Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The dispute concerned ownership of a strip of land at the boundary between two neighboring properties. The petitioner initiated litigation to resolve title to this land, and the respondents answered and asserted counterclaims. With both parties’ consent, a special master reviewed the title issues. The trial court adopted part of the special master’s recommendation, rejected the petitioner’s claims, and vested title in the respondents. Before the respondents’ counterclaims could be tried, they voluntarily dismissed those claims. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal challenging the trial court’s order on title.The Court of Appeals of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that the petitioner’s appeal was untimely. The court reasoned that the notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after the entry of the trial court’s order and held that the voluntary dismissal of the counterclaims did not render the earlier order appealable as a final judgment. The majority relied on Dykes v. Atlanta Paving & Concrete Construction, which held that the date of entry of the original order determines its finality for appeal purposes, not subsequent dismissals of remaining claims. A dissent argued that an order could become final due to subsequent events, such as dismissal of remaining claims.The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari and concluded that the appeal was timely. The Court held that when all remaining claims were dismissed, the prior order became a final judgment, triggering the 30-day period to file a notice of appeal. The Court overruled Dykes and similar precedents, clarifying that a judgment can become final due to subsequent events and not solely upon original entry. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ dismissal and remanded the case for consideration of the merits. View "NEELY v. PARSELL" on Justia Law

The case concerns a hemp farm operated by Blue 42 Organics, LLC, which was damaged during a drug interdiction operation conducted by the Georgia Department of Public Safety (DPS). Blue 42, a properly registered hemp grower, alleged that in July 2021, DPS flew helicopters and a fixed-wing aircraft at low altitude over its property, destroying two rows of crops valued at approximately $37,000. Blue 42 also claimed that the operation jeopardized future land leases due to cattle being harassed by the aircraft. Blue 42 filed a claim for inverse condemnation, asserting that its property was damaged for a public purpose without just compensation as required by the Georgia Constitution.The Superior Court (trial court) granted DPS’s motion to dismiss, agreeing with DPS’s argument that the damage occurred during the exercise of the State’s police powers and was therefore barred by sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed, holding that all exercises of the police power were categorically exempt from the constitutional requirement to pay just and adequate compensation for property taken or damaged for public purposes.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that there is no categorical exemption from the Just Compensation Clause of the Georgia Constitution for all exercises of the police power. The court clarified that while limited exceptions exist—namely, destruction of property due to abatement of nuisances or in cases of urgent necessity—these did not apply categorically to all police power activities. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, concluding that the lower courts erred by dismissing Blue 42’s complaint on the basis of a broad police power exemption. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "BLUE 42 ORGANICS, LLC v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY" on Justia Law

A company was ordered by a local Board of Zoning Appeals to remove LED displays from a billboard it was constructing. Disagreeing with this directive, the company sought judicial review in the Superior Court of Fulton County and brought additional claims. The superior court affirmed the Board's decision regarding the displays but left the company’s other claims unresolved.After this partial ruling, the company submitted a discretionary application for review to the Court of Appeals of Georgia. The Court of Appeals dismissed the application in an unpublished order, determining that the superior court’s decision was not final and thus not subject to discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(1), which governs appeals from superior court reviews of certain administrative actions. The appellate court also considered, but did not resolve, whether the superior court’s order functioned as an interlocutory injunction under OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(4), which could have permitted an immediate appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the Court of Appeals erred by not considering whether the superior court’s order should be treated as an interlocutory injunction, which would allow immediate appeal by discretionary application. The Supreme Court clarified that OCGA §§ 5-6-34(a) and 5-6-35 are not conflicting but may overlap, and that certain immediately appealable orders may still require a discretionary application. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’s dismissal and remanded the case for the appellate court to determine if the superior court’s order qualifies as an interlocutory injunction and whether it has jurisdiction to hear the appeal. View "THE LAMAR COMPANY, LLC v. NORTH FULTON OUTDOOR, LLC" on Justia Law

