Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against defendant alleging, inter alia, negligence in that plaintiff made numerous telephone calls to the motel the night before her husband died, and when she was unable to reach him, she alerted the motel operators of the possibility that her husband was in need of medical aid. However, the motel operators refused to comply with her requests to check on him. At issue was whether the court of appeals erred in concluding as a matter of law that defendant had no duty to comply with plaintiff's requests to attempt a rescue of her husband from his medical peril. The court held that innkeepers did not have a duty to investigate or check on their guests to determine if they were in medical need. Therefore, the court need not determine whether any duty to render or summon medical aid under section 314(A)(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts should be adopted in Georgia. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed.

This case stemmed from a motor vehicle collision in which six people were killed and several were injured. The driver of one of the vehicles drove with a passenger to a convenient store while intoxicated and purchased a 12 pack of beer. The driver and the passenger consumed the beer and subsequently ran head-on into a van going the opposite way. At issue was whether Georgia's Dram Shop Act (Act), OCGA 51-1-40, applied when a convenience store sold closed or packaged containers of alcohol not intended for consumption on the premises to a noticeably intoxicated adult. The court held that the Act did apply where, if a convenience store sold alcohol to such a customer, it was foreseeable that the customer would drive while intoxicated and injure an innocent third party and where, if the plaintiff could prove that such sale of alcohol was a proximate cause of any injuries, the convenience store would be held liable. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.

Appellant owned and operated the Sewell Creek Energy Facility, a "peaking" power plant that began operating in 2000. Appellees, neighbors of the power plant, filed suit in 2007 alleging that the power plant constituted a nuisance. At issue was whether appellants were entitled to summary judgment where the power plant was either a permanent nuisance or continuing nuisance that could be abated. The court found that the power plant's exhaust silencing system, which was an integral part of the gas turbines that generated power, was an enduring feature of the power plant's plan of construction and the noise emanating from the exhaust stacks resulted from the essential method of the plant's operation. Consequently, the exhaust stacks were a permanent nuisance. Thus, the court held that the Court of Appeals erred when it omitted any consideration of whether the nuisance resulted from an enduring feature of the power plant's plan of construction or an essential method of its operation and grappled only with whether the nuisance could be abated at "slight expense." The court held that appellees' action was barred under the statute of limitation for permanent nuisances because they did not file their lawsuit until almost seven years after the plant became operational, unless some new harm that was not previously observable occurred within the four years preceding the filing of their cause of action. The court also held that, to the extent the trial court found that a factual issue remained concerning whether there was an "adverse change in the nature" of the noises and vibrations coming from the plant after the start of the 2004 operating season, the denial of summary judgment was appropriate. By contrast, to the extent that the trial court found that a factual issue remained concerning whether there was an "adverse change in the... extent and amount" of the noises and vibrations after the 2004 operating season, the denial of summary judgment was inappropriate. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Appellant filed a negligence action against a police officer, in his individual and official capacity, and the City of Waynesboro after appellant was injured when the officer, while conducting a routine patrol, drove his police cruiser into the back of appellant's vehicle. At issue was whether the tort immunity for local government employees for situations covered by OCGA 36-92-3(a) was limited to only those covered situations in which the local government entity remained liable. Also at issue was whether the construction of the statute applied by the trial court rendered the statute unconstitutional because it violated the Georgia Constitution's guaranty of the right to trial by jury by foreclosing entirely any remedy for appellant for her injuries arising out of the underlying tort. The court affirmed summary judgment for appellees and held that, by the passage of section 36-92-3(a), the legislature intended to foreclose all recovery against municipal employees for torts committed within the scope of employment and involving the use of a covered motor vehicle. The court also held that the statute was not unconstitutional where appellant's failure to send ante litem notice, and not section 36-92-3(a), was why she found herself without a remedy; where the issue of immunity for the individual government employee was moot when appellant's constitutional right to a jury trial was satisfied by her ability to seek redress and recover from the city; and where the issue of whether the statutory cap on damages was unconstitutional, was now moot.