Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The named plaintiffs in this class action owned real property in Mallard Pointe, a residential neighborhood in Effingham County. Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products, LP has operated the Savannah River Mill nearby since 1986. Plaintiffs argued that their real property was contaminated by hydrogen sulfide gas released from the decomposition of solid waste sludge released by the mill. As a result, they have been exposed to noxious odors, their use and enjoyment of their property has been impaired, and the value of their property has diminished. Plaintiffs sued Georgia-Pacific for nuisance, trespass, and negligence. The plaintiffs sought not only to recover monetary damages for themselves, but they proposed to seek relief for a class of other nearby property owners. Georgia-Pacific appealed the certification of the class, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon the petition of Georgia-Pacific, the Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, and concluded after that review that the trial court abused its discretion when it certified the class. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals View "Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products, LP v. Ratner" on Justia Law

Donna Austin sued to recover for personal injuries she allegedly sustained when she fell on a sidewalk as she was leaving a graduation ceremony at Peach County High School. She filed the suit against Susan Clark, the Superintendent of Peach County Schools; C.B. Mathis, the Assistant Superintendent of Facilities of Peach County Schools; Bruce Mackey, the Principal of Peach County High School; and Chad Sanders, the Director of Maintenance of Peach County Schools. Austin alleged that the individual defendants negligently performed the ministerial duties of inspecting, maintaining and repairing the sidewalk and road where she fell. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the claims against them were barred by the doctrine of official immunity. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, however, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in granting defendants immunity from suit. The Supreme Court found that discovery in this case had been extremely limited, and it could not be said that the allegations of the complaint disclosed with certainty that Austin would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in support. According to the Court, it did not matter that "'Austin has pointed to no specific and clear procedures or methods for dealing with the purported hazard created by the drainage opening on the curb.' This is factual evidence which may or may not be developed during discovery and can be considered on a subsequent motion for summary judgment." View "Austin v. Clark" on Justia Law

In December 2007, appellees Jordan and Renee Conley filed a product liability suit against appellant Ford Motor Company based on a single-vehicle rollover accident that occurred in 2006. The case went to trial in 2009. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Ford, and the Conleys did not file an appeal. Based on information about Ford's insurers that came to light more than a year later, the Conleys filed a motion for new trial in 2011. In early 2012, the trial court granted that motion. Ford filed an application for interlocutory appeal, which the Court of Appeals granted. The Court of Appeals judges were divided evenly, so the case was transferred to the Supreme Court for decision. After careful consideration of the record and the contentions of the parties, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court: "we reiterate the high hurdles that must be surmounted before an untimely, 'extraordinary' motion for new trial may be granted, but we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the Conleys met that burden under the particular circumstances of this case." View "Ford Motor Co. v. Conley" on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice action, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether it was wrong for the appellate court to reverse the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs in this case accused an emergency room surgeon of having negligently delayed surgery that ultimately lead to the injured person losing a finger. Upon review of the facts of the case, the Supreme Court concluded there remained questions of fact that should have been presented to the jury, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. As such, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision to reverse the trial court. View "Abdel-Samed v. Dailey" on Justia Law

In March 2010, Justyna Kunz was involved in a car accident with GEICO's insureds, Crystal, Joseph, and Elizabeth Kalish. Kunz received medical treatment at Athens Regional Medical Center; the Hospital Authority of Clarke County and Athens Regional Medical Center (collectively, "the Hospitals") filed three hospital liens. Kunz subsequently filed suit against the Kalishes. Kunz's attorney wrote a letter to the Kalishes' attorney accepting their $100,000 policy limit settlement offer. The settlement documents, signed in Fall 2010, expressly required Kunz to satisfy the hospital liens out of the settlement fund and constituted a "general[ ] release ... from all legal and equitable claims of every kind and nature." The liens were never satisfied. The Court of Appeals held that, under OCGA 44–14–473 (a), the Hospitals were barred by a one-year statute of limitations from filing suit against GEICO to collect on the hospital liens. The Hospitals appealed the appellate court's decision. Finding that the appellate court erred in arriving at its conclusion, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Hospital Authority of Clarke County v. GEICO General Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in this case to decide whether the Court of Appeals erred in its determination that the public duty doctrine insulated the City of Doraville from liability arising from the response of a Doraville Police Department ("DPD") officer to a vehicle emergency on an interstate highway which culminated in a multi-vehicle accident injuring Kenyatta Stevenson. Stevenson sued the City and a DPD Officer, asserting that the officer was negligent in failing to redirect traffic away from Stevenson's disabled car and in causing traffic to move in Stevenson's direction by engaging his vehicle's blue emergency lights while stopped near the outer lane of the highway behind and to the right of Stevenson. The trial court granted summary judgment to both defendants, finding official immunity shielded the officer from liability and that the public duty doctrine precluded Stevenson's claims against the City. Stevenson appealed, arguing that the public duty doctrine did not apply to his case because he alleged affirmative acts of negligence and that, even if the doctrine did apply, he fell within the special relationship exception identified in "City of Rome v. Jordan," (426 SE2d 861) (1993)). The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding Stevenson's arguments lacked merit. Although it appeared that the appellate court based its rejection of Stevenson's first argument on a finding that "there [was] nothing in the record . . . showing any active negligence on the part of the officer," the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, but wrote to clarify the public duty doctrine. The doctrine "does not apply to limit liability where a claim of active negligence (misfeasance), rather than a mere failure to act (nonfeasance) is alleged." View "Stevenson v. City of Doraville" on Justia Law

