Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

H.E. McLeod, Sr. transferred a part of his land to H.E. McLeod, Jr. The parties agreed that McLeod, Jr. would dig a well on his land and give McLeod, Sr. and others living on McLeod, Sr.’s land (specifically Mrs. McLeod, Sr., Michael McLeod, and Appellant R. Jerry McLeod) water from that well free of charge. This agreement was put in writing in 1971 in an indenture. In 1992, McLeod, Jr. deeded the well property to Michael McLeod. Michael and Sally McLeod then sold the well property to Ryan and Melissa Reeves on August 28, 1996. The Reeveses’ deed, which was recorded on September 27, 1996, included a “Special Agreement” in which the Reeveses agreed to provide water to the house occupied by Appellant and Mrs. McLeod, Sr. as long as Appellant and Mrs. McLeod, Sr. occupied the benefitted property and paid the Reeveses a reasonable monthly fee for electricity and well maintenance costs. No mention was made of the 1971 agreement. Sometime later in 1996, Appellant recorded the 1971 agreement. The well property then changed hands a few more times before it was sold to Appellee Stan Clements in 2007. Appellee’s deed said that the property was “conveyed subject to that certain Special Agreement contained in a deed from Michael R. McLeod and Sally J. McLeod to Ryan Reeves and Melissa Reeves.” In his affidavit, Appellee averred that he was not aware of the 1971 water agreement when he purchased the property, but he was aware of the 1996 agreement that required him to provide water to Appellant and Mrs. McLeod, Sr. via the visible pipes on the burdened land. Appellee and Appellant operated under the 1996 agreement, but in 2008, after Appellant stopped paying and Appellee cut off the water supply, Appellant filed a complaint seeking to require Appellee to provide him with water. The trial court then entered several orders that were reversed or vacated on procedural grounds during four trips to the Court of Appeals. On the fifth trip, Appellee moved for summary judgment, asking the court to find that he was not bound by either the 1971 or the 1996 water agreement. In 2012, the trial court granted Appellee summary judgment as to the 1971 agreement and denied him summary judgment as to the 1996 agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed the partial grant of summary judgment, holding that even assuming the 1971 water agreement was a covenant running with the land, it was not enforceable against Appellee, a bona fide purchaser for value, because it was recorded outside his chain of title and Appellee did not have actual or constructive notice of it. In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeals said, “[i]n the face of the well- developed law [we have] set forth above, we decline to follow Wardlaw v. Southern Railway Co., [. . .] for its statement that covenants running with the land bind subsequent owners thereof ‘with or without notice.’” The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to consider whether: (1)the Court of Appeals erred in “declin[ing] to follow "Wardlaw;" and (2) whether "Wardlaw" was wrongly decided. The Supreme Court concluded that the answer to both questions was no: the statement from Wardlaw that the Court of Appeals declined to follow was dicta that did not govern this case, and Wardlaw was correctly decided based on the facts presented in that case. View "McLeod v. Clements" on Justia Law

Brian Wedereit sued BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. ("BAC") for (among other things) breach of contract and wrongful foreclosure. BAC moved for summary judgment, and the trial court denied BAC's motion on Wedereit's claims for wrongful foreclosure, equitable relief, punitive damages and attorney fees. The trial court granted sua sponte partial summary judgment to Wedereit on his breach of contract claim because BAC allegedly failed to give proper pre-acceleration notice as required under Paragraph 22 of the Security Deed. BAC appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's sua sponte grant of partial summary judgment to Wedereit. The Supreme Court granted BAC's petition for certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred when it held in its Division 1 that the issues resolved by the award to Wedereit of partial summary judgment were the same as those raised by BAC's motion for summary judgment, such that an award of partial summary judgment sua sponte to a nonmovant was permissible. The Supreme Court concluded that because the record did not support the conclusion that Wedereit carried his burden of proving that he was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on his breach of contract claim, the trial court erred in awarding summary judgment sua sponte to Wedereit. View "BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Wedereit" on Justia Law

Appellant Land USA, LLC filed suit against Georgia Power Company for quiet title, trespass, and ejectment, challenging the validity of an easement Georgia Power claimed on property owned by Land USA in Fulton County. Finding that Georgia Power had a valid easement, the Superior Court granted Georgia Power’s motion for summary judgment on all counts. Land USA appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to Georgia Power on Land USA’s claim for ejectment, but reversed on Land USA’s other claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Land USA, LLC v. Georgia Power Company" on Justia Law

