Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
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The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia certified three questions regarding the operation of the State's law governing non-judicial foreclosure to the Georgia Supreme Court. After careful analysis, the Georgia Court concluded that current law did not require a party seeking to exercise a power of sale in a deed to secure debt to hold, in addition to the deed, the promissory note evidencing the underlying debt. The Court also concluded that the plain language of the State statute governing notice to the debtor (OCGA 44-14-162.2), required only that the notice identify "the individual or entity [with] full authority to negotiate, amend, and modify all terms of the mortgage with the debtor." This construction of OCGA 44-14-162.2 rendered moot the third and final certified question. View "You v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

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This appeal arose from appellee Bank of America, N.A.'s attempts to enforce the terms of the promissory note and deed to secure debt executed in its favor by appellant Johnta M. Austin ("Borrower"). The Bank sued to collect the debt it claimed the Borrower owed as a result of default, including attorney fees, and the trial court awarded the Bank summary judgment. The issue came on appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court because the constitutionality of the statute at issue was called into question. The Court has long held that "all presumptions are in favor of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature and that before an [a]ct of the legislature can be declared unconstitutional, the conflict between it and the fundamental law must be clear and palpable and [the] Court must be clearly satisfied of its unconstitutionality." The Court found that the statute in this case bore a rational relation to the purpose for which the statute was intended, namely to provide debtors with the opportunity to avoid the contractual obligation to pay the creditor’s attorney fees by allowing the debtor a last chance to pay the balance of the debt and avoid litigation. Further, the Court concluded that the application of OCGA 13-1-11 to arrive at the amount of the award of attorney fees in this case was neither punitive nor violative of Borrowers’ due process rights, nor was the award contrary to the intent of the statute. View "Austin v. Bank of America N.A." on Justia Law

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In 2007, Appellant Derick Villanueva acted as the closing attorney for a mortgage-refinance transaction in which Homecomings Financial, LLC served as the lender supplying funds to pay off earlier mortgages on the secured property. Appellee First American Title Insurance Company issued title insurance on the transaction. Pursuant to Villanueva’s instructions, Homecomings wired funds into a specified escrow account. However, the funds were not used to pay off the earlier mortgages; instead, the funds were withdrawn and the account closed by a person not a lawyer. First American paid off the earlier mortgages and, pursuant to its closing protection letter to Homecomings, became "subrogated to all rights and remedies [Homecomings] would have had against any person or property…." First American then filed this lawsuit against appellants, the estate of another attorney, the escrow account, the non-lawyer who withdrew the funds from the escrow account, and others, seeking damages for legal malpractice and breach of a contract with Homecomings. The trial court denied summary judgment to appellants. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a legal malpractice claims were not per se unassignable. After studying the issue, the Court agreed with the appellate court that legal malpractice claims are not per se unassignable. View "Villanueva v. First American Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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In 1999, a jury awarded monetary damages and equitable relief to homeowner Kenneth Barngrover. The damages were paid to the trial court's registry shortly after entry of judgment on the verdict, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in favor of Barngrover in 2001. In its 1999 judgment, the trial court ordered the City of Columbus to abate all nuisances created, maintained and in existence on Barngrover's property, and directed the City to restore the property to its undamaged condition. The trial court expressly retained jurisdiction pursuant to its equitable power to ensure completion of this equitable remedy. A week later, the trial court issued an order clarifying the nuisances to be abated as only those identified by the jury in its verdict. After several years of entering various orders in an effort to provide the equitable relief required by the jury's verdict, the trial court appointed a special master in 2007 to enforce the 1999 judgment. In 2011, the special master concluded that the structures on Barngrover's property were beyond repair, and recommended new ones be built. Further, the special master recommended implementation of the last of the City's abatement plans. Barngrover filed objections to the special master's report and moved to replace the special master. Over his objections, the trial court adopted the special master's report. This appeal to the Supreme Court followed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error with the trial court's orders, and affirmed. View "Barngrover v. City of Columbus" on Justia Law

