Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Stephen and Elizabeth Schultz contracted with Benchmark Builders, Inc. for the construction of a home. The Schultzes refused to close because they claimed the home was not built in conformance with the contract and Benchmark sued for specific performance or, in the alternative, for money damages for breach of contract. The Schultzes answered and filed a counterclaim for breach of contract seeking money damages for the return of earnest money they had paid and also for the value of certain fixtures they purchased and that had been installed in the home. They also sought attorney fees resulting from the alleged breach. The jury returned a verdict form that found for the Schultzes both as to Benchmark's claim and the Schultzes' counterclaim. The jury awarded the Schultzes zero dollars on the claim for light fixtures, zero dollars for return of the earnest money, and $16,555 on the claim for attorney fees. The Court of Appeals held the Schultzes were entitled, as the “prevailing party” to the award of attorney fees pursuant to the parties' contract and thus affirmed the award. The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the parties' contract allowed for an award of attorney fees to a party that recovered no money damages or other relief that it sought. Under the terms of the contract, the fact that the jury did not award actual damages did not mean the Schultzes could not be deemed the prevailing party to the lawsuit. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Benchmark Builders, Inc. v. Schultz" on Justia Law

In a foreclosure action, the trial court granted partial summary judgment to bankruptcy trustee J. Coleman Tidwell against National City Mortgage Company. Addressing its jurisdiction sua sponte, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the grounds that PNC Bank, N.A. was not a party to the foreclosure and therefore lacked standing to appeal the order entered against National City. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that PNC Bank lacked standing to appeal on behalf of its predecessor National City Mortgage Company. Because the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the appeal must be dismissed due to the trial court's failure to substitute or join PNC Bank as a party under OCGA 9-11-25 (c), the Court reversed and remanded the case for the Court of Appeals to address issues raised in this appeal. View "National City Mortgage Co. v. Tidwell " on Justia Law

George and Catherine Dickens appealed the City of Statesboro's Zoning Board of Appeals denial of their application to construct a 2,160-square-foot detached garage on their property. The Dickenses then filed a petition for mandamus and damages at superior court to compel the City to issue their building permit. The City moved for summary judgment, which the superior court summarily denied. The trial court issued a certificate of immediate review, and the City applied for interlocutory appeal. Because the Dickenses were required to seek judicial review at superior court by way of a petition for a writ of certiorari rather than a petition for mandamus, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case back to the trial court for dismissal. View "City of Statesboro v. Dickens" on Justia Law

The Stephens County Board of Commissioners decided to abandon a 3,000-foot-long, dead-end county road that ran along the side of a mountain and served no existing homes or businesses. Owners of some undeveloped lots on the Road and others sued the Board, and the trial court set aside the decision. Based on that ruling, the court issued a writ of mandamus requiring the Board to repair and maintain the Road. The court also ordered the Board to pay attorney fees and later granted summary judgment against the Board on its counterclaims. The Board appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court failed to give proper deference to the Board's decision to abandon the Road and reversed the trial court's decisions. View "Scarborough v. Hunter" on Justia Law

Appellant Alstep, Inc. obtained a multimillion dollar loan from Appellee State Bank and Trust Company (SB&T) for the purchase of a sandwich shop, gas station and liquor store. Alstep fell behind on loan payments, and the Bank conducted a non-judicial foreclosure. SB&T was the highest bidder at the sale, and applied the proceeds of that sale to Alstep's loan balance. There was still a deficit. The Bank demanded immediate possession of the property, but Alstep refused. Despite receiving notice of a temporary restraining order, Alstep continued to operate the gas station and otherwise make use of the property. SB&T filed and served Alstep with an emergency motion for appointment of a receiver. SB&T cited three grounds in support of its motion: (1) that Alstep converted rent from the property's tenant (the sandwich shop) that should have gone to SB&T; (2) that Alstep was depleting the property that served as collateral for its debt; and (3) that SB&T needed to take control of the property to guard against its potential liability under state and federal environmental regulations as the owner of the gas station. Appellant never filed a response to the motion, but ultimately challenged the trial court's appointment of a receiver. The Supreme Court held that the trial court had broad discretion in deciding whether to appoint a receiver, and found no abuse of that discretion. View "Alstep, Inc. v. State Bank & Trust Co." on Justia Law