In January 1992, Diversified Capital Management, Inc. leased premises designated as a grocery store to James Bostick. In August 1992, Diversified assigned its rights as lessor to Ingram Timber Enterprises, L.P. In October 2000, Bostick, with the approval of Ingram, subleased the property to CMM Properties, Inc. (“CMM”). The sublease was subject to all the terms of the original lease, referred to by the parties as the “master lease.” In June 2005, Ingram filed suit in superior court against CMM and three individual guarantors of the sublease (collectively “the CMM parties”), but not Bostick. Ingram claimed default under the terms of the master lease and sublease, and sought liquidated damages under the master lease. The trial court granted summary judgment to the CMM parties, finding that the purported liquidated damages constituted a void and unenforceable penalty. Ingram never appealed that final judgment. In January 2010, Ingram filed a complaint for rent and breach of contract against Bostick, seeking the same liquidated damages sought in the first suit. Then in November 2010, Bostick filed a third-party complaint against the CMM parties, claiming that if he was liable to Ingram, then the CMM parties were liable to him. The CMM parties moved for summary judgment, asserting, among other things, res judicata, based on the judgment in the first lawsuit. Before the trial court ruled on the summary judgment motion, Ingram and Bostick entered into a consent judgment, which provided that Ingram was entitled to judgment in excess of $1 million, but that Ingram would not attempt to collect such judgment. Instead, the consent judgment would be satisfied by Bostick pursuing the case against the CMM parties. The trial court granted the CMM parties' motion for summary judgment, finding that res judicata precluded the suit; that the remedy provisions of the master lease were void and unenforceable penalties; and that under the terms of the consent judgment between Ingram and Bostick there was no real threat of liability for Bostick, and thus, no secondary liability to be recovered by the third-party action. Bostick appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that he was not a party to the first lawsuit, therefore, it could not preclude him in the second. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and as to the issue of res judicata, finding that Bostick and the CMM parties were privies, and therefore, that Bostick was bound by the judgment in the first lawsuit. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the appellate court's analysis and conclusion were "fatally flawed" because they were premised "on a basic misconception of the doctrine of res judicata:" as a privy of the CMM parties, the doctrine could not be applied against Bostick because of the lack of an adversarial relationship in regard to the prior litigation. "Even if Bostick was not deemed to be such a privy of the CMM parties, res judicata is not properly asserted against him by the CMM parties so as to preclude Bostick's third-party complaint because Bostick was not involved in the initial suit brought by Ingram." The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Bostick v. CMM Properties, Inc." on Justia Law

Wayne Farms owned and operated a chicken processing plant in Oakwood. A fire broke out at the plant in 2003. Roughly three years later, Wayne Farms and its insurers filed suit against Crane Composites, Inc., which manufactured interior panels used in the plant, alleging Crane’s negligence caused the fire to spread extensively. In the meantime, the legislature enacted OCGA 9-11-68 (b) (1). The question for decision in this case is whether OCGA 9-11-68 (a tort reform, fee-shifting statute) could be applied to a negligence action in which the injury occurred prior to the effective date of the statute, but in which the action was filed after that date. The Supreme Court concluded that it could, and in so doing, overruled the case law set forth in "L. P. Gas Industrial Equipment Co. v. Burch," (701 SE2d 602) (2010)). View "Crane Company v. Wayne Farms, LLC" on Justia Law

East Georgia Land and Development Company, LLC sued Newton County and several of its officers for a writ of mandamus, arguing that a zoning ordinance adopted by the County in May1985 was invalid. The trial court agreed that the zoning ordinance is invalid, it awarded summary judgment to East Georgia. The County appealed. The zoning ordinance at issue referred to (and purported to incorporate by reference) a set of maps identified in the ordinance as the "Official Zoning District Maps for Newton County." These maps are an integral part of the zoning ordinance. The only such maps that appeared in the record, however, were adopted by the County on July 2, 1985, and nothing in the record showed that those maps even were in existence in May 1985. "A map not yet in existence cannot have been 'made a public record' and certainly is not 'accessible to members of the public who are, or may be, affected by it.'" The trial court found, and as a result, concluded that the ordinance was void at the moment of its enactment. The Supreme Court saw no error in the findings of the trial court on this point, nor in its conclusion that the ordinance was void from its inception. View "Newton County v. East Georgia Land & Development Cp., LLC" on Justia Law

