Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Frederick Whitney owned a piece of property located in Habersham County. Whitney became delinquent on his property taxes. As a result, Habersham County sold the property at a tax sale to Appellee Lanier 5, LLC. Over a year later, on August 15, 2014, Lanier sent a notice of foreclosure of the right to redeem the property by certified and first class mail to Whitney at his residence in Forsyth County, giving Whitney until September 21, 2014, to exercise his right of redemption. While the certified mailing sent to Whitney went unclaimed, the first class mail notice was never returned as undeliverable. Meanwhile, on August 29, 2014, a security deed was created between Whitney and Appellant Reliance Equities, LLC. Two days after the September 21 foreclosure date, Whitney’s agent attempted to redeem the property. After confirming its certified and first class mailings were sent to the proper address, Lanier rejected the tender as untimely. Receiving no other tenders for redemption, Lanier filed a “Petition to Remove a Cloud on Title – Conventional Quia Timet” in the Superior Court of Habersham County, requesting the court remove the cloud of title in Lanier’s favor. Whitney filed a counterclaim requesting the trial court quiet title in his favor and also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that he did not receive sufficient notice of Lanier’s foreclosure of his right of redemption. The trial court denied Whitney’s motion. On November 19, 2015, the trial court entered an order granting Lanier’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, denied Reliance’s motion to intervene, Whitney’s motion for reconsideration and Whitney’s motion for summary judgment, finding all motions to be moot. On appeal, Reliance argued that the trial court erred in denying its motion to intervene; Whitney argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment on the pleadings and quieting title in favor of Lanier. The Supreme Court agreed with Whitney (based on the plain language of the applicable statute, Lanier could not foreclose Whitney's right to redeem until all conditions enumerated in the statute were met), and reversed the trial court in case S16A1014. Because the decision effectively ended the underlying litigation between Whitney and Lanier, Reliance’s appeal in case S16A1013 was rendered moot and dismissed. View "Reliance Equities, LLC v. Lanier 5, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellants George and Tennie Nemchik and appellee Tony Michael Riggs were neighbors in Cobb County. The Nemchiks claimed an easement across a heavily wooded portion of Riggs’s property that the parties referred to as “Lot 9,” while Riggs, who had plans to develop the Lot, denied the existence of the easement. When the Nemchiks started cutting down trees and posted notices on the property, Riggs filed a lawsuit to settle the dispute, and the trial court eventually entered an interlocutory injunction barring both parties from going on Lot 9 for any purpose during the pendency of the case. The Nemchiks appealed, claiming that Riggs failed to show a substantial likelihood that he would prevail on his claims at trial and that the threatened harm to Riggs did not outweigh the harm that the injunction would do to them. The Supreme Court saw no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s order, and affirmed it. View "Nemchik v. Riggs" on Justia Law

Appellant Dennis Tyrones and his brother, George, held joint title to land in DeKalb County. After George’s death, the probate court awarded a fifty-percent interest in the property to his widow, Appellee Andrea White Tyrones. In December 2011, Appellee filed a complaint for statutory partition of the land, and Appellant answered, alleging various defenses and counterclaims. In a subsequent consent order, the parties agreed that the land could not be divided by metes and bounds; instead, they agreed to a process by which the land would be appraised and, if necessary, subject to a partition sale. Though dissatisfied with the initial appraisal, Appellant failed to secure a second one (even with an extension of time); thus, as provided in the consent order, the initial appraisal established the fair market value of the subject property. In April 2013, counsel for Appellee filed a “Notice of Established Appraised Value,” which, among other things, reiterated the time frame envisioned by the consent order for the sale of the subject property once the value had been established and where Appellant had elected not to exercise the option to purchase Appellee’s interest in the property. In January 2015, the trial court entered an order initiating the partition-sale process. A few months later, Appellee purchased the property at the partition sale for $2,000. On June 3, 2015, Appellant moved the trial court to set aside the partition sale. In her response, Appellee attached correspondence showing that her counsel had tried numerous times over the course of several months to negotiate with Appellant’s counsel to avoid the sale and that Appellee’s counsel (as well as the trial court’s staff) had attempted to engage Appellant’s counsel to prepare for the sale, but counsel was unresponsive. In October 2015, the trial court entered an order confirming the sale and denying Appellant’s motion. Finding no error with the trial court's order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tyrones v. Tyrones" on Justia Law

