Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After the Merle and Lesia Long and their business Water Park Properties, LLC dismissed their most recent lawsuit against the City of Helen with prejudice, the trial court awarded more than $17,000 to the City for attorney fees and litigation expenses pursuant to OCGA 9-15-14. The Longs and Water Park appealed, contending that the award of fees and expenses was improper because those fees and expenses actually were borne by the City’s insurer, not the City itself. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the award. View "Long v. City of Helen" on Justia Law

The Community Bank loaned money to several entities (“the Borrowers”) over the course of several years. The Borrowers executed five promissory notes, granting the bank a security interest in real estate located in three different counties. To further secure the loans, the Guarantors signed commercial guaranties (“the Guaranties”) in which they guaranteed full payment of the notes. In 2011, RES-GA foreclosed on and bought the properties that were serving as collateral. It then filed confirmation actions in the three counties in which the secured properties were located. In each instance, the court entered an order refusing to confirm the sale, finding that RES-GA had failed to prove that it obtained the fair market value of the property in question, and refusing to allow a resale. RES-GA appealed two of those orders, and the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed in each case. Last year, the Supreme Court held that compliance with OCGA 44-14-161, Georgia’s confirmation statute, “is a condition precedent to the lender’s ability to pursue a guarantor for a deficiency after foreclosure has been conducted, but a guarantor retains the contractual ability to waive the condition precedent requirement.” The Court granted certiorari in this case to consider additional questions regarding creditors’ ability to pursue deficiency actions against guarantors. The Court concluded that Jim York and John Drillot (“the Guarantors”) waived any defense based on the failure of creditor RES-GA LJY, LLC (“RES-GA”) to confirm the relevant foreclosure sales, and thus affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision that upheld deficiency judgments against them. View "York v. RES-GA LJY, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant La Chona, LLC, brought a quiet title action asserting that it was the owner of property located in the City of Decatur, because it had purchased the property at a tax sale and had barred the right of other interested persons, including appellee Haddis Aberra to redeem the property pursuant to barment notices that it had sent those parties under OCGA 48-4-45. The trial court ruled in favor of Aberra, concluding that, when La Chona sent the barment notices, it did not hold a record interest in the property, was therefore not authorized by law to send the notices, and, accordingly, had not barred Aberra’s right to redeem the property. The trial court also ruled that, even if La Chona had been authorized to send the barment notices, La Chona had waived the requirement of tender as to Aberra. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that La Chona did not have the right to send the barment notice to Aberra, and because of that ruling, it did not decide the tender issue. View "La Chona, LLC v. Aberra" on Justia Law

This case centered on the procedure by which a local zoning board’s quasi-judicial decision on a variance request could be appealed to the superior court. Kerley Family Homes, LLC was granted a variance by the City of Cumming’s Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”). Neighboring homeowners aggrieved by the variance sought to appeal the BZA’s decision by filing a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus and an injunction with the superior court. The defendants argued that they were entitled to summary judgment against the homeowners because the zoning variance decision was a quasi-judicial decision that could be challenged in the superior court only by a petition for certiorari under OCGA 5-4-1. The Supreme Court concluded they were right, and therefore reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment. View "City of Cumming v. Flowers" on Justia Law

Appellants Ken and Rochel Parker and Appellees Andrew and Penny Leeuwenburg were neighbors with a contentious relationship. Appellees first sought to have Appellants secure a good behavior bond in 2011, but the parties reached an agreement without the issuance of the bond. Appellees again sought a good behavior bond in 2013; the parties agreed to a six-month bond, which was later extended for an additional six months, and that bond expired in December 2014. Appellees sought a second bond in January 2015, alleging that Appellants had: installed security cameras aimed at Appellees’ property; conversed with and “objected to the activities of a tree service hired by [Appellees]”; and used flashlights in a manner that disrupted the sleep of Appellees. Following a hearing a magistrate court issued a bond enjoining both parties from: having direct or indirect contact with the other. Appellants sought review of the bond by way of a petition for certiorari with the superior court. Later, however, Appellees agreed to dismiss the bond, and Appellants agreed to dismiss their appeal; a consent order memorializing the parties’ agreement was filed in June 2016. In that same month, Appellants filed a complaint in the superior court seeking, among other things, a declaration that OCGA 17-6-90 was unconstitutional. The trial court concluded that the statute was constitutional and granted summary judgment to Appellees. On appeal, Appellants continued to assert that OCGA 17-6-90 was unconstitutional. In response, Appellees argued that Appellants lacked standing to bring their challenge. With that contention, the Supreme Court agreed. View "Parker v. Leeuwenberg" on Justia Law

In January 2016, the Superior Court of Chatham County granted a petition for an interlocutory injunction, pursuant to which it removed Leonard McCoy as President of the Board of Directors of the Willow Lakes Plantation Homeowners Association. McCoy and the Association appealed, but upon its review of the record and briefs, the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed. View "McCoy v. Bovee" on Justia Law