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The Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County adopted a Stormwater Utility Ordinance in 2004. Pursuant to the Ordinance, a stormwater utility and stormwater enterprise fund took effect in 2005, and landowners were required to pay certain fees based on their estimated relative contribution to stormwater runoff problems. Despite Unified Government sending Homewood Village, LLC a quarterly stormwater utility bill, Homewood Village did not pay any of their bills since the inception of the program. In 2010, Unified Government sued Homewood Village to recover, among other things, the unpaid fees. In 2011, Homewood Village filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment, arguing that the Ordinance was an unconstitutional tax which could not be assessed involuntarily. The Superior Court granted Homewood Village's motion for partial summary on its contentions that : (1) Unified Government could not collect unpaid fees under a theory of unpaid account; and (2) Unified Government had not established any of the elements necessary to establish a claim for quantum meruit. In Case No. S12A1836, Homewood Village appealed the trial court's ruling that the Unified Government was authorized to collect stormwater fees from Homewood Village pursuant to its Ordinance, and in Case No. S12X1837 the Unified Government appealed the trial court's rulings in favor of Homewood Village on the issues of unpaid account and quantum meruit. In Case No. S12A1836, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the Ordinance imposed a permissible fee and properly granted summary judgment to the Unified Government on its claim to collect the unpaid fees. The Court vacated the judgment in Case No. S12X1837 in light of the trial court's correct decision to grant summary judgment to the Unified Government, Homewood Village's argument relating to quantum meruit or open account was rendered moot. View "Homewood Village, LLC v. Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County" on Justia Law

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In 2006, debtor Denise Codrington executed a security deed with appellant Wells Fargo that was recorded with the Clerk of the Superior Court of Fulton County on October 13, 2006. The deed provided: "[i]f one or more riders are executed by Borrower and recorded together with this Security Instrument, the covenants of each such rider shall be incorporated into ...this Security Instrument as if the rider(s) were a part of this Security Instrument." The security deed specifically identified the "ARM Rider" as being incorporated. The last page of the deed was signed by the debtor, the co-debtor (Alvina Codrington), and a notary, but the signature line for an "Unofficial Witness" was left blank. Contemporaneously recorded with the security deed were a number of other exhibits, including a "Waiver of Borrower's Rights." The waiver provided that "the provisions hereof are incorporated into and made a part of the security deed." The parties agreed that the waiver was signed by the debtor, the co-debtor, an unofficial witness, and a notary. In June 2008, the debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Appellee Neil Gordon, Trustee for the debtor's bankruptcy estate, commenced an adversary proceeding against Wells Fargo seeking to avoid Wells Fargo's interest in the property. Appellee asserted that because the security deed lacked the signature of an unofficial witness, it was not duly recorded and it did not provide constructive notice to a subsequent bona fide purchaser, rendering the security deed avoidable per 11 U.S.C. 544. Wells Fargo moved for summary judgment, the bankruptcy court denied the motion, and the bankruptcy court entered judgment in favor of appellee. Wells Fargo appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals which certified two questions to the Georgia Supreme Court: (1) whether a security deed that lacks the signature of an unofficial witness should be considered "duly filed, recorded, and indexed" as required by OCGA 44-14-33; and (2) if no, whether such a situation would nonetheless put a subsequent hypothetical bona fide purchaser on inquiry notice. Upon review, the Supreme Court answered both certified questions in the negative. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Gordon" on Justia Law

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Appellant Peter McGlashan and appellee Terrell Snowden own adjacent lots of real property in Ware County. McGlashan contracted to build a home on his lot and took exclusive possession of the completed home in July 2010. In March - April 2011, McGlashan discovered that his home encroached 1.11 acres onto Snowden's lot. After being informed by McGlashan of the encroachment, Snowden filed a complaint for ejectment, seeking to recover possession of his lot and the dwelling house and improvements located on it as well as damages for trespass, and seeking to be awarded fee-simple title to the home and improvements. McGlashan filed a counterclaim in which he raised an equitable claim for unjust enrichment and sought permission to remove the home and improvements from Snowden's lot. McGlashan also filed a third-party complaint against the builders of the home, seeking to recover from them the full value of McGlashan's loss should he lose the ejectment action or the cost of removing the dwelling and improvements from Snowden's lot should McGlashan have prevailed. After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment to Snowden. McGlashan appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court. The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to Snowden on McGlashan's counterclaim for equitable unjust enrichment. Upon review, the Court disagreed with McGlashan's contention that the trial court erred. View "McGlashan v. Snowden" on Justia Law