Deloris Gaulden died in the emergency department of Liberty Regional Medical Center. Her daughter sued Bobby Herrington, M.D., the medical director of the emergency department, alleging that Gaulden could have been saved, if only her treating physician and nurse had promptly and properly implemented a chest pain protocol that the hospital had adopted. The trial court awarded summary judgment to Dr. Herrington, but the Court of Appeals reversed to the extent that the claim against him sounded in professional negligence. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in its reversal of the trial court. The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Herrington v. Gaulden" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the limitation period for a claim of pain and suffering in this wrongful death action could be tolled for fraud under OCGA 9-3-96. The victim, Sparkle Reid and Rajeeve Rai, the son of appellant Chiman Rai, married when their daughter was five months old. Within a month of the wedding, the victim was murdered in their apartment in the presence of the daughter. Rajeeve was at work at the time. The victim's father, Bennet Reid and his wife took custody of the child and later adopted her. Rajeeve abandoned the child, and never challenged the adoption nor the consequent termination of his parental rights. The crime went into cold case status until 2004 when, while investigating an unrelated matter, police spoke to a woman who said she was present at the murder and identified the hired killers. This information led eventually to appellant. Appellant was convicted of the murder. Reid filed a complaint and subsequently an amended complaint for wrongful death as the minor child's next friend and for pain and suffering as administrator of the victim's estate. After a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment on the jury's verdict, awarded $2.5 million to the child on the wrongful death claim and $100,000 to Reid as estate administrator for the victim's pain and suffering. Appellant's motion for new trial was denied. Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals divided evenly by a vote of six to six on the issue of whether appellant had committed fraud that would trigger the tolling provisions of OCGA 9-3-96, and thus, prevent the estate's claim for pain and suffering from being time-barred by the statute of limitation for personal injury actions. The appellate court ultimately reversed those portions of the trial court's judgment relating to the tolling of the limitation period for the pain and suffering claim, but affirmed the remainder of the judgment, finding that actual fraud was the gravamen of Reid's claim for pain and suffering and was not supported by the record or the law. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with much of the position advocated by the appellate court. That portion of the final judgment entered on the jury's verdict against appellant and in favor of Reid, as administrator of the victim's estate, for pain and suffering was reversed, but the remainder of the final judgment entered on the jury's verdict for wrongful death against appellant and in favor of Reid, as next friend of the victim's minor child, was affirmed. View "Rai v. Reid" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in "Greenway v. Northside Hosp., Inc." (730 SE2d 742) (2012)), to determine if the appellate court erred in its evaluation of Deputy Sheriff Terry Roper's claim that he was entitled to official immunity from liability in connection with the euthanization of two dogs. Greenway was taken by ambulance from his home to a hospital; two dogs remained at the home. While Greenway was in the hospital's emergency department, and uncertain whether he would live, he was pressured to sign an “Owner Release Form” regarding his dogs; the form was given to him by Roper and authorized Forsyth County Animal Control to destroy the dogs. At the time he signed the form, Greenway was unable to read it without his eyeglasses and understood that his dogs were going to the Humane Society; the dogs were euthanized before Greenway was able to recover from his illness and take further action. Greenway sued Roper, the hospital, the Sheriff, and the County's animal shelter provider. The trial court granted summary judgment to all defendants, but the Court of Appeals reversed as to Roper, the hospital, and the animal shelter operator. As to Roper, the Court of Appeals found that the doctrine of official immunity insulated him from liability from his decision to ask Greenway to sign the form, but not from his execution of that decision. Finding that the Court of Appeals erred, the Supreme Court reversed that court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Roper v. Greenway" on Justia Law

Thelma Johnson took her 15-year-old son Shaquille to the emergency department at Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital; a week earlier, Shaquille had undergone arthroscopic knee surgery. Shaquille complained of chest pain; was first seen by a nurse; and then examined by Dr. Price Omondi. The doctor noted that Shaquille had undergone surgery a week earlier; he inquired about Shaquille's medical history and family history and conducted a physical examination. Dr. Omondi ruled out multiple ailments, specifically, pulmonary embolism as causes of Shaquille's pain. Dr. Omondi diagnosed Shaquille with pleurisy and discharged him from the hospital with a prescription for an anti-inflammatory pain reliever, and instructions to return to the emergency department if his symptoms continued. Two weeks later, Shaquille returned to the emergency department, and died of a bilateral pulmonary embolism. Thelma Johnson and her husband sued Dr. Omondi and Southwest Emergency Physicians, P.C., for medical malpractice. Dr. Omondi moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in to determine whether the appellate court properly applied the standards for a medical malpractice claim in a hospital emergency department as found in OCGA 51-1-29.5 (c). Finding that the plurality opinion of the Court of Appeals erred, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Omondi" on Justia Law