Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia certified two questions of Georgia law to the Georgia Supreme Court. Both questions involved interpretation of the foreclosure confirmation statute, OCGA 44-14-161: (1) whether a lender's compliance with the statute's requirements a condition precedent to the lender's ability to pursue a borrower and/or guarantor for a deficiency after a foreclosure has been conducted; and (2) if so, can borrowers or guarantors waive the condition precedent requirement of such statute by virtue of waiver clauses in the loan documents? The Supreme Court answered both questions with regard to guarantors in the affirmative. View "PNC Bank, National Association v. Smith" on Justia Law

TDGA, LLC acquired a certain piece of property from another entity that had purchased the property at a tax sale. Afterwards, TDGA followed the non-judicial process of foreclosing any right of redemption to the property in accordance with Georgia law. TDGA provided notice of the foreclosure of redemption rights to all interested parties in the property, including the Georgia Department of Revenue and the Georgia Department of Labor (Departments), each of which held recorded tax liens against the property. Following the completion of this procedure, which the Departments did not contest, TDGA filed the current quiet title action at issue in this appeal. This case presented a question of whether conventional actions for quiet title, where the State of Georgia asserts an interest in the property at issue, were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court found that they were barred, and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The Court found further, that in rem actions for quiet title were not barred by sovereign immunity. View "TDGA, LLC. v. CBIRA, LLC et al." on Justia Law

Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless (the “Task Force”) operated a homeless shelter in a building located in downtown Atlanta (“the property”). The Task Force owned the property unencumbered from 1997 to 2001, when it took out a total of $900,000 in loans with its two original lenders, Institute for Community Economics (“ICE”) and the McAuley Institute, which transferred its promissory note and security deed to Mercy Housing, Inc. (“Mercy”). In 2009, the Task Force was in default on its loans with ICE and Mercy, but the parties entered into forbearance agreements in which ICE and Mercy agreed to do nothing on the notes until 2010. In early 2010, however, defendant Ichthus Community Trust purchased the outstanding notes from ICE and Mercy, using money borrowed from defendant Premium Funding Solutions, LLC (“PFS”) to buy the notes. After the forbearance period had expired and the Task Force had not made payment, Ichthus foreclosed on the property and sold it on the courthouse steps in May 2010. Ichthus, as the sole bidder, purchased the property for at least the amount it paid for the notes. Ichthus then filed an to evict the Task Force. At the same time, Ichthus also filed a dispossessory action in magistrate court; but this action and any other dispossessory efforts by Ichthus were ultimately stayed. The Task Force counterclaimed for injunctive relief to maintain its right of possession (wrongful foreclosure) and to quiet title in the property. In addition, the Task Force counterclaimed for: violations of Georgia’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act; tortious interference with business relations; libel, slander and defamation; bad faith; and punitive damages. In June 2010, the Task Force filed a separate action against Central Atlanta Progress (“CAP”), Atlanta Downtown Improvement District (“ADID”), Benevolent Community Investing Company, LLC (“BCIC”), PFS, and Emanual Fialkow (“defendants”) for the same relief it counterclaimed for against Ichthus. In 2011, while these actions were pending, Ichthus defaulted on its loan obligation with PFS and, as a result, Ichthus executed a warranty deed and transferred its interest in the property to PFS. At issue before the Supreme Court were two lower court orders: an order lifting a stay and allowing for the filing of the dispossessory action, and an order deciding the validity of several substantive issues on summary judgment. The Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the order granting leave to file a dispossessory action, but affirmed in part and reversed in part the summary judgment order. View "Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc. v. Ichthus Community Trust" on Justia Law

This case returned to the Georgia Supreme Court for a second time. The central issue to this case involved a long-running boundary line dispute between Monroe County and Bibb County. In the prior appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of mandamus relief and remanded the case with direction for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. On remand, the trial court entered an order directing Secretary of State Brian Kemp to consider certain evidence and to preclude him from the consideration of other evidence in determining the true boundary line between the counties. Both the Secretary and Bibb County appealed the trial court’s order. The Supreme Court concluded, after review, that the trial court misapplied the Supreme Court's mandate, and accordingly, reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Kemp v. Monroe Cty." on Justia Law