April Gens purchased 4.3 acres of land adjacent to Lake Lanier in Forsyth County. She divided the property into a number of residential lots, including "Lot 7," which is the property at issue in this quiet title case. She created “access strips” which provided lake access for each lot. Gens gave the Bank a security deed covering all of the land in 1999. Two years later, Gens gave another security deed to the Bank for Lots 0, 7 and 8. That deed mistakenly described the property in dispute as only “part of Lot 7.” Gens defaulted on her bank loans and filed for bankruptcy protection. Gens ultimately surrendered all her interest in all the properties. The Bank exercised its right of foreclosure and sold part of Lot 7 to White’s predecessors in title. White later purchased the property, built a house on it, and paid all property taxes as they became due. Six years and a number of months after White purchased the property and began to make improvements on it, Gens filed a quiet title action, asserting she was the legal owner of Lot 7 because the deed to White only conveyed a “part of Lot 7.” Shortly after filing suit, April Gens died, and Nicholle Gens, the administrator of Gens’s estate, was substituted in her stead. White counterclaimed, seeking reformation of the deeds in the chain of title to White’s property, alleging the deeds described the property erroneously due to accident, mistake or fraud. The special master assigned to this matter found that Gens was equitably estopped from claiming title to Lot 7 (excepting the access strip) and that White was entitled to the property. The trial court adopted the special master's findings and conclusions, and quieted title in favor of White. Gens argued on appeal that the trial court relied on the wrong caselaw precedent. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed. Furthermore, the Court remanded for the trial court to determine the merits of White's reformation counterclaim. View "Gens v. White" on Justia Law

At the heart of this case was a dispute among family members over the estate of Edwin Burton Anderson, Jr. (“Burt”): his widow, Donna Lee Morris Anderson and Robert Knox, Jr., in his capacity as the administrator of Burt’s estate; and appellants, Burt’s three children from his first marriage, Charles Anderson, Arthur Anderson, and Kimberly Ware Anderson. At the time of his death, Burt owned a substantial amount of real property, including land which had been bequeathed to him by his father, Edwin Burton Anderson, Sr. (“Edwin”), in a 1962 will. After Burt’s death, Donna and Knox jointly filed an action seeking, in pertinent part: (1) to set aside certain deeds made in June 2013; and (2) construction of Edwin’s 1962 will, arguing that "Item Six" devised the land described therein in fee simple to Burt, thereby placing that property in Burt’s estate upon his death. The trial court granted Donna's motion for partial summary judgment on her claim to set aside the June 2013 deeds, concluding that Charles (who once held power of attorney over the property at issue) had no legal right to execute the deeds. With regard to Edwin’s will, the trial court ruled that Item Six bequeathed a life estate in the described property to Burt and at his death, the fee to Burt’s children. Burt’s children appealed (case number S16A1052) challenging the trial court’s order to the extent it granted partial summary judgment to Donna, and set aside the June 2013 deeds. In a cross-appeal (case number S16X1053), Donna argued the trial court erred by holding that Item Six of Edwin’s will granted Burt a life estate. The Supreme Court reversed that part of the trial court’s order challenged in S16A1052 and affirmed that part the trial court’s order challenged in S16X1053. View "Anderson v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The owners of residential properties in Lowndes County appealed a final superior court order that declared OCGA 48-5-2(3) (B.1), which excluded low-income housing income tax credits from consideration for the purpose of assessing ad valorem tax, was unconstitutional for violating the taxation uniformity provision of the Georgia Constitution. The properties at issue were eligible to receive federal and state low-income housing income tax credits. In exchange for receiving a ten-year award of tax credits, the property owners agreed to lease their rental units to eligible low-income tenants at below-market rents set by the state Department of Community Affairs (GDCA) for thirty years or more. During the credit period, the owner may not sell, transfer, or exchange the property without first requesting GDCA’s approval of the proposed sale, transfer, or exchange. After being awarded state and federal income tax credits by the GDCA, the property owners in this case “sold” the tax credits to investors in that they allowed investors to purchase limited partnership interests. The tax credits would “flow through” the partnerships to the limited partners, who would then use the tax credits to reduce their individual income tax liabilities. The Lowdnes County Board of Tax Assessors filed for a declaration as to the constitutionality of OCGA 48-5-2 (3) (B.1), which precluded the Assessors from considering the tax credits in determining the fair market value of the real property at issue. After review of the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed: "inasmuch as OCGA 48-5-2 (3) (B.1) exempts these income tax credits from consideration in determining the fair market value of the properties at issue, the statute grants preferential treatment for ad valorem taxation purposes and creates a subclass of tangible property other than as permitted by the State Constitution." View "Heron Lake II Apartments, L.P. v. Lowndes Cty Bd. of Tax Assessors" on Justia Law

