Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Norma Fitzpatrick, Barry Fitzpatrick and George Elrod, (taxpayers), own parcels of land in Madison County. Following a valuation of those properties for tax purposes by the Madison County Board of Assessors, the taxpayers appealed the valuation to the Madison County Board of Equalization. The Board of Equalization denied the appeal. Subsequently, the taxpayers filed an appeal in superior court, but the Board of Assessors refused to certify the appeal to the superior court unless the taxpayers first paid the filing fee to the superior court clerk. Thereafter, the taxpayers contended that, except for appeals to an arbitrator pursuant to OCGA 48-5-311(f), a taxpayer is not required to pay any fee at all for an appeal. Based on this argument, the taxpayers filed a declaratory action seeking a ruling to this effect. The trial court issued an order finding that the taxpayers are responsible for paying the filing fee, which prompted the taxpayers to appeal to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the applicable statute, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Fitzpatrick v. Madison Co. Bd. of Tax Assessors" on Justia Law

Through interrogatories, a jury determined that David Keever, individually and in his capacity as administrator of the Estate of Henry Keever, failed to prove that he had adversely possessed certain land whose record title was held by James R. Dellinger, Jr. and Frank Troutman. Specifically, the jury found that, although Keever had proven all other elements of adverse possession, he had failed to establish exclusive possession. Keever appealed, contending, among other things, that the trial court made improper evidentiary rulings. Finding no errors, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling. View "Keever v. Dellinger" on Justia Law

In 2004, Allen Ehlers signed a contract to sell certain property to Keith Sharp, the owner of Upper West Side, LLC. Allen had acquired the property in question pursuant to a 1995 deed of assent that identified the land as “Parcel Two,” and described the property as a strip of land 25 feet wide and 200 feet long. Although the deed of assent described the land as a 25' x 200' strip, Upper West Side believed that it would be purchasing the entire eight acre tract of land at the time that it entered the February 2004 contract with Allen. Eventually, in 2008, Allen deeded the property in the deed of assent to Upper West Side, and Upper West Side filed an action in the Fulton County Superior Court seeking to reform the deed of assent and asking the court to declare that, as reformed, the deed conveyed the entire eight acre tract of Parcel Two, and not just the 25' x 200' strip described in the deed. Following a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of Upper West Side, and issued a certificate of immediate review. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, agreeing with the trial court's conclusion that Upper West Side’s action to reform the deed of assent was not barred by the seven-year statute of limitations applicable to reformation actions. View "Ehlers v. Upper West Side, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant Andrea Brown Jacobs and several family members holding ownership interest in certain undeveloped real property filed a partition action in January 2006 after another family member, Mary Young, refused to sign a contract for the sale of the property. The parties entered into a consent writ of partition which provided for the sale of the property pursuant to OCGA 44-6-166.1. However, neither Young nor any other party in interest tendered the sums necessary to purchase petitioners' shares of the property. Mary Young then deeded her interest in the property to the Mary E. Young Revocable Trust and died one day later. In 2010, the case appeared on a pretrial calendar; the property not having been sold and there being no appearance by Young or anyone on her behalf, the trial court struck Young's pleadings, entered judgment in favor of the petitioners, and appointed three commissioners to conduct the sale of the property consistent with the requirements of OCGA 44-6-167 through 169. Because the property had not been sold and the owners of the property still were unable to reach an agreement with regard to its disposition, the court, believing that a mandated public sale would cause financial loss to all owners, amended its 2010 partition order to provide for the listing of the property with a particular broker with the terms of the sale to be established by a majority of the previously appointed commissioners. The 2010 judgment was quickly voided by the trial court after certain petitioners alleged counsel had acted without authority in seeking the partition order. In September 2011, petitioner Florence Brown through new counsel filed a motion for order for public sale. After a hearing on Brown's motion, the trial court entered an order for public sale and appointed three commissioners to conduct the sale. The sale was advertised and the property sold to the highest bidder. Appellant Jacobs appealed orders in Case No. S12A1340. In Case No. S12X1342, Brown filed across-appeal stating she was satisfied with the trial court's orders and was cross-appealing only to ensure the entire record was included on appeal. Because the Supreme Court found that all parties received proper notice of the partition action and in fact, agreed to the entry of a final consent judgment of partition which gave rise to the trial court's authority to order the public sale, the trial court's orders confirming the sale of the property and directing the parties and parties in interest to execute the deeds were affirmed. View "Jacobs v. Young" on Justia Law

