letter of zoning compliance based on its interpretation that a landfill was not a permitted use under the Newton County zoning ordinance. The court held that the trial court erred in holding that East Ga. Land and Development Co. v. Baker mooted any issue regarding the validity of the process used by the county to enact the original zoning ordinance. The court also held that the trial court erred by relying on parol evidence to provide a link between the original set of maps incorporated onto the 1985 zoning ordinance and the set that was currently located in the zoning office. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "East Georgia Land and Development Co., LLC v. Newton County, et al." on Justia Law

Local residents filed a complaint with the governor against appellants, who were elected members of the WCBE, alleging that they had violated OCGA 45-10-3. Appellants subsequently appealed the order of the superior court denying their petition for judicial review under the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act. The court held that the appeal as to Appellant Roberts was moot and must be dismissed; the appeal as to Appellants Brown and Culver were not moot because their terms have not expired; and that appellants were required by section 45-10-4 to proceed under the Act, and no delay seen here warranted the imposition of the doctrine of laches. The court held that OCGA 20-2-50, et seq. did not create county boards of education and the court had previously stated that county school boards were creations of the Constitution. The court rejected appellees' assertion that the the term "boards, commissions, and authorities created by general statute" should be construed expansively to include any and all such entities created by the Constitution. The court also noted that the General Assembly was well aware of how to include members of county boards of education within the ambit of ethics legislation. View "Roberts, et al. v. Deal, et al." on Justia Law

GSASC filed a complaint against appellants for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. GSASC requested a declaration that a 2009 annual survey issued by DCH to single-specialty, physician-owned ASCs sought information beyond the scope of OCGA 31-6-70. GSASC further requested interlocutory and permanent injunctive relief preventing DCH from requiring GSASC's members to respond to certain disputed requests in the 2009 survey. The Court of Appeals concluded that DCH did not have statutory authority to include the disputed requests in the 2009 survey and also rejected an alternative basis for affirmance when it determined that GSASC and its members were not required to exhaust administrative remedies because it would be futile and because GSASC was challenging DCH's authority and power to act. Because neither exception upon which the Court of Appeals relied to dispense with the exhaustion requirement was applicable, the court reversed its judgment and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. View "GA Dept. of Community Health, et al. v. GA Society of Ambulatory Surgery Centers" on Justia Law

Johnnie Owens, acting City Clerk, and Darryl Williams, the acting Chief of Police, sued the City and the Mayor, in both is official and individual capacities, for wrongful termination and concomitant damages. The trial court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case because it presented a purely political question. In the alternative, the trial court granted the City's and the Mayor's motions for summary judgment, finding, among other things, that, despite the Mayor's actions, the terms of Owens and Williams had naturally expired in accordance with the City Charter. Owens and Williams appealed. Because the trial court had proper jurisdiction over the case, questions of material fact remained, and questions of law remained unreached by the trial court. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Owens et al. v. City of Greenville, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant, pro se, brought an action in the trial court against the City, the City Council, and the City's Municipal Clerk (appellees) alleging violations of Georgia's Open Meetings Act, OCGA 50-14-1 et seq. Appellant alleged that the minutes of a Council meeting in February 2010 omitted certain information concerning the outcome of a non-roll-call vote in violation of subsection (e)(2), namely the names of council members who voted, in the minority, to amend rather than maintain certain Council rules. The court found that the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the Act, which must be broadly construed. Therefore, the court reversed in part and concluded that only that portion of appellant's complaint seeking to impose criminal liability upon the individual defendants was properly dismissed. View "Cardinale v. City of Atlanta, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit against the Board, alleging that sections 2 and 3 of Ordinance No. 10-01, amending two sections of the Local Act, Ga. L. 1983, p. 4594 (sections 10 and 14), were unconstitutional and sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, as well as nominal damages and expenses of litigation, including attorney's fees. Section 14 prohibited members of the Board from transacting business with the county and section 10 provided that all bills shall be paid by check signed by the clerk and by the chairman or vice-chairman. Section 3 amended section 14 by adding a provision that section 14 would not apply where a majority of the Board approved the contract or transaction after establishing that the goods, services, or property could not be obtained for less and that the taxpayers' interests would be served. Section 2 amended section 10 by providing that all bills shall be paid by check signed by at least two officials among a list of officials. The court held that section 2 conferred only administrative rather than executive authority on the chair of the Board's finance committee and that it therefore did not violate Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. 1(c)(2) by affecting the composition or form of the Board; section 3 did not constitute an action affecting the elective office of commissioner in violation of Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I (c)(1); section 3 was not preempted by OCGA 36-1-14; and section 3 did not impair OCGA 16-10-6 but rather effectively augmented and strengthened it. Accordingly, the trial court erred in declaring sections 2 and 3 unconstitutional, in granting partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their claims of declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and in denying defendants' motion for summary judgment. The remaining enumeration of error regarding defendants' immunity defenses was moot.

The County appealed from the grant of a writ of mandamus ordering it to reinstate appellee to his former position as a fire captain and awarding him back pay and costs of litigation. The court held that because appellee had a clear legal right to reinstatement, a right violated by the County's steadfast refusal to abide by the order of the hearing officer, as affirmed by the Council on appeal, mandamus was properly granted. The court also approved the monetary award fashioned by the trial court to make appellee whole for the full amount of salary he was denied from the date of his wrongful termination. The court further held that the record showed that the County affirmatively waived its right to a hearing on the issue of attorney fees.