Colonial Pipeline Company maintained an underground liquid petroleum pipeline that passes through DeKalb County near the home of Paige Jansen-Nichols. In 2013, a leak detection alarm system caused Colonial to become concerned that its pipeline might have been compromised, and Colonial twice used helicopters to inspect the pipeline. Alleging that these helicopters flew too low over her home, Jansen-Nichols sued Colonial for trespass, nuisance, negligence, and negligence per se, seeking money damages and permanent injunctive relief. She also sought an interlocutory injunction to prohibit Colonial from flying helicopters low over her house for so long as her lawsuit was pending. Following two evidentiary hearings, the trial court denied the motion for an interlocutory injunction, and Jansen-Nichols appealed, arguing the denial of an interlocutory injunction was error because it sanctioned low overflights of her home, thereby giving Colonial a license to trespass upon her property, to maintain a nuisance, and to breach the duty of care that it allegedly owes her in connection with aerial pipeline inspections. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed denial of the injunction. View "Jansen-Nichols v. Kinder Morgan Southeast Terminals, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1954, Stiles Apartments, Inc. and the City of Athens entered into an agreement to create a drive-in parking area and new sidewalk on the western side of South Lumpkin Street in Athens. The purpose was to relieve traffic congestion due to cars parking parallel to the raised sidewalk along the street. Stiles Apartments paid all construction costs, and the public sidewalk was relocated onto its private property, and a parking lot was created that contained 22 spaces. About two thirds of each space lies on land owned by Stiles Apartments and the other third lies on what was the old public sidewalk. The agreement provided that the parking spaces and sidewalk will be maintained by the Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County. In 2003, Stiles' commercial tenants, including the now-closed Five Points Deli, began complaining about non-customers using the parking area, with some leaving their cars for days. Stiles Apartments attempted to tow the vehicles, but was forced to stop when its president, Barry Stiles, was threatened with arrest by the county attorney, William Berryman. Berryman took the position that the parking area was created for use by the public, not just Stiles' tenants, and therefore Stiles Apartments did not control who could park there. After losing several tenants due in part to the parking problems, Stiles sued the local government, asserting ownership over the parking area and asking the court to grant a temporary injunction and prohibit the city and county government from exercising any control over the spaces while the case was being litigated. Athens-Clarke County counterclaimed and following a hearing, the trial court issued an order granting the injunction against the government's attempt to assert control over the parking area. Athens-Clark County then appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Court upheld the temporary injunction. The question that still needed to be answered was whether the parties to the 1954 agreement intended to reserve public property rights in the land owned by Stiles Apartments. The trial court entered a final order, concluding that under the agreement, the parties did not intend for the parking area to be available to the public. The trial court noted it would be unlikely for a landowner to give up control over property for which it paid taxes. Athens-Clarke County appealed that decision to the Supreme Court, which found that according to the agreement signed 60 years ago by the local government and apartment complex, "the parties never intended that the parking area be kept open for the public." View "Unified Government of Athens-Clarke Co. v. Stiles Apartments, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose from a title dispute. Appellants Mark and Becky Kelley and appellees Erich and Suzette Randolph were adjoining property owners. Their backyards are partly contiguous with a strip of land between their respective properties designated by plat as an alleyway. The alleyway did not run from street to street, and there was no evidence of it ever having been used as an alleyway. Any remnants of the alleyway are no longer visible. The Randolphs purchased their property in 1987. In 1990, they constructed railroad tie terraces in their backyard to raise and level the yard. The Randolphs believed all construction was completed within their property line. The Kelleys bought their property in 2007. In 2011, they commissioned a survey to determine their rear property line so that they could design and install a landscape project. Their investigation revealed to all parties for the first time that the Randolphs’ terraces and construction debris from the Randolphs’ property had encroached onto the alleyway and over appellants’ rear property line. Appellants informed the Randolphs of the encroachment and asked them to relocate the terraces and remove the debris, but the Randolphs refused. The Kelleys sued, claiming trespass and sought a declaratory judgment: (1) establishing title to their property; (2) determining that they would have no duty to provide lateral support to the Randolphs’ property after the encroaching terraces and construction debris were removed; and (3) requiring the Randolphs to abate the nuisance created by the blockage in the alleyway. The Randolphs claimed in response that they had obtained prescriptive title to both the privately owned alleyway and a portion of appellants’ property through adverse possession. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court denied the Kelleys' motion and granted the Randolphs’ motion on their claim of prescriptive title by adverse possession. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment rulings. View "Kelley v. Randolph" on Justia Law

The named plaintiffs in this class action owned real property in Mallard Pointe, a residential neighborhood in Effingham County. Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products, LP has operated the Savannah River Mill nearby since 1986. Plaintiffs argued that their real property was contaminated by hydrogen sulfide gas released from the decomposition of solid waste sludge released by the mill. As a result, they have been exposed to noxious odors, their use and enjoyment of their property has been impaired, and the value of their property has diminished. Plaintiffs sued Georgia-Pacific for nuisance, trespass, and negligence. The plaintiffs sought not only to recover monetary damages for themselves, but they proposed to seek relief for a class of other nearby property owners. Georgia-Pacific appealed the certification of the class, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon the petition of Georgia-Pacific, the Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, and concluded after that review that the trial court abused its discretion when it certified the class. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals View "Georgia-Pacific Consumer Products, LP v. Ratner" on Justia Law