Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

n November 2005, Appellant Richard Mitchell obtained title to property located in Alpharetta and executed a security deed in favor of MERS, who subsequently assigned the security deed to Wells Fargo as trustee. The property was foreclosed upon after Appellants Richard (and his wife Deborah) became delinquent on their mortgage payments. Wells Fargo purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. Since that time, Appellants admitted that they made numerous "dilatory filings," proceeding pro se, in state, federal, and bankruptcy courts. In May 2010, Mitchell filed a complaint against Wells Fargo; Wells Fargo moved to dismiss the complaint and moved for a bill of peace pursuant to OCGA 23-3-110 against Mitchell as a measure to end Mitchell's "meritless filings" in state court. The trial court issued an order granting Wells Fargo's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because Mitchell had not properly served Wells Fargo. The court also granted Wells Fargo's motion for a bill of peace, finding that the records of Fulton County courts reflected "nothing less than repeated and contemptuous behavior in the courts of this State" and that the lengthy history of filings in federal court showed a pattern of behavior by Mitchell consistent with his state filings. The court permanently enjoined Mitchell from filing any pleading or complaint related to the foreclosure and eviction from the property at issue for a period of five years unless Mitchell first received written approval from the court. Mitchell moved to set aside the order granting the bill of peace, which the court denied. The Mitchells appealed the dismissal of their lawsuit against Wells Fargo. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mitchell v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

In 2010, the City of Sandy Springs and two individual homeowners, John E. Balsam and Jerry Burnstein, filed suit against Fulton County, its Board of Commissioners, and its Director of Public Works. Sandy Springs sought a declaratory judgment, mandamus, and injunctive relief on whether Fulton County retained ownership of and responsibility for two drainage retention ponds and a dam located within Sandy Springs. Following a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of Sandy Springs, and Fulton County appealed, contending that it was prohibited from maintaining the detention ponds pursuant to the Georgia constitution. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court found that Fulton County retained current ownership of and responsibility for the easements it held over the dam and retention ponds located in Sandy Springs. However, any concomitant responsibility continued only until the easements at issue were legally transferred, terminated, or prospectively abandoned. As a result, to the extent that the trial court's order could be read to indicate that Fulton County had to maintain the easements in perpetuity, the Court reversed. View "Fulton County v. City of Sandy Springs" on Justia Law

Premier Petroleum, Inc. appealed the confirmation of the sale of a gas station held in receivership, entered after the superior court determined that a restrictive covenant Premier signed with a third party to encumber the property was unenforceable. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "CML-GA Smyrna, LLC v. Atlanta Real Estate Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

Monroe and Bibb Counties have fought over the true boundary line separating the two. At some time during the fight, the Superior Court attempted to resolve the dispute by ordering the Secretary of State to accept a line identified by a State-appointed land surveyor as the true boundary. The Supreme Court granted applications for discretionary appeal (filed separately by Bibb County and the Secretary of State) to address the Superior Court's order. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court lacked the authority to require the Secretary of State to accept a particular line as the true boundary. "Specifically, while mandamus is authorized to compel the Secretary to consider the relevant law and evidence, to determine the true boundary line between the counties, and to record the survey and plat reflecting that boundary line, mandamus is not authorized to dictate where the boundary line is to be located. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings." View "Bibb County v. Monroe County" on Justia Law

Gwinnett County appealed an interlocutory injunction against the County and in favor of Gerard and Jewell McManus. The injunction prohibited the County from using "artificial means" to increase the water and sediment that runs off a parcel of real property owned by the County and onto an adjacent parcel owned by the McManuses. The County contended that the trial court abused its discretion when it entered the injunction. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gwinnett County v. McManus" on Justia Law

Nathaniel and Lucy Boyd once owned a small parcel of commercial property in Fulton County, but according to the tax commissioner, they failed to pay their taxes, and as a result, the property was sold at a tax sale. The buyer, National Tax, gave its deed to Southeast Diversified Development, Inc., and Southeast Diversified gave a promissory note and deed to secure debt back to National Tax. That security deed later was assigned to JohnGalt Holdings, LLC. Southeast Diversified eventually defaulted on the promissory note, and JohnGalt foreclosed on its deed. In the meantime, the Boyds had made efforts to redeem the property with Southeast Diversified, by which the Boyds were to make periodic payments. The Boyds failed to make all of the payments required under this agreement. JohnGalt gave notice to the Boyds of its intent to foreclose their right of redemption, and the Boyds entered into a new agreement with JohnGalt, by which the Boyds were to make periodic payments to JohnGalt to redeem the property. Again, the Boyds failed to make all of the required payments. The Boyds then attempted to rescind their agreement with JohnGalt, and eventually sued JohnGalt for trespass and ejectment, contending that they had redeemed the property. JohnGalt promptly answered the suit, but it did not then assert a counterclaim to quiet title. About three years later, JohnGalt sought leave to amend its pleadings and assert such a counterclaim, and the trial court granted its request. The Boyds filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim, and JohnGalt filed a motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim. A special master concluded that JohnGalt had good title to the property by virtue of its foreclosure of the right of redemption. The trial court adopted the report of the special master and quieted title in favor of JohnGalt. The Boyds appealed, asserting several claims of error. Finding no reversible error, however, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Boyd v. Johngalt Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The parties in this suit had interests in a parcel of land as tenants in common. The trial court ordered the equitable partition by sale of the parcel. Appellee Sidney C. Mahan, Jr. sought the equitable partition and sale of the property. Appellant Brittany Pack urged that statutory partition was an adequate remedy and that the property should be divided by metes and bounds. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that the property could not be fairly divided by metes and bounds, and it granted the petition for an equitable division by sale. Pack appealed. The Supreme Court agreed with Pack's argument that the trial court's order was made in error, insofar as statutory partition was an adequate remedy in this case and no peculiar circumstances required an equitable partition. "But even in a statutory partition, a court may order the sale of property that cannot be fairly divided by metes and bounds, and we see no error in the finding that the property here cannot be fairly divided." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision that the property be sold, but vacated the judgment to the extent that it purported to order the sale as an equitable (rather than a statutory) partition. View "Pack v. Mahan" on Justia Law