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Appellant City of Suwanee appealed a judgment in favor of Appellee Settles Bridge Farm, LLC in an inverse condemnation action. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the City of Suwanee's enactment of an amendment to its zoning ordinance was an unconstitutional regulatory taking of a large parcel of land owned by Settles Bridge and awarded Settles Bridge more than $1.8 million in damages. The City appealed, contending, inter alia, that the case was unripe for judicial review due to Settles Bridge’s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the City that Settles Bridge should have exhausted its administrative remedies prior to initiating litigation in this matter, and therefore reversed the judgment entered against the City. View "City of Suwanee v. Settles Bridge Farm, LLC" on Justia Law

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U. S. Bank, N. A. and Vatacs Group, Inc. both claimed title to certain residential real property in Fulton County, and U. S. Bank filed a petition to quiet title to the property. The trial court appointed a special master, and after an evidentiary hearing, the special master found that U. S. Bank had good title to the property, that Vatacs had no interest in the property, and that, even if Vatacs had some interest in the property, the doctrine of equitable subrogation rendered the interest of U. S. Bank superior to any interest of Vatacs. The trial court adopted the findings of the special master and entered judgment vesting fee title to the property in U. S. Bank. Vatacs appealed, contending that the case should have been tried by a jury and that the findings of the special master were erroneous. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no merit in these claims of error, and affirmed. View "Vatacs Group, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, NA" on Justia Law

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We, the Taxpayers, an unincorporated association of individual taxpayer residents of Effingham County ("Taxpayers"), appealed the trial court's order dismissing Taxpayers's complaint against the Board of Tax Assessors of Effingham County ("Board"). In a separate case, the Board appealed the superior court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. Former OCGA 48-5B-1 became law in 2009, and was effective until January 2011. It placed a moratorium on increases in the assessed value of property subject to ad valorem taxation for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2009, and continuing through January 9, 2011, but provided an exception from the moratorium for any county which performed or had performed on its behalf a comprehensive county-wide revaluation of all properties in the county in 2008 or any county which in 2009 was under contract prior to February 28, 2009, to have performed on its behalf a comprehensive county-wide revaluation of all properties in the county. The Board, believing that Effingham County met the exception set forth in former OCGA 48-5B-1 (c), did not impose a moratorium on increases in assessed values in the 2009 tax year, but in fact, increased assessed values of certain property. Taxpayers, believing that the exception did not apply and that the moratorium should have been imposed, filed a complaint under OCGA 48-5-296 seeking the removal of Board members. Taxpayers amended the complaint to include the equitable relief of eliminating the 2009 assessed values and imposing instead the 2008 tax year figures; by later amendment, Taxpayers dropped the request to remove Board members, and added a request for a writ of mandamus to compel the Board to act in accordance with Taxpayers's interpretation of OCGA 48-5B-1. Taxpayers moved for summary judgment, contending that the undisputed evidence showed that the exception to the moratorium did not apply; the Board also moved for summary judgment, asserting that OCGA 48-5B-1 was unconstitutional, and, alternatively, that the undisputed facts showed that the statutory exception applied. The trial court denied both motions. The Board then filed its motion to dismiss, asserting that the Taxpayers property owners were obligated to appeal their 2009 ad valorem assessments to the county Board of Equalization, or otherwise in the manner set forth in OCGA 48-5-311, and that the failure to do so precluded the trial court's addressing the equitable and mandamus claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in denying Taxpayers's motion, and vacated the court's decision denying the Board's motion. View "We, The Taxpayers v. Bd. of Tax Assessors Effingham Cty." on Justia Law