Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant challenged his conviction for violating a county ordinance regulating the volume of noise from "mechanical sound-making devices." Appellant contended that the provision was facially invalid under the free speech clause of the Georgia Constitution. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. V. The court held that the county drew the challenged provision of its ordinance deliberately and in response to specific concerns, and the county had offered good reasons for rejecting appellant's proposed alternatives. The court also held that the provision advanced a substantial government interest in the least restrictive way. Furthermore, the provision was content neutral and left open ample alternatives for communication. Therefore, the ordinance was a reasonable, content-neutral time, place, and manner speech regulation and appellant's facial challenge to it was without merit.

Plaintiff filed a suit against two county police officers in their individual capacities, contending that the officers negligently operated their vehicles by causing plaintiff to lose control of his vehicle and crash. Plaintiff sustained bodily injuries and plaintiff's son was killed in the crash. At issue was whether OCGA 36-92-3 was unconstitutional because it was not part of the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA), OCGA 50-21-20 et seq. The court held that the trial court properly denied plaintiff's claim and properly granted summary judgment in favor of the officers where the Legislature was not limited to waiver of immunity solely in the GTCA and where the Legislature extended immunity to county employees like the officers in a section of the Georgia Code specifically applicable to counties, demonstrating that it had the constitutional authority to enact OCGA 36-92-3.

These appeals arose from trial court orders granting preliminary injunctions and appointing receivers to take control of the assets of certain stores and operate them. In each of the five stores, the state filed civil actions under the Georgia RICO statute, OCGA 16-14-1 et seq., and named as in personam defendants the purported owners and operators of the stores, alleging that defendants each engaged in two or more acts of illegal commercial gambling. Defendants appealed the trial court's order granting the state's motions for interlocutory injunctions, which continued in effect the terms of the temporary restraining orders and continued the receivership. The court held that a RICO forfeiture was a proceeding that could be initiated by the state pursuant to OCGA 16-14-7 and that the procedures surrounding the orders granting the injunctions and continuing the receiverships did not violate due process where defendants were afforded the opportunity to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and present arguments. The court also held that the trial court's consideration of the question of in rem forfeitures constituting unconstitutionally excessive fines was premature, and the cases must be remanded for consideration of those issues when properly presented. The court further held that the evidence presented did demonstrate a pattern of racketeering activity; that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding the issues where it recited equitable arguments of both parties; and that the trial court did not err in denying defendants' motion to recuse a judge. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings.

Appellants, former sworn officers of the Atlanta Police Department, appealed the grant of summary judgment to the Policemen's Pension Fund Board of Trustees (Board) in appellants' action seeking a writ of mandamus and an award of damages. While appellants were receiving disability pensions, the Atlanta City Council increased the multiplier used in calculating pensions from two percent to three percent in Ordinance 00-O-1099 and the ordinance was "applicable to all active sworn police officers employed as of the effective date" of the ordinance. At issue was whether the Board should use the three percent multiplier in calculating appellants' pension entitlements. The court held that there was no evidence presented that appellants were "active sworn officers" on the effective date of the new ordinance and in fact, it was alleged in the complaint that they were not. Accordingly, appellants were not entitled to the three percent multiplier and the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiffs appealed from an order granting summary judgment to defendant for the alleged breach of an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) entered into by the parties for the distribution of funds generated by a special sales tax instituted pursuant to the Homestead Option Sales and Use Tax Act (HOST), OCGA 48-8-100 et seq. At issue was whether the IGA was unconstitutional as violative of the Intergovernmental Contracts Clause of the Georgia Constitution, 1983 Ga. Const., Art. IX, Sec. III, Par. I(a). The court held that the IGA was not a valid intergovernmental contract where the IGA was neither a contract for services or one for the use of facilities, but a revenue-sharing contract. Therefore, summary judgment was properly granted to defendant.

Appellee filed a post-judgment garnishment action against a bank in Athens, Georgia, that purportedly held assets of the judgment debtor. At issue was whether the court of appeals erred in holding that substantial compliance with the notice requirements of OCGA 18-4-64(a) was sufficient. The court held that the court of appeals erred when it held that appellee's untimely notification of appellant substantially complied with the requirements of OCGA 18-4-64(a) where the rules of statutory construction were not applicable when the statute was plain and unambiguous.

Plaintiff, a prisoner who was incarcerated 22 months past his release date, sued appellants alleging that they failed to comply with OCGA 42-5-50(a) by notifying the Department of Corrections (DOC) of his amended sentence. At issue was whether the court of appeals correctly found that appellants, in their respective individual capacities as Clerk of the Superior Court of Fulton County and an employee in that office, were entitled to official immunity for their actions in regard to OCGA 42-5-50(a). The court held that because the specific actions mandated by OCGA 42-5-50(a) were ministerial and were unambiguously triggered by the amended order, the court of appeals correctly concluded they were not within the scope of official immunity and reversed the trial court's ruling to the contrary. The court disapproved, however, of the court of appeal's holding to the extent that it was based upon the law of the case doctrine.

These related appeals concern the rights of certain sign companies to construct billboards in areas formerly located in unincorporated Fulton County that are now located in the recently created cities of Sandy Springs, Milton, and Johns Creek and a recently annexed portion of the city of Alpharetta (collectively, "cities"). At issue was whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the sign companies based on its determination that the companies had a vested right to erect the billboards as of the date of their applications were filed. The court rejected the county and cities' arguments and held that the sign companies had vested rights to construct the billboards at issue where there were no valid ordinances regulating the construction of billboards at the time the applications were filed and the sign companies were entitled to construct, maintain, and operate all signs for which they submitted applications. Accordingly, the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the sign companies was affirmed.

Plaintiff, who was employed as the City of McDonough's ("city") chief building inspector, brought suit against the city when the city refused to pay him severance under an employment agreement contract. At issue was whether the contract was binding to a successor municipal council in violation of OCGA 36-30-3(a). The court held that the contract was ultra vires and void because the contract was renewed automatically and the severance package required the city to pay plaintiff his salary and benefits for an entire year after the year in which the contract was terminated.

This appeal involved a constitutional challenge to the 2008 Georgia Charter Schools Commission Act ("Act"), OCGA 20-2-2081 et seq. Appellants, local school systems whose 2009 and 2010 complaints were consolidated by the trial court, contended, inter alia, that the Act was unconstitutional because it violated the "special schools" provision in the Georgia Constitution of 1983. The court held that the Act was unconstitutional where the constitution embodied the fundamental principle of exclusive local control of general primary and secondary public education ("K-12") and where the Act clearly and palpably violated Art. VIII, Sec. V, Par. VII(a) by authorizing a state commission to establish competing state-created general K-12 schools under the guise of being "special schools." The court's holding rendered it unnecessary to address appellants' remaining constitutional challenges to the Act.