Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Matthew Chan ran a website on which he and others published commentary critical of copyright enforcement practices that they considered to be predatory. Linda Ellis, a poet, drew the ire of Chan and his fellow commentators by her efforts to enforce the copyright in her poetry. Chan's website published nearly 2,000 posts about Ellis, many of which were mean-spirited, distasteful and crude, and some of which publicize information about Ellis that she would prefer not to be public. In an "open letter" styled post to Ellis, the commentator threatened to publicize additional information about Ellis and her family if she continued to employ the practices of which Chan and the other commentators disapproved. It is undisputed that Chan never caused any of these posts to be delivered to Ellis or otherwise brought to her attention. But it also was undisputed that Chan anticipated that Ellis might see the commentary on his website, and he may have even intended that she see certain of the posts, including the open letter to her. Ellis eventually did learn of the posts, and she sued Chan for injunctive relief under the Georgia stalking law, alleging that the electronic publication of the posts was a violation of OCGA 16-5-90 (a) (1), which forbids one to “contact” another for certain purposes without the consent of the other. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court agreed that the electronic publication of posts about Ellis amounted to stalking, and it entered a permanent injunction against Chan, directing him to, among other things, delete “all posts relating to Ms. Ellis” from his website. Chan appealed, contending that the evidence simply did not show that the publication of posts about Ellis on his website amounts to the sort of “contact” that was forbidden by OCGA 16-5-90 (a) (1). The Supreme Court agreed with that contention, and reversed the trial court’s judgment. View "Chan v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Appellee Barto Mitcham filed a negligence action against appellants, the City of Atlanta (the “City”) and George Turner, in his official capacity as the Chief of Police for the City of Atlanta Police Department, alleging that Mitcham was seriously injured as a result of appellants’ failure to provide him necessary medical treatment while in their custody. Mitcham specifically alleged that after he was arrested by the City of Atlanta Police Department, he became ill because of low blood sugar associated with diabetes. He was taken to the hospital, and upon his discharge and release back into the custody of the City, Atlanta Police Department officers were informed of his diabetic condition and the need to monitor and regulate his insulin levels. He alleged they failed to do so, causing him further illness and serious and permanent injuries. The Supreme Court granted a petition for writ or certiorari in this case to determine whether the Court of Appeals used the proper analysis when it determined that the provision of medical care by the City of Atlanta to inmates in its custody was a ministerial function for which the City of Atlanta’s sovereign immunity had been waived. Because the Court found that the care of inmates in the custody of a municipal corporation is a governmental function for which sovereign immunity has not been waived, it reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Atlanta v. Mitcham" on Justia Law

Lucious Primas was injured while driving a prison work-detail van owned by the City of Milledgeville. The van was leased to the Georgia Department of Corrections but pursuant to contract, the City was responsible for maintaining the vehicle and purchasing insurance policies. On the day of the accident, as Primas approached an intersection, the brake line failed. Primas was able to steer the car off the road, but he was injured when he collided with a utility pole. Primas sued the City, alleging it was negligent by failing to inspect and maintain the vehicle’s brake lines. The trial court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment in which it claimed the maintenance and inspection of a brake line was a discretionary act for which its sovereign immunity had not been waived. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Primas’ claim against the City was barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity because the alleged negligent act was a discretionary act for which sovereign immunity had not been waived under Georgia law. Because the Supreme Court found that the proper analysis was not applied, it vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for reconsideration. View "Primas v. City of Milledgeville" on Justia Law