In January 2011, Reliance Equities, LLC acquired title to an Atlanta property pursuant to an August 2009 tax sale and a subsequent foreclosure of all rights of redemption. Nancy Karlen claimed to have had an interest in the Property based on 2001-2003 tax liens on the Property that she had purchased in 2004. In February 2011, Reliance filed a quiet title action to establish that it was the fee simple owner of the Property free and clear of all adverse claims. Reliance requested that the matter be submitted to a special master, and the Superior Court granted the request. Following a hearing which was not transcribed, and after Karlen acknowledged that she had received proper service of the quiet title action, the special master allowed Karlen additional time to file an amended answer and extended the time for Karlen to assert her right to redeem the Property. Karlen neither amended her answer nor made a tender of the statutory redemption amount within the required time period. The special master found that any potential rights held by Karlen had been divested. The special master also ruled that Karlen was prohibited from challenging the validity of the tax sale due to her failure to tender the statutory redemption amount. The trial court adopted the special master's findings and entered a final order and decree vesting title in Reliance. Karlen appealed pro se from the trial court's order, and, finding no error in the special master's findings, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Karlen v. Reliance Equities, LLC" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether application of OCGA 32-3-11(c) pertaining to appellants' motion to set aside or vacate a declaration of taking violated their due process rights, and whether that statute imposed upon appellant the responsibility to obtain a timely hearing on their motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the statute as properly applied does not violate a condemnee's due process rights but reversed and remanded the case to the trial court with direction that it hold a hearing pursuant to the mandate of 32-3-11(c) because it is the duty of the trial court, not the condemnee, to schedule the required hearing. View "Adkins v. Cobb County" on Justia Law

Appellant Leonard Small filed suit seeking ejectment and mesne profits after learning that Appellee Alphonso Irving had built a home on a lot located at 4110 Raybun Street in Savannah, which Small had purchased at a tax sale. A special master was appointed and issued an order adopted by the trial court, recommending that Small recover the premises and pay Irving for the value of the improvements. Small appealed, alleging the trial court's adoption of the special master's order was in error because the evidence was insufficient to support it. He argued further that the special master erred in concluding Small could not recover mesne profits because he held only a tax title to the property. The Supreme Court concluded it was not an error for the trial court to adopt the special master's order. However, the Court found that the trial court erred in adopting the special master's conclusion that Small could not recover mesne profits. The Court partly affirmed, and partly reversed the trial court's decision. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Small v. Irving" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted discretionary appeal to Haralson County to review a superior court's grant of the writ of mandamus. In 2008, Taylor Junkyard of Bremen, Inc. sought to purchase a piece of property in a residential area. Before doing so, it wanted confirmation that the property had a permitted nonconforming use, so Taylor Junkyard asked for, and was issued, a letter written by the County Zoning Administrator, which stated that the business operated by Trawick "falls under the grandfather clause." When Taylor Junkyard applied for a business license for the year 2009, Haralson County administratively rejected the application, with the stated reason that the business engaged in on the property had changed from the original nonconforming business of "used automobiles and parts" to "metal recycling and metal fabrication," and thus violated the County's zoning ordinance. Taylor Junkyard appealed to the County Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA), which, after a hearing, rejected the application for a business license, based upon found zoning violations. Taylor Junkyard then filed its petition for a writ of mandamus in superior court, which the court granted, finding that there was no evidence to support the ZBA's decision. The County contended on appeal to the Supreme Court that the superior court erred in addressing the petition for writ of mandamus, arguing that the County Zoning Ordinance provided a means for Taylor Junkyard to file an appeal from the adverse decision of the ZBA, and thus, mandamus was not an available remedy. "When local zoning ordinances do not establish a means by which an aggrieved party may gain judicial review of an adverse decision by a zoning appeal board, a petition to the appropriate superior court for a writ of mandamus is the proper remedy." Accordingly, as no provision of the Haralson County ordinances set forth an available means of judicial review, the superior court did not err in concluding that a petition for a writ of mandamus was the proper avenue for Taylor Junkyard to seek review of the ZBA's decision. View "Haralson County v. Taylor Junkyard of Bremen, Inc." on Justia Law

MCI sued CMES on theories of negligence and trespass, and sought damages consisting of the costs to repair a severed cable, compensation for the loss of use of the cable during the time it took to repair it, and punitive damages. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of CMES, holding that MCI could not recover loss of use damages. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified the following question: "Under Georgia law, may a telecommunications service provider whose cable is severed recover loss-of-use damages measured by the rental value of substitute cable when it has not rented such cable or otherwise incurred any monetary loss apart from the cost of repair?" The court concluded that a telecommunications carrier was not entitled to loss of use damages measured by the hypothetical cost to rent a replacement system where it suffered no actual loss of use damages and did not need to rent a replacement system because it was able to reroute calls within the existing redundant cable system the carrier necessarily installed in order to operate its business. View "MCI Communications Services v. CMES, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants, owners of a tract of real property in Dawson County, filed a nine-count complaint against appellees challenging a rezoning decision in superior court. The superior court granted summary judgment to appellees on three of the nine counts and appellants subsequently filed three direct appeals to the court. The court initially dismissed the appeals by order for failure to comply with the discretionary appeal procedures of OCGA 5-6-35. On appellants' motion for reconsideration, however, the court reinstated the appeals and directed the parties to brief whether OCGA 5-6-35(a)(1) applied. Having had the benefit of full briefing and oral argument on the issue, the court concluded that these appeals came under OCGA 5-6-35(a)(1) and so the court dismissed them again. View "West Hamryka, et al. v. City of Dawsonville, et al." on Justia Law