Polo Golf and Country Club (a homeowners association), the Rymers (homeowners in the subdivision), and Forsyth County, all disputed which party was responsible for repairing the stormwater facilities in a subdivision. The stormwater facilities lying beneath the lots in the subdivision were not expressly dedicated to the county when originally built; and the county disclaimed ownership of any stormwater facility that did not lie under the county's streets. Polo did not own any stormwater facilities in the subdivision. Polo's covenants, recorded in 1987, provided that each homeowner had to maintain and repair the structures on his own property. The county enacted a stormwater management ordinance in 1996. In 2004, the Department of Engineering enacted an addendum contemplated by the ordinance. The section of the addendum at issue in this case required homeowners associations to take responsibility for stormwater management facilities on their property. The Rymers owned a house and lot in the Polo Fields subdivision. Because the interior of the Rymers' home was flooded on a number of occasions, the Rymers demanded that Polo and the county take action to fix the stormwater system. Polo responded by notifying the Rymers that it gave notice to the county that "neither the individual homeowner nor [Polo] should be held responsible for the maintenance." Polo later informed the Rymers that it would be selecting a contractor to repair the stormwater facilities in the entire subdivision, including the facilities on the Rymers' property, at Polo's expense. However, the repairs were never made and the Rymers experienced additional flooding. At no point prior to litigation did Polo assert that the Rymers were responsible for repairs to the stormwater facilities on the Rymers' lot. The Rymers brought suit against Polo and the county. Polo counterclaimed seeking, among other things, an injunction to compel the Rymers to repair the stormwater facilities under their property pursuant to the covenants. Polo also cross-claimed against the county, asserting the county could not require it to maintain the stormwater facilities because the addendum applied to new development, not Polo. Thereafter, pipes in the vicinity of the Rymers' property failed completely, causing flooding and sinkholes on other lots in the subdivision and additional flooding on the Rymers' property. The county issued a notice to comply and warning to Polo, directing Polo to make necessary repairs in the subdivision within 30 days. Polo did not make the repairs and the county issued a notice of violation, but no fines or citations were issued. Polo filed a separate declaratory judgment action against the county seeking a declaration that the addendum impairs the obligation of contracts and was unconstitutional and invalid. It also sought injunctive relief to prohibit enforcement of the addendum. The Rymers moved to intervene in that case; the motion was granted; and the trial court consolidated the two cases. After the parties filed motions and crossmotions for summary judgment, the trial court denied the Rymers' and Polo's summary judgment motions, but granted the county's summary judgment motion, finding the addendum can be enforced against Polo. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in denying Polo's motion for summary judgment in its dispute with the Rymers, but that the court erred in granting summary judgment for the county. View "Polo Golf & Country Club Homeowners' Association v. Rymer" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case arose from a dispute over title and right of possession of certain real property in Randolph County. The dispute involved the location of the boundary between two adjoining parcels. The case was tried to a jury which returned a verdict in favor of the Clouds with respect to the disputed property. The trial court then entered judgment in favor of the Clouds, declaring the border between the Cloud property and Mathews property to be defined by certain metes and bounds reflected in a survey map entered into evidence and referred to at trial by the surveyor as a status print. Those measurements were based upon the plat referenced in the Cloud deed. The judgment also enjoined the Mathews heirs from trespassing upon the property. The Mathews heirs appealed. After careful review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court found no reversible error in the trial court's judgment and affirmed. View "Mathews v. Cloud" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Department of Transportation (DOT) initiated condemnation proceedings for property owned by Brian McMeans. The condemnation petition named as defendants, inter alia, McMeans, and McMeans Leasing, Inc. (MLI), a corporation owned solely by McMeans. McMeans filed an answer acknowledging that he was the "owner of the property loosely described in" the condemnation petition, and alleging damages of at least $1.3 million. MLI filed an amendment to the answer McMeans filed in order "to provide that said Answer was for [MLI], a corporation solely owned by Brian K. McMeans." This pleading stated that McMeans was the owner of the property, that MLI was a leasehold tenant, and that MLI would sustain damages for business losses resulting from its removal from the property. At the same time, McMeans filed a pleading, "Answer of Brian K. McMeans," in which he alleged damages of at least $1.3 million as a result of lost uses of the property, interruption in his business income, loss of business, and damage to his business in addition to the value of the condemned real estate. Following a hearing, the trial court granted DOT’s motion and struck both pleadings. MLI filed a direct appeal, which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals on jurisdictional grounds because it was not an appeal from a final judgment; McMeans filed an application for interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals, which was granted, and he appealed the trial court’s order striking his "First Amendment" to his answer. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that it erred to the extent it ruled that McMeans could not plead a business loss based on his failure to include it earlier and that he could not plead a loss from the business he owns and operates on the condemned property. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the appellate court erred in its decision. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals indeed erred in its decision, and reversed. View "Dept. of Transportation v. McMeans" on Justia Law