The trial court in this case ruled that there was no conflict between the 2010 amendment to OCGA 48-5-2 (3) and a 1981 local constitutional amendment providing for the assessment of homestead property in Muscogee County for school and consolidated city-county government taxing purposes. The court further ruled that the 2010 amendment controlled the determination of the fair market value of appellee John Yeoman's recently-purchased homestead property. The Columbus Board of Tax Assessors appeals, but finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Columbus Board of Tax Assessors v. Yeoman" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia certified three questions regarding the operation of the State's law governing non-judicial foreclosure to the Georgia Supreme Court. After careful analysis, the Georgia Court concluded that current law did not require a party seeking to exercise a power of sale in a deed to secure debt to hold, in addition to the deed, the promissory note evidencing the underlying debt. The Court also concluded that the plain language of the State statute governing notice to the debtor (OCGA 44-14-162.2), required only that the notice identify "the individual or entity [with] full authority to negotiate, amend, and modify all terms of the mortgage with the debtor." This construction of OCGA 44-14-162.2 rendered moot the third and final certified question. View "You v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from appellee Bank of America, N.A.'s attempts to enforce the terms of the promissory note and deed to secure debt executed in its favor by appellant Johnta M. Austin ("Borrower"). The Bank sued to collect the debt it claimed the Borrower owed as a result of default, including attorney fees, and the trial court awarded the Bank summary judgment. The issue came on appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court because the constitutionality of the statute at issue was called into question. The Court has long held that "all presumptions are in favor of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature and that before an [a]ct of the legislature can be declared unconstitutional, the conflict between it and the fundamental law must be clear and palpable and [the] Court must be clearly satisfied of its unconstitutionality." The Court found that the statute in this case bore a rational relation to the purpose for which the statute was intended, namely to provide debtors with the opportunity to avoid the contractual obligation to pay the creditor’s attorney fees by allowing the debtor a last chance to pay the balance of the debt and avoid litigation. Further, the Court concluded that the application of OCGA 13-1-11 to arrive at the amount of the award of attorney fees in this case was neither punitive nor violative of Borrowers’ due process rights, nor was the award contrary to the intent of the statute. View "Austin v. Bank of America N.A." on Justia Law

In 2007, Appellant Derick Villanueva acted as the closing attorney for a mortgage-refinance transaction in which Homecomings Financial, LLC served as the lender supplying funds to pay off earlier mortgages on the secured property. Appellee First American Title Insurance Company issued title insurance on the transaction. Pursuant to Villanueva’s instructions, Homecomings wired funds into a specified escrow account. However, the funds were not used to pay off the earlier mortgages; instead, the funds were withdrawn and the account closed by a person not a lawyer. First American paid off the earlier mortgages and, pursuant to its closing protection letter to Homecomings, became "subrogated to all rights and remedies [Homecomings] would have had against any person or property…." First American then filed this lawsuit against appellants, the estate of another attorney, the escrow account, the non-lawyer who withdrew the funds from the escrow account, and others, seeking damages for legal malpractice and breach of a contract with Homecomings. The trial court denied summary judgment to appellants. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a legal malpractice claims were not per se unassignable. After studying the issue, the Court agreed with the appellate court that legal malpractice claims are not per se unassignable. View "Villanueva v. First American Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 1999, a jury awarded monetary damages and equitable relief to homeowner Kenneth Barngrover. The damages were paid to the trial court's registry shortly after entry of judgment on the verdict, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in favor of Barngrover in 2001. In its 1999 judgment, the trial court ordered the City of Columbus to abate all nuisances created, maintained and in existence on Barngrover's property, and directed the City to restore the property to its undamaged condition. The trial court expressly retained jurisdiction pursuant to its equitable power to ensure completion of this equitable remedy. A week later, the trial court issued an order clarifying the nuisances to be abated as only those identified by the jury in its verdict. After several years of entering various orders in an effort to provide the equitable relief required by the jury's verdict, the trial court appointed a special master in 2007 to enforce the 1999 judgment. In 2011, the special master concluded that the structures on Barngrover's property were beyond repair, and recommended new ones be built. Further, the special master recommended implementation of the last of the City's abatement plans. Barngrover filed objections to the special master's report and moved to replace the special master. Over his objections, the trial court adopted the special master's report. This appeal to the Supreme Court followed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error with the trial court's orders, and affirmed. View "Barngrover v. City of Columbus" on Justia Law