Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Local residents filed a complaint with the governor against appellants, who were elected members of the WCBE, alleging that they had violated OCGA 45-10-3. Appellants subsequently appealed the order of the superior court denying their petition for judicial review under the Georgia Administrative Procedures Act. The court held that the appeal as to Appellant Roberts was moot and must be dismissed; the appeal as to Appellants Brown and Culver were not moot because their terms have not expired; and that appellants were required by section 45-10-4 to proceed under the Act, and no delay seen here warranted the imposition of the doctrine of laches. The court held that OCGA 20-2-50, et seq. did not create county boards of education and the court had previously stated that county school boards were creations of the Constitution. The court rejected appellees' assertion that the the term "boards, commissions, and authorities created by general statute" should be construed expansively to include any and all such entities created by the Constitution. The court also noted that the General Assembly was well aware of how to include members of county boards of education within the ambit of ethics legislation. View "Roberts, et al. v. Deal, et al." on Justia Law

GSASC filed a complaint against appellants for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. GSASC requested a declaration that a 2009 annual survey issued by DCH to single-specialty, physician-owned ASCs sought information beyond the scope of OCGA 31-6-70. GSASC further requested interlocutory and permanent injunctive relief preventing DCH from requiring GSASC's members to respond to certain disputed requests in the 2009 survey. The Court of Appeals concluded that DCH did not have statutory authority to include the disputed requests in the 2009 survey and also rejected an alternative basis for affirmance when it determined that GSASC and its members were not required to exhaust administrative remedies because it would be futile and because GSASC was challenging DCH's authority and power to act. Because neither exception upon which the Court of Appeals relied to dispense with the exhaustion requirement was applicable, the court reversed its judgment and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. View "GA Dept. of Community Health, et al. v. GA Society of Ambulatory Surgery Centers" on Justia Law

Johnnie Owens, acting City Clerk, and Darryl Williams, the acting Chief of Police, sued the City and the Mayor, in both is official and individual capacities, for wrongful termination and concomitant damages. The trial court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case because it presented a purely political question. In the alternative, the trial court granted the City's and the Mayor's motions for summary judgment, finding, among other things, that, despite the Mayor's actions, the terms of Owens and Williams had naturally expired in accordance with the City Charter. Owens and Williams appealed. Because the trial court had proper jurisdiction over the case, questions of material fact remained, and questions of law remained unreached by the trial court. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Owens et al. v. City of Greenville, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant, pro se, brought an action in the trial court against the City, the City Council, and the City's Municipal Clerk (appellees) alleging violations of Georgia's Open Meetings Act, OCGA 50-14-1 et seq. Appellant alleged that the minutes of a Council meeting in February 2010 omitted certain information concerning the outcome of a non-roll-call vote in violation of subsection (e)(2), namely the names of council members who voted, in the minority, to amend rather than maintain certain Council rules. The court found that the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the Act, which must be broadly construed. Therefore, the court reversed in part and concluded that only that portion of appellant's complaint seeking to impose criminal liability upon the individual defendants was properly dismissed. View "Cardinale v. City of Atlanta, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit against the Board, alleging that sections 2 and 3 of Ordinance No. 10-01, amending two sections of the Local Act, Ga. L. 1983, p. 4594 (sections 10 and 14), were unconstitutional and sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, as well as nominal damages and expenses of litigation, including attorney's fees. Section 14 prohibited members of the Board from transacting business with the county and section 10 provided that all bills shall be paid by check signed by the clerk and by the chairman or vice-chairman. Section 3 amended section 14 by adding a provision that section 14 would not apply where a majority of the Board approved the contract or transaction after establishing that the goods, services, or property could not be obtained for less and that the taxpayers' interests would be served. Section 2 amended section 10 by providing that all bills shall be paid by check signed by at least two officials among a list of officials. The court held that section 2 conferred only administrative rather than executive authority on the chair of the Board's finance committee and that it therefore did not violate Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. 1(c)(2) by affecting the composition or form of the Board; section 3 did not constitute an action affecting the elective office of commissioner in violation of Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I (c)(1); section 3 was not preempted by OCGA 36-1-14; and section 3 did not impair OCGA 16-10-6 but rather effectively augmented and strengthened it. Accordingly, the trial court erred in declaring sections 2 and 3 unconstitutional, in granting partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their claims of declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and in denying defendants' motion for summary judgment. The remaining enumeration of error regarding defendants' immunity defenses was moot.

