Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Amy Smith, individually and as next friend of her daughter Tyasia Brown, sued her landlord, Bobby Chupp for injuries Brown allegedly sustained as the result of ingesting lead from deteriorating lead-based paint at the house Smith rented from Chupp. The house was insured by Chupp under a commercial general liability (CGL) policy issued by Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (GFB). After Chupp tendered Smith’s claims to GFB under the provisions of the policy, GFB filed a declaratory judgment action against Smith and Chupp seeking a determination that Brown’s injuries were not covered under the policy and that it had no duty to defend Chupp against Smith’s claims. The Georgia Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding, as a matter of first impression, that personal injury claims arising from lead poisoning due to lead-based paint ingestion were not excluded from coverage pursuant to an absolute pollution exclusion in CGL insurance policy covering residential rental property. Because the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that lead-based paint was not clearly a “pollutant” as defined by the policy, it reversed the Court of Appeals' decision in this case. View "Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 2007, Cindy and David Ames executed a security deed to their residential property in favor of Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. (WaMu). WaMu’s receiver, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), later assigned the deed to JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A (Chase). When Chase initiated a non-judicial foreclosure sale on the property, the Ameses filed lawsuits in state court and then in federal court, alleging among other things that the assignment of the security deed to Chase was invalid. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Georgia Court of Appeals erred in concluding in the state lawsuit, the Ameses lacked standing to bring such a challenge to the assignment, a conclusion based on that court’s previous decisions in "Montgomery v. Bank of America," (740 SE2d 434 (2013)), and "Jurden v. HSBC Mortgage Corp.," (765 SE2d 440 (2014)). The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the appellate court's decision. Alternatively, the assignment issue raised by the Ameses was precluded because it had already been resolved against them in their federal lawsuit by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. View "Ames v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Defendant Atlanta Development Authority d/b/a Invest Atlanta petitioned the Georgia Supreme Court for interlocutory review of the superior court’s denial of its motion to dismiss plaintiff Clark Atlanta University, Inc.’s (“CAU”) complaint for declaratory judgment. CAU sought a declaration regarding CAU’s rights to three adjoining parcels of real property in southwest Atlanta that it donated to Morris Brown College (“MBC”) in 1940. In 1988, Atlanta University and Clark College consolidated to form Clark Atlanta University, and Clark Atlanta University was the successor-in-interest to Atlanta University, the entity that donated the property to MBC. MBC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief in an attempt to prevent the foreclosure and sale at auction of its campus. As a result of the Bankruptcy, MBC requested that the bankruptcy court approve the sale of a large portion of its campus, including the property at issue here, to Invest Atlanta. The bankruptcy court held a hearing in the matter at which it noted that it was “clear that [MBC] can only sell whatever interest in [the] property it has” and that it was “not making any findings regarding the extent of [MBC’s] interest in the reversionary property.” The sale to Invest Atlanta was approved, and the order approving the sale expressly provided that Invest Atlanta was "accepting title subject to any alleged and recorded interest held by CAU." CAU filed this complaint seeking, inter alia, a declaration and judgment that the Deed transferred the Property in the form of a fee simple determinable estate or a fee simple estate subject to a limitation, that CAU therefore had a valid automatic reversionary interest in the Property, and that such reversionary interest was triggered when MBC stopped using the Property for educational purposes and sold it to Invest Atlanta; alternatively, CAU asked for a declaration and judgment that with respect to any portions of the Property that were then being used for educational purposes by MBC, if at any time MBC ceased to so use such portions of the Property, title to such property would immediately and automatically revert to CAU. Invest Atlanta unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the complaint. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "Atlanta Development Authority v. Clark Atlanta University, Inc." on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia certified two questions of Georgia law to the Georgia Supreme Court. Both questions involved interpretation of the foreclosure confirmation statute, OCGA 44-14-161: (1) whether a lender's compliance with the statute's requirements a condition precedent to the lender's ability to pursue a borrower and/or guarantor for a deficiency after a foreclosure has been conducted; and (2) if so, can borrowers or guarantors waive the condition precedent requirement of such statute by virtue of waiver clauses in the loan documents? The Supreme Court answered both questions with regard to guarantors in the affirmative. View "PNC Bank, National Association v. Smith" on Justia Law