Following a bench trial arising out of a joint venture contract between appellant Thomas Bagwell and appellees Bobby and Oretta Trammel, the trial court denied Bagwell's claim for specific performance of the contract but granted his claims for an equitable partition of real property jointly owned by the parties and dissolution of the joint venture. Bagwell challenged the trial court's final order on several grounds, but the Supreme Court found none sufficient to disturb the trial court's judgment. View "Bagel v. Trammel" on Justia Law

The issue central to consolidated appeals and cross-appeals was the question of whether property owners were violating a zoning ordinance by operating their property as an event venue. In 2010, East Beach residents began raising complaints to the community homeowners' association and local law enforcement regarding noise, traffic, and parking issues arising from events held at "Villa de Suenos." From that time, Glynn County police investigated more than 20 noise complaints related to the property, many resulting in the issuance of citations or warnings. The property was situated within a single-family residential zoning district classified as “R-6” under the Glynn County Zoning Ordinance. the trial court issued an order on December 20, 2013, adopting the County’s interpretation of its zoning ordinance and directing the owners, Thomas and Lee Burton, to comply with the ordinance, so interpreted, in their future use of the property. The court also denied the Burtons’ equal protection claim, finding that they had presented no evidence of other residential properties in Glynn County that were operated in the same manner as the Burtons’ property but were treated differently by the County. The Burtons appealed, challenging the trial court’s interpretation of the zoning ordinance and its rejection of their equal protection claim; the County cross-appealed, seeking to clarify the nature of the relief the trial court had granted. Subsequently, with the appeal and cross-appeal pending, the County filed a motion for contempt in the trial court, alleging that the Burtons were continuing to promote Villa de Suenos as an event venue and accept bookings for this purpose, in violation of the trial court’s order. Upon review of the arguments made on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly found that the owners were violating the ordinance, and that the court properly issued a declaratory judgment to that effect. View "Burton v. Glynn County" on Justia Law

H.E. McLeod, Sr. transferred a part of his land to H.E. McLeod, Jr. The parties agreed that McLeod, Jr. would dig a well on his land and give McLeod, Sr. and others living on McLeod, Sr.’s land (specifically Mrs. McLeod, Sr., Michael McLeod, and Appellant R. Jerry McLeod) water from that well free of charge. This agreement was put in writing in 1971 in an indenture. In 1992, McLeod, Jr. deeded the well property to Michael McLeod. Michael and Sally McLeod then sold the well property to Ryan and Melissa Reeves on August 28, 1996. The Reeveses’ deed, which was recorded on September 27, 1996, included a “Special Agreement” in which the Reeveses agreed to provide water to the house occupied by Appellant and Mrs. McLeod, Sr. as long as Appellant and Mrs. McLeod, Sr. occupied the benefitted property and paid the Reeveses a reasonable monthly fee for electricity and well maintenance costs. No mention was made of the 1971 agreement. Sometime later in 1996, Appellant recorded the 1971 agreement. The well property then changed hands a few more times before it was sold to Appellee Stan Clements in 2007. Appellee’s deed said that the property was “conveyed subject to that certain Special Agreement contained in a deed from Michael R. McLeod and Sally J. McLeod to Ryan Reeves and Melissa Reeves.” In his affidavit, Appellee averred that he was not aware of the 1971 water agreement when he purchased the property, but he was aware of the 1996 agreement that required him to provide water to Appellant and Mrs. McLeod, Sr. via the visible pipes on the burdened land. Appellee and Appellant operated under the 1996 agreement, but in 2008, after Appellant stopped paying and Appellee cut off the water supply, Appellant filed a complaint seeking to require Appellee to provide him with water. The trial court then entered several orders that were reversed or vacated on procedural grounds during four trips to the Court of Appeals. On the fifth trip, Appellee moved for summary judgment, asking the court to find that he was not bound by either the 1971 or the 1996 water agreement. In 2012, the trial court granted Appellee summary judgment as to the 1971 agreement and denied him summary judgment as to the 1996 agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed the partial grant of summary judgment, holding that even assuming the 1971 water agreement was a covenant running with the land, it was not enforceable against Appellee, a bona fide purchaser for value, because it was recorded outside his chain of title and Appellee did not have actual or constructive notice of it. In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeals said, “[i]n the face of the well- developed law [we have] set forth above, we decline to follow Wardlaw v. Southern Railway Co., [. . .] for its statement that covenants running with the land bind subsequent owners thereof ‘with or without notice.’” The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to consider whether: (1)the Court of Appeals erred in “declin[ing] to follow "Wardlaw;" and (2) whether "Wardlaw" was wrongly decided. The Supreme Court concluded that the answer to both questions was no: the statement from Wardlaw that the Court of Appeals declined to follow was dicta that did not govern this case, and Wardlaw was correctly decided based on the facts presented in that case. View "McLeod v. Clements" on Justia Law