Sockwell Corners, LLC owned a parcel of land zoned as agricultural-residential in Newton County. The company, along with proposed purchasers and developers, sought to have the property rezoned. The Newton County Board of Commissioners denied their rezoning application on July 16, 2024. The applicants then filed a verified complaint in the Superior Court of Newton County, arguing that the county’s zoning ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to their property. After a bench trial, the Superior Court ruled against the applicants, rejecting their as-applied constitutional challenge in an order dated August 7, 2025.The applicants appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Georgia, asserting that appellate jurisdiction was proper due to the constitutional issues raised and on the basis that recent statutory amendments permitted a direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(14), which they claimed allowed direct review of final judgments or orders reviewing zoning decisions. The Supreme Court asked for supplemental briefing on whether the discretionary application procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35 should have been followed instead.The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the recent legislative amendments to the Zoning Procedures Law and the Appellate Practice Act did not abrogate its prior precedent, specifically Diversified Holdings, LLC v. City of Suwanee, 302 Ga. 597 (2017). That precedent requires appeals from superior court decisions reviewing local administrative agency decisions—such as the denial of a rezoning request for a specific property—to proceed by discretionary application. The Court found that the statutory amendments did not modify the relevant language or the nature of the decisions at issue. Because the appellants failed to file a discretionary application as required, the Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed the appeal. View "SOCKWELL CORNERS, LLC v. NEWTON COUNTY" on Justia Law

A college student was killed in a single-car accident when his vehicle left a city street, traveled over sixty feet off the paved road, and struck a large concrete planter situated more than six feet from the road in the City of Milton. The student’s parents brought a suit against the city, alleging negligence in failing to remove the planter, which they contended was a “defect” in the public road, and also claimed the planter constituted a nuisance.After a jury found the city liable under both negligence and nuisance theories, awarding damages reduced for comparative fault, the City of Milton appealed. The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the judgment, concluding that the city’s sovereign immunity had been waived under OCGA § 36-33-1(b) because the city has a ministerial duty to maintain streets in a reasonably safe condition. The appellate court analyzed the claim under OCGA § 32-4-93(a), reasoning that the planter was “in the public road” as it was on the city’s right-of-way, and found there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine it was a defect of which the city had notice.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to clarify the relationship between OCGA § 36-33-1(b) (waiving immunity for ministerial duties) and OCGA § 32-4-93(a) (limiting municipal liability for road defects). The Court held that OCGA § 32-4-93(a) does not itself waive municipal immunity. While OCGA § 36-33-1(b) can waive immunity for negligence in performing ministerial duties, the ministerial duty to keep streets safe applies only to ordinary travel on parts of the street intended for such use—not to areas outside travel lanes, even if within the right-of-way. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Milton v. Chang" on Justia Law

A property owner participated in Georgia’s Conservation Use Value Assessment (CUVA) program, which allows for reduced property tax assessments in exchange for maintaining the land for conservation purposes under a ten-year covenant. The property was subsequently sold in part to a new owner, who failed to apply to continue the CUVA covenant by the statutory deadline. As a result, the Hall County Board of Tax Assessors determined that this failure constituted a breach of the covenant, imposed penalties for the breach, and sent tax statements reflecting the penalty to both the original and new property owners.The original owner appealed the Board’s determination to the Hall County Board of Equalization, which denied the appeal. The owner then filed a petition for review in the Superior Court of Hall County, arguing that the Board had not completed required statutory steps before imposing the penalty, that the relevant statutory provision was unconstitutionally vague, and that the wrong penalty provision had been applied. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board on all issues.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia considered whether the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on the owner’s constitutional claim challenging the statute’s validity. The Supreme Court concluded that, due to a 2022 amendment to OCGA § 9-4-7(c), any constitutional challenge to a statute—even as part of a non-declaratory judgment action—requires service of the proceeding on the Attorney General so the State may defend the statute. Because the owner had not served the Attorney General prior to the trial court’s ruling, the Supreme Court held that the lower court lacked jurisdiction over the constitutional claim. The Court vacated the portion of the trial court’s order addressing the constitutional question and remanded the case to allow proper service on the Attorney General. The Court did not address the owner’s non-constitutional arguments. View "CHESTNUT RIDGE, LLC v. HALL COUNTY BOARD OF TAX ASSESSORS" on Justia Law

Tussahaw Reserves, LLC and Keys Ferry Crossing, LLC owned two parcels of land in Butts County, Georgia, zoned for agricultural and residential use. In 2020, they applied to rezone the property for use as a rock quarry, but the Butts County Board of Commissioners denied the applications in early 2021. Tussahaw then filed an “Appeal and Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Verified Complaint” in the Butts County Superior Court, challenging the Board’s decision. The complaint named the Board and its members as “respondents-in-certiorari” and the County as “defendant.” The claims included a writ of certiorari against the Board and its members, and alternative claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the County.After the Board and its members filed an answer and moved to be discharged from the case, the superior court denied their motion. Following the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in State v. SASS Group, Butts County moved to dismiss, arguing that the lawsuit violated the Georgia Constitution’s requirement that actions against a county be brought exclusively against the county and in its name. Tussahaw moved to drop the respondents-in-certiorari, but the superior court did not rule on that motion and instead dismissed the lawsuit, finding it barred by sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the substance of the complaint sought relief against the Board, not just the County.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that failure to comply with the constitutional naming requirement is not a jurisdictional bar and does not preclude the trial court from considering motions to drop parties. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing the superior court to vacate its dismissal order and address the pending motions. View "TUSSAHAW RESERVES, LLC v. BUTTS COUNTY" on Justia Law