TDGA, LLC acquired a certain piece of property from another entity that had purchased the property at a tax sale. Afterwards, TDGA followed the non-judicial process of foreclosing any right of redemption to the property in accordance with Georgia law. TDGA provided notice of the foreclosure of redemption rights to all interested parties in the property, including the Georgia Department of Revenue and the Georgia Department of Labor (Departments), each of which held recorded tax liens against the property. Following the completion of this procedure, which the Departments did not contest, TDGA filed the current quiet title action at issue in this appeal. This case presented a question of whether conventional actions for quiet title, where the State of Georgia asserts an interest in the property at issue, were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court found that they were barred, and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The Court found further, that in rem actions for quiet title were not barred by sovereign immunity. View "TDGA, LLC. v. CBIRA, LLC et al." on Justia Law

Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless (the “Task Force”) operated a homeless shelter in a building located in downtown Atlanta (“the property”). The Task Force owned the property unencumbered from 1997 to 2001, when it took out a total of $900,000 in loans with its two original lenders, Institute for Community Economics (“ICE”) and the McAuley Institute, which transferred its promissory note and security deed to Mercy Housing, Inc. (“Mercy”). In 2009, the Task Force was in default on its loans with ICE and Mercy, but the parties entered into forbearance agreements in which ICE and Mercy agreed to do nothing on the notes until 2010. In early 2010, however, defendant Ichthus Community Trust purchased the outstanding notes from ICE and Mercy, using money borrowed from defendant Premium Funding Solutions, LLC (“PFS”) to buy the notes. After the forbearance period had expired and the Task Force had not made payment, Ichthus foreclosed on the property and sold it on the courthouse steps in May 2010. Ichthus, as the sole bidder, purchased the property for at least the amount it paid for the notes. Ichthus then filed an to evict the Task Force. At the same time, Ichthus also filed a dispossessory action in magistrate court; but this action and any other dispossessory efforts by Ichthus were ultimately stayed. The Task Force counterclaimed for injunctive relief to maintain its right of possession (wrongful foreclosure) and to quiet title in the property. In addition, the Task Force counterclaimed for: violations of Georgia’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act; tortious interference with business relations; libel, slander and defamation; bad faith; and punitive damages. In June 2010, the Task Force filed a separate action against Central Atlanta Progress (“CAP”), Atlanta Downtown Improvement District (“ADID”), Benevolent Community Investing Company, LLC (“BCIC”), PFS, and Emanual Fialkow (“defendants”) for the same relief it counterclaimed for against Ichthus. In 2011, while these actions were pending, Ichthus defaulted on its loan obligation with PFS and, as a result, Ichthus executed a warranty deed and transferred its interest in the property to PFS. At issue before the Supreme Court were two lower court orders: an order lifting a stay and allowing for the filing of the dispossessory action, and an order deciding the validity of several substantive issues on summary judgment. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the order granting leave to file a dispossessory action, but affirmed in part and reversed in part the summary judgment order. View "Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc. v. Ichthus Community Trust" on Justia Law

This case returned to the Georgia Supreme Court for a second time. The central issue to this case involved a long-running boundary line dispute between Monroe County and Bibb County. In the prior appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of mandamus relief and remanded the case with direction for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. On remand, the trial court entered an order directing Secretary of State Brian Kemp to consider certain evidence and to preclude him from the consideration of other evidence in determining the true boundary line between the counties. Both the Secretary and Bibb County appealed the trial court’s order. The Supreme Court concluded, after review, that the trial court misapplied the Supreme Court's mandate, and accordingly, reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Kemp v. Monroe Cty." on Justia Law

Following a bench trial arising out of a joint venture contract between appellant Thomas Bagwell and appellees Bobby and Oretta Trammel, the trial court denied Bagwell's claim for specific performance of the contract but granted his claims for an equitable partition of real property jointly owned by the parties and dissolution of the joint venture. Bagwell challenged the trial court's final order on several grounds, but the Supreme Court found none sufficient to disturb the trial court's judgment. View "Bagel v. Trammel" on Justia Law