Brian Wedereit sued BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. ("BAC") for (among other things) breach of contract and wrongful foreclosure. BAC moved for summary judgment, and the trial court denied BAC's motion on Wedereit's claims for wrongful foreclosure, equitable relief, punitive damages and attorney fees. The trial court granted sua sponte partial summary judgment to Wedereit on his breach of contract claim because BAC allegedly failed to give proper pre-acceleration notice as required under Paragraph 22 of the Security Deed. BAC appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's sua sponte grant of partial summary judgment to Wedereit. The Supreme Court granted BAC's petition for certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred when it held in its Division 1 that the issues resolved by the award to Wedereit of partial summary judgment were the same as those raised by BAC's motion for summary judgment, such that an award of partial summary judgment sua sponte to a nonmovant was permissible. The Supreme Court concluded that because the record did not support the conclusion that Wedereit carried his burden of proving that he was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on his breach of contract claim, the trial court erred in awarding summary judgment sua sponte to Wedereit. View "BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Wedereit" on Justia Law

Appellant Land USA, LLC filed suit against Georgia Power Company for quiet title, trespass, and ejectment, challenging the validity of an easement Georgia Power claimed on property owned by Land USA in Fulton County. Finding that Georgia Power had a valid easement, the Superior Court granted Georgia Power’s motion for summary judgment on all counts. Land USA appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to Georgia Power on Land USA’s claim for ejectment, but reversed on Land USA’s other claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Land USA, LLC v. Georgia Power Company" on Justia Law

In January 1992, Diversified Capital Management, Inc. leased premises designated as a grocery store to James Bostick. In August 1992, Diversified assigned its rights as lessor to Ingram Timber Enterprises, L.P. In October 2000, Bostick, with the approval of Ingram, subleased the property to CMM Properties, Inc. (“CMM”). The sublease was subject to all the terms of the original lease, referred to by the parties as the “master lease.” In June 2005, Ingram filed suit in superior court against CMM and three individual guarantors of the sublease (collectively “the CMM parties”), but not Bostick. Ingram claimed default under the terms of the master lease and sublease, and sought liquidated damages under the master lease. The trial court granted summary judgment to the CMM parties, finding that the purported liquidated damages constituted a void and unenforceable penalty. Ingram never appealed that final judgment. In January 2010, Ingram filed a complaint for rent and breach of contract against Bostick, seeking the same liquidated damages sought in the first suit. Then in November 2010, Bostick filed a third-party complaint against the CMM parties, claiming that if he was liable to Ingram, then the CMM parties were liable to him. The CMM parties moved for summary judgment, asserting, among other things, res judicata, based on the judgment in the first lawsuit. Before the trial court ruled on the summary judgment motion, Ingram and Bostick entered into a consent judgment, which provided that Ingram was entitled to judgment in excess of $1 million, but that Ingram would not attempt to collect such judgment. Instead, the consent judgment would be satisfied by Bostick pursuing the case against the CMM parties. The trial court granted the CMM parties' motion for summary judgment, finding that res judicata precluded the suit; that the remedy provisions of the master lease were void and unenforceable penalties; and that under the terms of the consent judgment between Ingram and Bostick there was no real threat of liability for Bostick, and thus, no secondary liability to be recovered by the third-party action. Bostick appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that he was not a party to the first lawsuit, therefore, it could not preclude him in the second. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and as to the issue of res judicata, finding that Bostick and the CMM parties were privies, and therefore, that Bostick was bound by the judgment in the first lawsuit. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the appellate court's analysis and conclusion were "fatally flawed" because they were premised "on a basic misconception of the doctrine of res judicata:" as a privy of the CMM parties, the doctrine could not be applied against Bostick because of the lack of an adversarial relationship in regard to the prior litigation. "Even if Bostick was not deemed to be such a privy of the CMM parties, res judicata is not properly asserted against him by the CMM parties so as to preclude Bostick's third-party complaint because Bostick was not involved in the initial suit brought by Ingram." The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Bostick v. CMM Properties, Inc." on Justia Law