Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jay Richard Smith (Smith) died testate in 2013, survived by his wife Kathy (appellant), and the couple’s two minor daughters. At the time of his death, Smith was the beneficiary of the Jay Richard Smith Irrevocable Trust established by his parents, the provisions of which granted Smith an unrestricted testamentary power of appointment of the Trust assets remaining after his death. Following Smith’s death, appellant petitioned to probate Smith’s will. Thereafter, the probate court appointed appellant to serve as personal representative of Smith’s estate and appellee, Dana Ashford, to serve as Guardian Ad Litem representing the interests of the minor children. Appellant filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Construction of a Will, seeking construction of the Will by the probate court and a declaration as to whether Smith, under the terms of the Will, exercised the testamentary power of appointment granted him by the Trust. Appellee filed a response on behalf of the children, asserting that the language of the Will was clear and unambiguous, that no construction of the Will was necessary or appropriate, and that no justiciable controversy existed to support the declaratory relief sought. After reviewing the pleadings, motions, briefs and arguments of counsel, the probate court found that the Will was not ambiguous and that the court thus could not look beyond the four corners of the document to ascertain Smith’s intent. Further, the court decided that the plain language of the relevant provisions of the Will clearly and unambiguously showed Smith failed to exercise the testamentary power of appointment granted him by the Trust. Accordingly, the probate court ordered the Trust assets to be distributed pursuant to the terms of the Trust where no power of appointment had been exercised. Appellant appealed. Because the Supreme Court agreed the language of the Will was unambiguous, but disagreed with the probate court’s determination that Smith failed to exercise his testamentary power of appointment therein, it affirmed in part and reversed in part the probate court’s order in this case. View "Smith v. Ashford" on Justia Law

This trust management dispute has made a repeat trip to the Georgia Supreme Court. In their complaint, the plaintiffs raised claims of breach of fiduciary duty and breach of trust against the defendants by:(1) allegedly failing to make proper accountings to plaintiffs with respect to certain S-Trusts and family entities; (2) by making trust investments in illiquid family-owned entities (leaving the plaintiffs with unmarketable assets when the S-Trust assets are distributed free of trust to each beneficiary upon reaching the mandated age); (3) by creating a distribution scheme that imposes a code of conduct upon each beneficiary to qualify for distributions from trust investments; by creating a conflicts of interest; and (4) by failing to maximize income distributions in favor of growing trust principal. Plaintiffs also asserted claims for an accounting; constructive fraud/recision for failure to disclose and fraudulent misrepresentation regarding certain transactions allegedly improperly obtained the plaintiffs’ written consent; and for attorney fees. Both sides filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants as to each of plaintiffs’ claims, with the exception of the breach of trust claim for the defendants’ failure, at any time prior to the filing of the lawsuit, to make required periodic accountings to the plaintiffs for the assets held in the trusts. The Supreme Court held the Court of Appeals erred with respect to its ruling that defendants owed the plaintiffs an accounting of the family entities, concluding that the Court of Appeals failed to give due deference to the trial court’s discretion to grant or deny the equitable relief sought in the prayer for an accounting. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for it to reconsider the accounting issue. Upon remand, the Court of Appeals again found fact issues remain for jury determination with respect to whether the defendants breached their fiduciary duty or committed a breach of trust. Court of Appeals also remanded to the trial court the issue of whether the defendants owed the plaintiffs an accounting of the family entities held as trust assets so the trial court could reconsider its decision and exercise its discretion in light of the Court of Appeals’ opinion. Defendants petitioned for certiorari. The Supreme Court directed the parties to address the question of whether a jury had to determine which fiduciary duty applied to the various decisions and transactions made by the defendants. The Supreme Court again reversed the Court of Appeals, concluding that the trial court properly ruled with respect to its summary judgment decision. View "Rollins v. Rollins" on Justia Law

William Stephens had two children who were born out of wedlock, Frank Debter and Vickie Estes. Stephens died in 2011; he executed his last will and testament in early 2006. In it, Stephens made several specific bequests of money, and he left the residue of his estate to Estes. He did not make Debter a beneficiary under the will. Debter filed a caveat to executor Roy Stephens' petition to probate the decedent Stephens' will in solemn form, challenging the validity of the will. Debter claimed that the will was a product of undue influence and that the decedent Stephens intended for Debter to share in his estate as if he were a formally legitimated child. The probate court rejected Debter's caveat, and Debter appealed to the superior court. Once there, the executor filed a motion for summary judgment which the superior court summarily granted in 2014. Instead of filing a timely notice of appeal from this ruling, Debter filed a motion for new trial, asserting that he had discovered new material evidence which undermined the superior court's summary judgment decision. The trial court denied Debter's motion for new trial, prompting this appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal because his notice for appeal was untimely filed. The Court noted that Debter did not present evidence that would qualify as "newly discovered evidence" to challenge the grant of summary judgment to the executor; he merely presented evidence that he should have, but failed to, produce earlier in the case. View "Debter v. Stephens" on Justia Law