The issue central to consolidated appeals and cross-appeals was the question of whether property owners were violating a zoning ordinance by operating their property as an event venue. In 2010, East Beach residents began raising complaints to the community homeowners' association and local law enforcement regarding noise, traffic, and parking issues arising from events held at "Villa de Suenos." From that time, Glynn County police investigated more than 20 noise complaints related to the property, many resulting in the issuance of citations or warnings. The property was situated within a single-family residential zoning district classified as “R-6” under the Glynn County Zoning Ordinance. the trial court issued an order on December 20, 2013, adopting the County’s interpretation of its zoning ordinance and directing the owners, Thomas and Lee Burton, to comply with the ordinance, so interpreted, in their future use of the property. The court also denied the Burtons’ equal protection claim, finding that they had presented no evidence of other residential properties in Glynn County that were operated in the same manner as the Burtons’ property but were treated differently by the County. The Burtons appealed, challenging the trial court’s interpretation of the zoning ordinance and its rejection of their equal protection claim; the County cross-appealed, seeking to clarify the nature of the relief the trial court had granted. Subsequently, with the appeal and cross-appeal pending, the County filed a motion for contempt in the trial court, alleging that the Burtons were continuing to promote Villa de Suenos as an event venue and accept bookings for this purpose, in violation of the trial court’s order. Upon review of the arguments made on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly found that the owners were violating the ordinance, and that the court properly issued a declaratory judgment to that effect. View "Burton v. Glynn County" on Justia Law

H.E. McLeod, Sr. transferred a part of his land to H.E. McLeod, Jr. The parties agreed that McLeod, Jr. would dig a well on his land and give McLeod, Sr. and others living on McLeod, Sr.’s land (specifically Mrs. McLeod, Sr., Michael McLeod, and Appellant R. Jerry McLeod) water from that well free of charge. This agreement was put in writing in 1971 in an indenture. In 1992, McLeod, Jr. deeded the well property to Michael McLeod. Michael and Sally McLeod then sold the well property to Ryan and Melissa Reeves on August 28, 1996. The Reeveses’ deed, which was recorded on September 27, 1996, included a “Special Agreement” in which the Reeveses agreed to provide water to the house occupied by Appellant and Mrs. McLeod, Sr. as long as Appellant and Mrs. McLeod, Sr. occupied the benefitted property and paid the Reeveses a reasonable monthly fee for electricity and well maintenance costs. No mention was made of the 1971 agreement. Sometime later in 1996, Appellant recorded the 1971 agreement. The well property then changed hands a few more times before it was sold to Appellee Stan Clements in 2007. Appellee’s deed said that the property was “conveyed subject to that certain Special Agreement contained in a deed from Michael R. McLeod and Sally J. McLeod to Ryan Reeves and Melissa Reeves.” In his affidavit, Appellee averred that he was not aware of the 1971 water agreement when he purchased the property, but he was aware of the 1996 agreement that required him to provide water to Appellant and Mrs. McLeod, Sr. via the visible pipes on the burdened land. Appellee and Appellant operated under the 1996 agreement, but in 2008, after Appellant stopped paying and Appellee cut off the water supply, Appellant filed a complaint seeking to require Appellee to provide him with water. The trial court then entered several orders that were reversed or vacated on procedural grounds during four trips to the Court of Appeals. On the fifth trip, Appellee moved for summary judgment, asking the court to find that he was not bound by either the 1971 or the 1996 water agreement. In 2012, the trial court granted Appellee summary judgment as to the 1971 agreement and denied him summary judgment as to the 1996 agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed the partial grant of summary judgment, holding that even assuming the 1971 water agreement was a covenant running with the land, it was not enforceable against Appellee, a bona fide purchaser for value, because it was recorded outside his chain of title and Appellee did not have actual or constructive notice of it. In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeals said, “[i]n the face of the well- developed law [we have] set forth above, we decline to follow Wardlaw v. Southern Railway Co., [. . .] for its statement that covenants running with the land bind subsequent owners thereof ‘with or without notice.’” The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to consider whether: (1)the Court of Appeals erred in “declin[ing] to follow "Wardlaw;" and (2) whether "Wardlaw" was wrongly decided. The Supreme Court concluded that the answer to both questions was no: the statement from Wardlaw that the Court of Appeals declined to follow was dicta that did not govern this case, and Wardlaw was correctly decided based on the facts presented in that case. View "McLeod v. Clements" on Justia Law