Gail Reed appealed a superior court order granting Kimberly McConathy’s motion to dismiss Reed’s petition for an equitable partition of real property and an accounting. Reed owned a piece of real property in Catoosa County, on which she operated a florist shop. In May 2004, she executed a conveyance of the property to her daughter, McConathy, that she contended met the requirements of then-OCGA 44-6-190, and resulted in Reed and McConathy owning the property as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. In 2007, Reed executed a quitclaim deed transferring all right, title, and interest she possessed in the property to Patricia Page; Page executed a quitclaim deed transferring to Reed any and all interest Page had in the property. Then in 2014, Reed filed a petition for an equitable partitioning of the property and an accounting. McConathy moved to dismiss, asserting that under OCGA 44-6-160, equitable partitioning was only available when property was held by tenants in common, not joint tenants with the right of survivorship, which she contended the parties were. Reed responded by citing then-OCGA 44-6-190, and arguing that the 2007 transfer of Reed’s interests to Page severed the joint tenancy under that statute. After a hearing on McConathy’s motion to dismiss, the trial court granted the motion. On appeal, McConathy argued Reed’s 2007 quitclaim deed to Page was not a “lifetime transfer” within the meaning of former OCGA 44-6-190 (a)’s severance language because it was not a transfer of the property for her lifetime, as she quickly received the property back again. The Supreme Court disagreed: when Page received a grant of Reed’s interest in the property by virtue of the quitclaim deed, it was Page’s to do with as she wished. "There was no restriction in the quitclaim deed, and had Page chosen to retain what had previously been Reed’s interest, or sell it to another, the quitclaim deed would provide Reed no basis upon which to assert that an interest in the property should be returned to her. Rather, the reference to 'lifetime transfer' in former OCGA 44-6-190 (a)’s severance language is clearly to distinguish a conveyance during the life of a joint tenant, such as the 2007 quitclaim deed to Page, from an attempted conveyance by devise." The superior court erred in granting the motion to dismiss the petition for partition and an accounting, therefore, the Supreme Court reversed its decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Reed v. McConathy" on Justia Law

Toyo Tire North America Manufacturing Inc. operated a large tire manufacturing and distribution facility about 625 feet from the home of Lynn and Duron Davis. The Davises sued Toyo Tire, alleging that its facility was a nuisance and has resulted in a trespass, causing them discomfort and annoyance and diminished their property’s value. The trial court denied Toyo Tire’s motion for summary judgment; the Court of Appeals affirmed that order. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to address two issues: (1) Toyo Tire’s argument that the Davises presented insufficient evidence, at the summary judgment stage of the case, to show that the decrease in their property value was proximately caused by the alleged nuisance and trespass; and (2) Toyo Tire’s argument that even if the Davises could establish causation, they could not recover damages both for their discomfort and annoyance and for the diminution in their property value, because that would constitute an impermissible double recovery. The Supreme Court rejected Toyo's first argument, and concluded that the past discomfort and annoyance caused by a continuing nuisance and the diminution in the property’s market value resulting from the expectation of continuing discomfort and annoyance constituted two separate injuries, and the Davises, who both occupied and owned the property, could potentially recover damages for both injuries. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Toyo Tire North America Manuf. v. Davis" on Justia Law

In a quiet title action, appellants appealed the award of clear title to appellee for a two acre parcel of land located in the Hog Hammock Subdivision on Sapelo Island. A special master entered his report finding a 1957 deed to the property at issue here was adequate when viewed in light of extrinsic evidence, adding that, in any event, appellee established title by prescription. The trial court adopted the special master’s findings and entered judgment in favor of appellee, but only on the ground that the 1957 deed was sufficient to convey the property to appellee’s predecessors in title. It made no ruling with regard to prescriptive title; nor did it reach any conclusion as to the efficacy of a 1992 deed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the deed upon which appellee relied did not contain a valid description of the property. View "Johnson v. Holmes" on Justia Law

Amy Smith, individually and as next friend of her daughter Tyasia Brown, sued her landlord, Bobby Chupp for injuries Brown allegedly sustained as the result of ingesting lead from deteriorating lead-based paint at the house Smith rented from Chupp. The house was insured by Chupp under a commercial general liability (CGL) policy issued by Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (GFB). After Chupp tendered Smith’s claims to GFB under the provisions of the policy, GFB filed a declaratory judgment action against Smith and Chupp seeking a determination that Brown’s injuries were not covered under the policy and that it had no duty to defend Chupp against Smith’s claims. The Georgia Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding, as a matter of first impression, that personal injury claims arising from lead poisoning due to lead-based paint ingestion were not excluded from coverage pursuant to an absolute pollution exclusion in CGL insurance policy covering residential rental property. Because the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that lead-based paint was not clearly a “pollutant” as defined by the policy, it reversed the Court of Appeals' decision in this case. View "Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith" on Justia Law