Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Purchasers sued Developers and Brokers, alleging that at the time of their purchases in a 26-story condominium, Developers had already undertaken plans to develop a 46-story building directly across the street. Developers advertised "spectacular city views" from the 26-story condominium and Brokers advised that any future developments to the south of the building would be low to mid-rise office buildings. Purchasers alleged that they paid substantial premiums for their views of the city which was now blocked by the 46-story building. At issue was whether the Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the trial court's grant of judgment on the pleadings on Purchasers' claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligent supervision and violation of the Georgia's fair business practices statute. The court held that the trial court was correct in finding that Purchasers did not properly elect rescission as a remedy, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision; the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Purchasers were not bound by the agreements they signed; because there can be no justifiable reliance where Purchasers were bound by their agreements, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Purchasers' fraud-based claims could proceed; and the trial court correctly found that Purchasers did not sufficiently plead a cause of action against Developers for negligent supervision and the Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the trial court's decision on that count.

These appeals arose from annexations by the City of parcels of unincorporated real property in Fayette County. At issue was whether appellee, the City resident seeking to enjoin the City from providing services to the area annexed in 2007, had standing as a citizen-taxpayer to do so; whether the appeal was moot; and whether a subsequent annexation by the City cured the flaw the Court of Appeals found in the first annexation. The court concluded that the appeal was moot when it was docketed in the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals should have dismissed it as such. In light of this decision, there was no need to address the issue of appellee's standing as a citizen-taxpayer. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

This case stemmed from a dispute regarding the partition of a 40 acre piece of land where the testator's four heirs wanted to sell the land but the testator's grandson had been living on a 2.2 acre tract of land that was part of the 40 acres at issue. The grandson contended that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the heirs because a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to his claim that he owned the 2.2 acres at issue. The court held that despite the fact that the grandson had lived on the property at issue for several years, this fact alone was insufficient as a matter of law to satisfy the requirements for a parol gift of land. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the heirs.

The parties in this case were adjoining landowners whose deeds both allegedly included a disputed six-acre parcel lying in Land Lot 95 of the 16th District, First Section, in Union County, Georgia. Based on the evidence, the trial court found that Porter had established superior title to the disputed property. In light of the court's holding in Division 1 that the trial court did not err in concluding that Porter had superior title by deed to the disputed property, the court need not address the trial court's alternative conclusion that Porter and her predecessors had otherwise established prescriptive title to the disputed property by adverse possession.

This case arose when Josephine Bailey petitioned to quiet title under OCGA 23-3-60 et seq., asserting that she owned an adjacent property at issue by deed and, in the alternative, by prescription. On appeal, Bailey appealed the order of the superior court adopting the report of a Special Master and decreeing that fee simple title to the parcel of land at issue was vested in Derether Moten. The court held that the judgment of the trial court that Bailey did not have title to the property by virtue of deed was not error; the trial court did not err in adopting the report of the Special Master and denying Bailey's claim of adverse possession; and that Moten's quitclaim deed was the only deed placed before the Special Master that described an interest in the property and it was not error for the trial court to adopt the Special Master's conclusion that title was vested in Moten. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Appellants filed suit against all appellees for compensatory and punitive damages, asserting breach of contract, negligence, fraud, and violations of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), OCGA 16-14-1 et seq. In 2009, the trial court, inter alia, granted summary judgment to all appellees on the contract, negligence, and RICO claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grants of summary judgment. The court held that, since the Court of Appeals erred in making reliance an element of mail fraud and in affirming the grant of summary judgment to appellees based on the failure of appellants to establish reliance, the court reversed that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the grant of summary judgment to appellees on the RICO claim based on mail fraud and remanded for further proceedings. The court also held that there was no evidence in the record that would provide the basis for a fact-finder to calculate damages upon a finding of liability and therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that summary judgment was authorized due to the failure of appellants to present evidence of damages.

Wife and husband were married in 1993 and, after a bench trial, were awarded a final decree of divorce on July 14, 2010. The court granted wife's application for discretionary review under this court's previously instituted Pilot Project for domestic relations cases. On appeal, wife contended that the trial court erred when it improperly designated her Scottrade account as marital property; improperly applied the source of funds rule, improperly made an erroneous finding of fact, improperly valued husband's separate property, and improperly valued property adjacent to the marital home. The court held that the trial court erred in designating the Scottrade account as marital property and the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the order denying the motion for new trial was reversed as to this issue and the matter remanded for the marital property to be equitably divided. The court also held that the trial court did not commit reversible error in its varied treatment of husband's office and of the $210,000 funds from wife's Scottrade account. The court further held that there was no merit in wife's claim that husband's testimony, regarding his contribution, was insufficient proof where the trial court had the right to credit husband's testimony on that matter. The court finally held that the trial court did not err in applying the source funds rule where wife had acquiesced to the trial court's use of county tax records to determine the value of the various real estate properties at issue. The court sustained the trial court's denial of the motion for new trial where wife's remaining enumeration of error was without merit.

Plaintiff, the non-profit corporation that served as the homeowners association for the Skidway Island Community, sued defendants claiming that defendants did not own a strip of land which was located between defendants' eastern boundary line of their property and the marshlands that were located to the east of their property. At issue was whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment in part for plaintiffs, finding that the property at issue was owned by plaintiffs, in that it had been transferred by deed from The Branigar Organization (Branigar), the entity that previously owned the property, to plaintiffs and finding that defendants did not gain title to the property in question by prescription. The court held that because the undisputed evidence revealed that plaintiffs gained title to the disputed property through a proper conveyance from Branigar and that the land in question was not owned by any other entity, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on its claim of holding the valid title to the property. The court also held that there was no deadline by which the common areas had to be conveyed in order for the conveyances to be valid. The court further held that the trial court did not err in finding that defendants' claim for prescriptive title failed as a matter of law. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Appellant, a limited liability company that speculated in real estate, brought this appeal to challenge the ruling of the trial court upholding the constitutionality of OCGA 9-13-172.1, authorizing the rescission of foreclosure sales under certain conditions, in its suit against appellee, Countrywide Home Loans (Countrywide), in which appellant asserted it was entitled as high bidder to delivery of the Deed Under Power to the home of appellees, James and Tammi Garland. The court held that the trial court properly upheld the constitutionality of OCGA 9-13-172.1 and correctly found that Countrywide was authorized to and properly rescinded the sale to appellant. The court did not address appellant's remaining arguments.

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant seeking a declaratory injunction that defendant did not have an easement on their property, damages for trespass and conversion for a 2007 and 2008 incident, an injunction against further trespass, and attorney fees. Defendant asserted as a defense that the lawsuit was filed after the one-year statute of limitations under OCGA 46-3-204. At issue was whether summary judgment against plaintiffs was proper. The court affirmed the trial court's rejection of plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to the one-year statute of limitations. The court then affirmed in part and reversed in part the grant of summary judgment because issues of material fact remained regarding the existence of a valid prescriptive easement and plaintiffs' trespass and conversion claims based on defendant's 2008 actions were not barred by OCGA 46-3-204.