Peggy Dion (“Dion”), the widow of Dale Dion (“Dale”), appealed a Superior Court order that granted Y.S.G. Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Depot Sports Bar and Grill's (“Depot”) motion to dismiss. Dale died in a single-car wreck; his blood alcohol content was .282. At 2:30 p.m. the previous day, Dale went to the Depot and drank alcoholic beverages for the next eight hours, closing his tab at 10:43 p.m. During that time, he was visibly intoxicated and a Depot employee asked for the keys to Dale’s car, but Dale refused. Dion filed a wrongful death action against Depot, contending that the conduct of its employees was the proximate cause of Dale’s death. Depot moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing that Dion’s asserted cause of action fell under the Dram Shop Act. The trial court granted Depot's motion, specifically rejecting Dion's contentions that the Act was unconstitutional. Dion appealed the trial court's holding, but finding the Act constitutional, and finding no otherwise reversible error in the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Dion's case. View "Dion v. Y.S.G. Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a The Depot Sports Bar & Grill" on Justia Law

Wayne Farms owned and operated a chicken processing plant in Oakwood. A fire broke out at the plant in 2003. Roughly three years later, Wayne Farms and its insurers filed suit against Crane Composites, Inc., which manufactured interior panels used in the plant, alleging Crane’s negligence caused the fire to spread extensively. In the meantime, the legislature enacted OCGA 9-11-68 (b) (1). The question for decision in this case is whether OCGA 9-11-68 (a tort reform, fee-shifting statute) could be applied to a negligence action in which the injury occurred prior to the effective date of the statute, but in which the action was filed after that date. The Supreme Court concluded that it could, and in so doing, overruled the case law set forth in "L. P. Gas Industrial Equipment Co. v. Burch," (701 SE2d 602) (2010)). View "Crane Company v. Wayne Farms, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was an “ante litem notice.” Kimberly Myers arrived for class at Dalton State College and allegedly stepped on the edge of an unrepaired pothole in the parking lot and was injured. She received emergency medical treatment that day, had follow-up orthopedic doctor visits, and began physical therapy. Myers sent an ante litem notice to the Georgia Department of Administrative Services, stating she intended to sue the Board of Regents for negligence based on the allegedly unsafe condition of the parking lot that led to her fractured left ankle and torn tendons. Under a provision of the Georgia Tort Claims Act, the State government may not be sued in a civil action without first being given notice of the claim. In her ante litem notice, Myers’ attorney provided details of what had happened to her and stated: “The amount of Ms. Myers’ loss is yet to be determined as she is still incurring medical bills and does not yet know the full extent of her injury.” The question in this case centered on whether the language in the ante litem notice was a sufficient statement of the amount of loss claimed. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court correctly recognized Myers "failed entirely to comply with a requirement despite having knowledge.” View "Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia v. Myers" on Justia Law

Colonial Pipeline Company maintained an underground liquid petroleum pipeline that passes through DeKalb County near the home of Paige Jansen-Nichols. In 2013, a leak detection alarm system caused Colonial to become concerned that its pipeline might have been compromised, and Colonial twice used helicopters to inspect the pipeline. Alleging that these helicopters flew too low over her home, Jansen-Nichols sued Colonial for trespass, nuisance, negligence, and negligence per se, seeking money damages and permanent injunctive relief. She also sought an interlocutory injunction to prohibit Colonial from flying helicopters low over her house for so long as her lawsuit was pending. Following two evidentiary hearings, the trial court denied the motion for an interlocutory injunction, and Jansen-Nichols appealed, arguing the denial of an interlocutory injunction was error because it sanctioned low overflights of her home, thereby giving Colonial a license to trespass upon her property, to maintain a nuisance, and to breach the duty of care that it allegedly owes her in connection with aerial pipeline inspections. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed denial of the injunction. View "Jansen-Nichols v. Kinder Morgan Southeast Terminals, LLC" on Justia Law