Defendant Veterans Parkway Developers, LLC (“VPD”) appealed a Superior Court order granting injunctive relief and requiring an accounting in this suit by RMW Development Fund, II, LLC (“RMW”) stemming from VPD’s management of Veterans Parkway Apartments, LLC (the “Company”). The order at issue granted RMW an interlocutory injunction: (1) enjoining VPD from using funds in its possession or control to construct a second entrance to an apartment complex in Columbus (the “Property”), constructed and managed by the Company; (2) prohibiting VPD from using funds for any purpose other than the normal day-to-day expenses of the Property; and (3) requiring VPD to submit a monthly report of its expenses to the superior court, with copies to counsel for the parties. RMW filed suit against VPD alleging VPD’s breach of contract by its entering into an unauthorized management agreement and thereby paying an unauthorized management fee, and a claim for “promissory estoppel,” stemming from VPD’s alleged failure to use some of the Company’s funds for partial repayment of a development loan; RMW asked for VPD’s removal as manager of the Company and for the costs of litigation. Prior to the filing on the complaint, the Company had purchased a 60-foot strip of land for the purpose of creating a second entrance to the Property. At a hearing on the injunction, RMW argued that it could not undo any construction of the second entrance to the Property. VPD countered that RMW was, in reality, concerned about money being spent on the construction of the second entrance instead of being used to repay the loans made by RMW, and that any appropriate redress was monetary damages. Ultimately the injunction was granted and VPD appealed. The Supreme Court found after review of this matter that the trial court's injunction was not supported by the record, and that court abused its discretion in granting the injunction. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded this matter for further proceedings. View "Veterans Parkway Developers, LLC v. RMW Development Fund II, LLC" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a December 7, 1993 tax sale, DeKalb County sold the Property at issue here, which was owned at that time by Dorothy Kelly. DeKalb County ultimately purchased the Property at the tax sale as the highest bidder. DeKalb County did not foreclose the redemption rights to the Property after the tax sale in accordance with OCGA 48-4-45 or OCGA 48-4-48. In 1999, DeKalb County conveyed its tax deed to Geraldine Nix, and Nix conveyed her tax deed, via a deed to secure debt, to Bank of America. However, this deed to secure debt was canceled in 2009, and the tax deed reverted back to Nix on May 6, 2009. In 2003, Kelly, the owner of the Property prior to the tax sale, transferred her interest in the Property to Community Renewal and Redemption, LLC (“CRR”). CRR filed suit seeking a declaration that it was the owner of the Property by virtue of having tendered the statutory redemption amount to Nix. CRR transferred its interest in the Property to Belfare, LLC (“Belfare”). Belfare tendered $70,000 to Nix to redeem the Property, but Nix rejected tender of the redemption amount. In 2015, Belfare transferred its interest in the Property to Kirkwood Homes. Nix claimed that she had acquired full fee simple title to the Property, under OCGA 48-4-48, by virtue of the passage of four years since the time of execution of the tax deed. Kirkwood Homes then filed an action seeking declaratory judgment and quiet title relief, asserting that it was the owner of the Property. The superior court issued a final order concluding that Kirkwood Homes was the fee simple owner of the Property. Nix appealed, but after review, the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed that order. View "Nix v. 230 Kirkwood Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant Frederick Whitney owned a piece of property located in Habersham County. Whitney became delinquent on his property taxes. As a result, Habersham County sold the property at a tax sale to Appellee Lanier 5, LLC. Over a year later, on August 15, 2014, Lanier sent a notice of foreclosure of the right to redeem the property by certified and first class mail to Whitney at his residence in Forsyth County, giving Whitney until September 21, 2014, to exercise his right of redemption. While the certified mailing sent to Whitney went unclaimed, the first class mail notice was never returned as undeliverable. Meanwhile, on August 29, 2014, a security deed was created between Whitney and Appellant Reliance Equities, LLC. Two days after the September 21 foreclosure date, Whitney’s agent attempted to redeem the property. After confirming its certified and first class mailings were sent to the proper address, Lanier rejected the tender as untimely. Receiving no other tenders for redemption, Lanier filed a “Petition to Remove a Cloud on Title – Conventional Quia Timet” in the Superior Court of Habersham County, requesting the court remove the cloud of title in Lanier’s favor. Whitney filed a counterclaim requesting the trial court quiet title in his favor and also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that he did not receive sufficient notice of Lanier’s foreclosure of his right of redemption. The trial court denied Whitney’s motion. On November 19, 2015, the trial court entered an order granting Lanier’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, denied Reliance’s motion to intervene, Whitney’s motion for reconsideration and Whitney’s motion for summary judgment, finding all motions to be moot. On appeal, Reliance argued that the trial court erred in denying its motion to intervene; Whitney argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment on the pleadings and quieting title in favor of Lanier. The Supreme Court agreed with Whitney (based on the plain language of the applicable statute, Lanier could not foreclose Whitney's right to redeem until all conditions enumerated in the statute were met), and reversed the trial court in case S16A1014. Because the decision effectively ended the underlying litigation between Whitney and Lanier, Reliance’s appeal in case S16A1013 was rendered moot and dismissed. View "Reliance Equities, LLC v. Lanier 5, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellants George and Tennie Nemchik and appellee Tony Michael Riggs were neighbors in Cobb County. The Nemchiks claimed an easement across a heavily wooded portion of Riggs’s property that the parties referred to as “Lot 9,” while Riggs, who had plans to develop the Lot, denied the existence of the easement. When the Nemchiks started cutting down trees and posted notices on the property, Riggs filed a lawsuit to settle the dispute, and the trial court eventually entered an interlocutory injunction barring both parties from going on Lot 9 for any purpose during the pendency of the case. The Nemchiks appealed, claiming that Riggs failed to show a substantial likelihood that he would prevail on his claims at trial and that the threatened harm to Riggs did not outweigh the harm that the injunction would do to them. The Supreme Court saw no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s order, and affirmed it. View "Nemchik v. Riggs" on Justia Law