The County appealed from the grant of a writ of mandamus ordering it to reinstate appellee to his former position as a fire captain and awarding him back pay and costs of litigation. The court held that because appellee had a clear legal right to reinstatement, a right violated by the County's steadfast refusal to abide by the order of the hearing officer, as affirmed by the Council on appeal, mandamus was properly granted. The court also approved the monetary award fashioned by the trial court to make appellee whole for the full amount of salary he was denied from the date of his wrongful termination. The court further held that the record showed that the County affirmatively waived its right to a hearing on the issue of attorney fees.

Appellant contended that it was a "public utility" under OCGA 48-1-2 and, as such, was required under OCGA 48-5-511 to make an annual tax return of its Georgia property to the Georgia Revenue Commissioner rather than to the Chatham County tax authorities. Appellant filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment and for writ of mandamus in superior court, seeking to have the trial court recognize appellant as a "public utility" and to order appellee to accept appellant's annual ad valorem property tax return. The trial court granted appellee's motion to dismiss the complaint based on appellant's failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the doctrine of sovereign immunity was applicable to the claims. The court reversed and held that it need not address whether sovereign immunity would act as a bar to appellant's declaratory action, as it was clear that, if the declaratory action were barred by sovereign immunity, appellant's mandamus action would still remain viable.

These appeals arose from annexations by the City of parcels of unincorporated real property in Fayette County. At issue was whether appellee, the City resident seeking to enjoin the City from providing services to the area annexed in 2007, had standing as a citizen-taxpayer to do so; whether the appeal was moot; and whether a subsequent annexation by the City cured the flaw the Court of Appeals found in the first annexation. The court concluded that the appeal was moot when it was docketed in the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals should have dismissed it as such. In light of this decision, there was no need to address the issue of appellee's standing as a citizen-taxpayer. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

This case arose from an automobile collision in which a police officer employed by the City of Newman was driving a City police car when it was struck by a motor vehicle owned and operated by the insured, who had $25,000 of motor vehicle liability coverage. The City had a Member Coverage Agreement (Agreement) with the Georgia Interlocal Risk Management Agency (GIRMA), established under OCGA 36-85-1 et seq. The officer subsequently sued the insured in tort and served a copy of the complaint on GIRMA to notify GIRMA that it might be held responsible as an uninsured motorist carrier pursuant to OCGA 33-7-11. The court subsequently granted a writ of certiorari to the court of appeals to consider whether that court properly determined that a municipality's motor vehicle liability coverage secured through an interlocal risk management agency was not statutorily obligated to satisfy the requirements for uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage that were applied to commercial insurance policies and private self-insurance plans. The court held that the district court reached the correct conclusion when it determined that there was no authority for the conclusion that an interlocal risk management program such as that offered by GIRMA must include uninsured motorist coverage pursuant to OCGA 33-7-11. Therefore, the Agreement was limited to its express terms and did not include the underinsured motorist protection that the police officer sought. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

This appeal involved the manner in which a superior court could enforce the provisions of the Open Records Act (Act), OCGA 50-14-1, against a municipality. Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging an Open Records Act violation against the city and requested, among other things, an award of attorney fees and an injunction preventing the city from holding any future "secret" meetings. The city ultimately conceded that it had violated the Act but filed an appeal, arguing that the trial court's imposition of attorney fees was improper. The court held that OCGA 36-33-5 did not apply to plaintiffs' request for attorney fees and that the Act explicitly authorized the assessment of attorney fees. The court also held that the city's argument was defeated by the plain text of the Act. Therefore, based on this explicit grant of legislative authority, the trial court did not err. The court finally held that plaintiffs provided no evidence that the trial court abused its discretion by determining that the amount of attorney fees awarded to plaintiffs, not the amount for which they asked, was reasonable under the circumstances of the case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's award of attorney fees and expenses.