Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The County appealed from the grant of a writ of mandamus ordering it to reinstate appellee to his former position as a fire captain and awarding him back pay and costs of litigation. The court held that because appellee had a clear legal right to reinstatement, a right violated by the County's steadfast refusal to abide by the order of the hearing officer, as affirmed by the Council on appeal, mandamus was properly granted. The court also approved the monetary award fashioned by the trial court to make appellee whole for the full amount of salary he was denied from the date of his wrongful termination. The court further held that the record showed that the County affirmatively waived its right to a hearing on the issue of attorney fees.

Plaintiff brought a slip and fall action against CSX under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. 51 et seq., which provided a federal tort remedy for interstate railroad employees who were injured while working within the scope of their employment. At issue was whether 29 C.F.R. 1910.24(f) applied to an indoor office building and whether the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear evidence of, and determine whether, plaintiff was out of service because he was within the broad scope of protection of the FELA. The court held that, because the requirement of section 1910.24(f) that the nosings be of nonslip finish was applicable to the stairs in CSX's office building, was raised by the evidence, and was not otherwise covered in the jury instructions, the trial court should have given plaintiff's request to charge the jury that it could consider a violation of that regulation as evidence of negligence on the part of CSX. The court also held that because the circumstances surrounding plaintiff's dispute with the supervisors a few hours before he went to CSX's administration building to attend the safety meeting were at least indirectly material to matters at issue in this case, including whether plaintiff was acting within the cope of his employment at the time of his fall, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing CSX to cross-examine plaintiff on the issue and in admitting the testimony of supervisors for purposes of disproving certain facts to which plaintiff had testified.

The court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in order to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the State Board of Worker's Compensation exceeded its authority in promulgating its Rule 205. The court held that, contrary to the analysis and resulting conclusion by the Court of Appeals, Rule 205 was not burden-shifting in the manner found and did not interfere with the substantive rights of the parties. The court also held that there was evidence to support the subject ruling that Mulligan did not sustain a subsequent compensable injury. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing the order of the superior court interpreting Rule 205 was affirmed.

Appellants, former sworn officers of the Atlanta Police Department, appealed the grant of summary judgment to the Policemen's Pension Fund Board of Trustees (Board) in appellants' action seeking a writ of mandamus and an award of damages. While appellants were receiving disability pensions, the Atlanta City Council increased the multiplier used in calculating pensions from two percent to three percent in Ordinance 00-O-1099 and the ordinance was "applicable to all active sworn police officers employed as of the effective date" of the ordinance. At issue was whether the Board should use the three percent multiplier in calculating appellants' pension entitlements. The court held that there was no evidence presented that appellants were "active sworn officers" on the effective date of the new ordinance and in fact, it was alleged in the complaint that they were not. Accordingly, appellants were not entitled to the three percent multiplier and the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff, who was employed as the City of McDonough's ("city") chief building inspector, brought suit against the city when the city refused to pay him severance under an employment agreement contract. At issue was whether the contract was binding to a successor municipal council in violation of OCGA 36-30-3(a). The court held that the contract was ultra vires and void because the contract was renewed automatically and the severance package required the city to pay plaintiff his salary and benefits for an entire year after the year in which the contract was terminated.

Appellant filed a negligence action against a police officer, in his individual and official capacity, and the City of Waynesboro after appellant was injured when the officer, while conducting a routine patrol, drove his police cruiser into the back of appellant's vehicle. At issue was whether the tort immunity for local government employees for situations covered by OCGA 36-92-3(a) was limited to only those covered situations in which the local government entity remained liable. Also at issue was whether the construction of the statute applied by the trial court rendered the statute unconstitutional because it violated the Georgia Constitution's guaranty of the right to trial by jury by foreclosing entirely any remedy for appellant for her injuries arising out of the underlying tort. The court affirmed summary judgment for appellees and held that, by the passage of section 36-92-3(a), the legislature intended to foreclose all recovery against municipal employees for torts committed within the scope of employment and involving the use of a covered motor vehicle. The court also held that the statute was not unconstitutional where appellant's failure to send ante litem notice, and not section 36-92-3(a), was why she found herself without a remedy; where the issue of immunity for the individual government employee was moot when appellant's constitutional right to a jury trial was satisfied by her ability to seek redress and recover from the city; and where the issue of whether the statutory cap on damages was unconstitutional, was now moot.