Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant appealed from the trial court's order granting partial summary judgment in favor of appellee on its claim for ejectment. Appellant contended that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment because the ejectment action was filed in violation of the bankruptcy court's automatic stay and because appellee failed to file a proof of claim to the property in her bankruptcy action. The court held that the record evidence demonstrated that neither the complaint nor the summary judgment order were entered in violation of the automatic stay. In addition, the court found no merit in appellant's contention that appellee was estopped from asserting a claim on the property based on its failure to file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceedings. The court also held that the trial court erred by giving res judicata effect on the quiet title judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of appellee in spite of affidavit evidence that appellant was not served with the summons and complaint in the quiet title action. Because there remained a question of fact regarding whether appellant was a party to the prior action, the grant of summary judgment on the ground of res judicata was error. Accordingly the court reversed the judgment. View "James v. Intown Ventures, LLC." on Justia Law

The Boyds sued JohnGalt for trespass and ejectment over a disputed piece of property that JohnGalt purported to gain ownership of. JohnGalt counterclaimed for trespass and conversion, and to quiet title. Following the trial court's grant in part of JohnGalt's quiet title claim, the Boyds filed a timely notice of appeal and requested to proceed in forma pauperis. The trial court denied the Boyds' request to proceed in forma pauperis and the Boyds filed a separate notice of appeal from that judgment. The trial court subsequently issued a single order dismissing both the Boyds' appeals and the Boyds filed a notice of appeal from the order. The court transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeals because it lacked jurisdiction over the claims where there was no title of land claim presented by the appeal. View "Boyd, et al. v. JohnGalt Holdings, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

In June 2002, Holders purchased from Brenda Ruth Pruitt Griffin a 70-acre tract of land in Gwinnett County. As part of the consideration for the purchase, Griffin was to grant Holders a right of first refusal to acquire an approximately 74-acre tract located across the road. Holders subsequently appealed from an order of the superior court ruling adversely on their claims for compensation stemming from Gwinnett County's condemnation of a portion of the real property subject to the right of first refusal. The court found that the right of first refusal in this case was not compensable under the 1983 Georgia Constitution, Art. I, Sec. III, Par. I, and affirmed the judgment of the superior court. View "Robinson, et al. v. Gwinnett County, et al." on Justia Law

Joseph Washington and his wife field a quiet title action to establish that they had legal title to some disputed land. Joan Brown, Washington's sister, counterclaimed with her own quiet title action, seeking to establish that she was the rightful owner of the disputed land. The Special Master concluded that Brown was the rightful owner, the trial court entered an order that incorporated the Special Master's report and ruled in favor of Brown, and the Washingtons subsequently appealed. Because there was no evidence to support the conclusion that Brown owned the disputed property either by deed or by adverse possession, the court reversed that portion of the trial court's order awarding the disputed property to Brown. However, because evidence did not support the trial court's conclusion that the Washingtons also did not own the disputed property, that portion of the order determining that the Washingtons do not own the property must be upheld on appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Larry DeFoor petitioned to establish title against all the world on a piece of property in Ellijay, Georgia. Appellants, certain descendants of Millie DeFoor, the record title holder, answered the petition and denied its material allegations. The court held that the earlier denial of appellants' motion for summary judgment was harmless or moot because the court found evidence sufficient to support the jury's verdict in favor of Larry; Larry did not need to reside on the property in order to establish adverse possession, he only needed to exercise dominion over it; appellants' assertion that Larry could not "tack" his adverse possession to the adverse possession of his father was without merit; the evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to conclude that Larry met his burden to show ouster; it was not error to grant Larry's first motion in limine which sought to exclude certain evidence; and the trial court did not err in refusing to permit appellants to show that Flint Timber agreed to pay Larry for an easement on the property. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Husband appealed a trial court's issuance of a final divorce judgment and decree that divided some unimproved real property in Florida and two Morgan Stanley funds equally between the parties and made no disposition of the interests in an apartment complex, thereby leaving each party with his or her own interest. The court held that the two Morgan Stanley accounts were transformed into marital property when Husband gave Wife an ownership interest in the property; the Florida property was transformed into a marital asset where it was deeded to him and his Wife as tenants in common; and in regards to the apartment complex, Wife acquired an ownership interest separate and distinct from Husband's. Finally, the court held that Husband's claims that the trial court abused its discretion by announcing a prejudgment of the case prior to his presentation of evidence was without merit. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

DRST Holdings filed a petition for money rule nisi and mandamus against Sheriff Brown demanding payment of excess funds where Sheriff Brown had determined that the redemption of certain property by DRST Holdings was unauthorized and thus released the excess funds to an unauthorized representative of the estate of the defendant who owned the property at the time of the sale. The court held that Sheriff Brown was required to file a verified answer and it was undisputed that he ultimately submitted verification of the answer. Therefore, the court rejected DRST Holdings' contention that the trial court should have granted the motion to strike the unverified answer and issue a rule absolute. The court also rejected DRST Holdings' contention that the trial court erred in holding that it was not a party entitled to redeem the real property from the tax sale where DRST Holdings failed to present evidence establishing that it held an interest in the real property or that it was a creditor of the defendant pursuant to OCGA 48-4-40 and 48-4-41. Therefore, the redemption by DRST Holdings was void and the excess funds from the tax sale were properly paid to the unauthorized representative.

In a hierarchical church property dispute, the court granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied the "neutral principles of law" doctrine set forth in Jones v. Wolf. The court held that neutral principles of law demonstrated that an implied trust in favor of the PCUSA existed on the local church's property to which TPC, Inc. held legal title. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding to the contrary and the judgment was reversed.

This case involved a dispute over control of property belonging to the oldest church in Georgia, Christ Church in Savannah. At issue was whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in applying the neutral principles doctrine, particularly with respect to OCGA 14-5-46 and 14-5-47. The court held that although those courts could have erred to some extent in their reliance on OCGA 14-5-46 and 14-5-47, they correctly concluded that neutral principles of law showed that the property of Christ Church at issue was held in trust for the benefit of the Episcopal Church.

The court granted certiorari to examine whether the "anti-indemnity" statute found at OCGA 13-8-2(b) applied to invalidate an indemnification clause within an assignment and assumption agreement transferring responsibility for the management and operation of a newly developed subdivision to its homeowner's association. The court held that OCGA 13-8-2(b) did apply to the assignment and assumption agreement. Therefore, the court held that the indemnification provision was invalid and given that the third party's claims were premised solely on this invalid provision, the Court of Appeals correctly held that summary judgment should have been granted to appellee.