Following an injury in October 1999, Employee filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Shortly thereafter, Employer began paying the first of 32 payments of temporary total disability benefits. Twelve of the payments were untimely under the terms of the workers’ compensation statute. Employee returned to work in June 2002 and his benefits were suspended at that time. Nearly eight years later, employee demanded payment of the statutory penalties due on the 12 late payments. Employer refused the demand, asserting it was time barred. Employee sought a hearing and an order requiring employer to pay the penalties. The administrative law judge determined employee’s claim was a “change in condition” claim under OCGA 34-9-104, and, therefore, barred under the two-year limitation period set forth in OCGA 34-9-104 (b). The Appellate Division of the State Board and the superior court agreed. The Court of Appeals granted employee’s application for discretionary review and reversed the judgment of the superior court, finding employee’s claim for statutory penalties was not governed by any limitation period and, therefore, was not time barred. The question presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the proper statute of limitations for a claim of statutory penalties for late benefits payments in workers’ compensation cases under OCGA 34-9-221 was the general statute of limitations, OCGA 34-9-82, rather than the change in condition statute of limitations, OCGA 34-9-104 (b). The Court answered that question in the affirmative. View "Marta v. Reid" on Justia Law

Appellee Yvonne Butler was a principal at a DeKalb County elementary school. Appellant DeKalb County School District notified appellee it would be terminating her employment for: (1) incompetency; (2) insubordination; (3) wilful neglect of duties; and (4)for other good and sufficient cause. Appellee was placed on suspension while the charges were pending. A hearing was scheduled pursuant to the Fair Dismissal Act (FDA), but the parties agreed to a continuance. The record revealed the hearing never took place. Appellant offered appellee, in lieu of termination, a contract for a classroom teaching position for the 2011- 2012 school year and required that she sign and return the contract before May 19, 2011, if she chose to accept the offer. On May 31, 2011, appellee responded to the May 11 letter by asserting that she had a right to an FDA hearing. In her May 31 response, appellee never indicated she would be accepting the offered position of classroom teacher. On June 30, 2011, upon hiring new counsel, appellee returned the signed teaching contract "under protest." In July, appellant issued appellee a separation notice indicating appellee’s employment had ended as of June 30, 2011. The following March, appellee filed this mandamus action, requesting an FDA hearing, a name-clearing hearing, and damages for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in regard to the proffered 2011-2012 teaching contract. Both parties moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted and denied in part both parties’ motions: the decision effectively granted appellee’s petition for a writ of mandamus and held that appellee was entitled to an FDA hearing because she was a tenured employee and had been demoted from an administrator to a teacher. In addition, the trial court held that the request for a separate name-clearing hearing was moot as appellee could clear her name at the FDA hearing. Finally, the trial court denied appellee’s claim of damages for breach because it found that appellee had not timely accepted the contract to be a classroom teacher for the 2011-2012 school year. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that since appellee had earned tenure as a teacher, at the time of her suspension from the position as principal in 2010, the only right she had under the FDA was continued employment as a teacher. Therefore, the School District complied with the FDA when it offered appellee a teaching position for the 2011-2012 school year rather than insisting upon her termination. At that point, the FDA did not require any additional action by appellant. Thus, it was error for the trial court to conclude that appellant was required to hold a demotion hearing pursuant to the FDA in addition to offering appellee continued employment as a teacher. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court in all other respects. View "Dekalb County Sch. Dist. v. Butler" on Justia Law

Appellant Louise Shorter Barzey challenged the constitutionality of certain provisions in the Workers' Compensation Act that precluded her, as a non-dependent parent, from recovering benefits for the death of her son, Deron Shorter, from his employer, the City of Cuthbert. Shorter was killed in 2010 while acting in the course of his employment with the City. He was 37 at the time of his death, was not married, and had no dependents. His mother Barzey was his only heir at law. After Shorter's death, Barzey filed a lawsuit against the City, seeking a judgment declaring that she has the right to sue the City. Barzey acknowledged that the Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy of an employee's heirs for the employee's death during the course of his employment. She also acknowledged that the Act expressly said that the compensation for a deceased employee "shall be payable only to dependents and only during dependency." After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the Act's limitation on the recovery of nondependent heirs did not violate Barzey's constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. View "Barzey v. City of Cuthbert" on Justia Law