Owners of developed commercial and residential properties in Athens-Clarke County challenged the county’s stormwater utility charge, arguing that it was an unconstitutional tax rather than a fee. The charge, established by county ordinances in 2004, funds stormwater management services required by federal law, with the amount assessed based on impervious surface area and land-use classification. The ordinance exempts certain properties, such as public roads and sidewalks, and offers credits for on-site stormwater management. The funds collected are used for flood prevention, pollution minimization, and compliance with federal regulations.Previously, the Superior Court of Athens-Clarke County granted summary judgment to the county, finding that the stormwater utility charge was a fee, not a tax, and thus not subject to the Georgia Constitution’s taxation uniformity provision. This decision relied on the Georgia Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in Homewood Village, LLC v. Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County, which had addressed the same ordinance and held it imposed a fee rather than a tax. The appellants also pursued related claims in federal court, but those were dismissed on abstention grounds.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that its prior decision in Homewood Village, LLC v. Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County controlled, reaffirming that the stormwater utility charge is a fee and not a tax, and therefore the uniformity provision does not apply. The court also rejected the appellants’ arguments that the charge constituted an unconstitutional taking under the Georgia and United States Constitutions, finding no basis for such a claim. Finally, the court found that the trial court had properly applied the summary judgment standard and had not improperly resolved factual disputes. The judgment in favor of the county was affirmed. View "HOMEWOOD ASSOCIATES INC. v. UNIFIED GOVERNMENT OF ATHENS-CLARKE COUNTY" on Justia Law

Daniel Cook, an independent contractor, was injured when he fell from an exposed, unguarded ledge while installing cabinetry in a second-story bathroom at a residential construction site owned by SMG Construction Services. Cook had previously observed the absence of a guardrail on the ledge and acknowledged this hazard in his deposition. At the time of the accident, he was moving backward toward the ledge while working. Cook sued SMG, alleging that the company failed to maintain a safe premises, which led to his injuries.The Superior Court granted summary judgment to SMG, finding that Cook had actual knowledge of the hazard and failed to exercise ordinary care for his own safety. The court concluded that Cook’s knowledge of the exposed ledge was equal to SMG’s, and therefore, SMG owed him no duty to warn or protect against the risk. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed, holding that although Cook knew of the ledge, there was evidence that conditions at the site affected his ability to perceive the exact location and risk posed by the ledge. The appellate court found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cook’s knowledge of the hazard was equal to or greater than SMG’s.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that the Court of Appeals had conflated actual and constructive knowledge, erroneously applying standards relevant to constructive knowledge. The Supreme Court held that Cook’s own testimony established his actual knowledge of the specific hazard—the unguarded ledge—that caused his injury. The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings to address the remaining elements of SMG’s affirmative defenses in light of Cook’s actual knowledge of the hazard. View "SMG CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, LLC v. COOK" on Justia Law

A county in Georgia revised a zoning ordinance to increase the maximum allowable dwelling size in a historic district on Sapelo Island. Some residents opposed this change and, relying on the Georgia Constitution’s Home Rule Provision, petitioned for a referendum to repeal the ordinance. The county probate court found the petition valid and scheduled a special election. Before the order was entered, the county filed suit in superior court to stop the referendum, arguing that zoning ordinances are not subject to the Home Rule Provision’s referendum process.The Superior Court of McIntosh County agreed with the county, holding that the ordinance was adopted under the Constitution’s Zoning Provision, not the Home Rule Provision, and thus was not subject to repeal by referendum. The court issued a writ of prohibition against the probate judge to halt the referendum. However, the superior court also granted an injunction, at the request of the residents, preventing enforcement of the revised ordinance while the appeal was pending.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed whether the Home Rule Provision’s referendum process applies to county zoning ordinances. The court held that, under the 1983 Georgia Constitution, the legislative power to enact zoning ordinances derives from the Home Rule Provision, and nothing in the Constitution excludes zoning ordinances from the referendum process. Therefore, the superior court erred in stopping the referendum and issuing a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed those portions of the superior court’s order. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s injunction against enforcement of the ordinance, finding the county failed to show error in the record regarding the injunction. View "Bailey v. McIntosh County" on Justia Law