James Myers, Sr. executed his last will and testament in 2008, and died in 2012. He was survived by his wife and two sons, appellant James Myers, Jr. and appellee Anthony Myers. Appellant was appointed executor by the will. After a motion by Appellee and a hearing, the probate court entered an order on August 1, 2014, finding that Appellant had violated his fiduciary duty in numerous ways, removing him as executor, and appointing a county administrator to replace him. Appellant appealed his removal as executor. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Myers v. Myers" on Justia Law

Joseph Schmidt executed the will at issue in this case on July 20, 2010. Schmidt was a disabled Marine Corps veteran who suffered from paranoid schizophrenia with delusions since the early 1970's; he also had vision and hearing difficulties. He was treated as a disabled veteran and received disability benefits from the Veterans Administration (“VA”) until his death in 2013. He was appointed a VA guardian and conservator in 1974. Dale Groenenboom was appointed as successor guardian of Schmidt’s person and property in 1976, and served in such capacity until Schmidt’s death. In 1997, Schmidt entered into the personal care home owned and operated by Charles Reeves. Jr. and his wife, Jerry, and he resided there the remainder of his life. The Reeveses were compensated monthly for their services. The Will named Groenenboom as executor and the Reeveses and Groenenboom as the beneficiaries. In the Will, Judith Webb, Schmidt’s twin sister and sole named heir at law, was expressly excluded from inheriting from Schmidt’s estate. Groenenboom filed the petition to probate the Will. Webb filed a motion to deny the Petition and the accompanying Settlement, as well as an objection and caveat to them, contending that Groenenboom and the Reeveses breached their fiduciary duties owed to Schmidt; that they committed fraud against Schmidt and the probate court; that Schmidt was unduly influenced by them within the meaning of OCGA 53-4-12; and that Schmidt lacked testamentary capacity at the time the Will was executed. The probate court entered a final order dismissing the Petition, finding that Groenenboom did not “make out a prima facie case” to admit the Will to probate in that Groenenboom “failed to produce the subscribing witness [to the Will] for examination at the hearing despite the fact that they were neither shown to be deceased or inaccessible.” After review, the Supreme Court found the Will had a self-proving affidavit, so it could have been admitted into probate without testimony of the subscribing witnesses or other proof for the purpose of showing that the formalities of execution were met. The probate court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Reeves v. Webb" on Justia Law

Lillian and Jimmie Lee Johnson were married for 37 years, and together, raised her grandniece, Jessica Rogers. In 2005, Ms. Johnson made a will that included a number of bequests to Rogers. Ms. Johnson died in 2011, and Mr. Johnson then sought to probate her will. Rogers filed a caveat, asserting that she had been adopted by Ms. Johnson after the will was made, which would entitle her to an intestate share of the estate Although Rogers was unable to point to any statutory adoption by Ms. Johnson, she claimed nonetheless that she had been adopted pursuant to the equitable doctrine of “virtual adoption.” The probate court agreed that Rogers was “virtually adopted” by Ms. Johnson after she made her will, and so, the probate court admitted the will to probate, but subject to Rogers taking an intestate share of the estate. Mr. Johnson appealed, arguing the doctrine of virtual adoption had no application in a case in which the decedent disposed of her entire estate by will. The Supreme Court agreed, and for that reason, affirmed the admission of the will to probate, but reversed that part of the judgment holding Rogers was entitled to an intestate share. View "Johnson v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Appellant Lori Davis, individually and as personal representative of the estate of her husband Keith L. Davis, M.D., appealed three superior court orders dated March 7, 2014, April 1, 2014, and April 21, 2014, which granted mandatory interlocutory injunctions against her and held her in civil and criminal contempt in an action brought against her husband’s estate by Steven M. Roth, M.D. and two Georgia limited liability companies Roth co-owned with Keith Davis. The plaintiffs filed suit against appellant and the Davis Estate seeking to enforce certain provisions of the companies’ operating agreements giving Roth, as the surviving member of the LLCs, an option to purchase Davis’ interests, and to otherwise establish the rights of the parties, including the ownership of certain trademarks. Appellant also appeals an April 21, 2014 order where the trial court adopted the Third Report of the Special Master and limited discovery in the pending case. Appellees, VCP South, LLC, VCP Raleigh, LLC and Mary Anne Roth, individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Steven M. Roth, M.D. cross-appealed, alleging the trial court erred in allowing the Davis Estate to maintain an ownership interest in the LLCs past the time provided for in the operating agreements, and in allowing the distribution of LLC profits accruing after Davis’ death to the Davis Estate. After careful consideration of the parties' arguments on both the appeal and cross-appeal, and finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's orders. View "Davis v. VCP South, LLC" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute among the grandchildren of decedent Mildred Warnock Hilton concerning the distribution of her estate. The probate court denied probate of Decedent’s purported 1988 will, which meant that her estate would be distributed according to the rules of intestate succession. On de novo appeal to the superior court, the parties stipulated to a bench trial, after which the superior court affirmed the probate court’s decision, ruling that Decedent had revoked her 1988 will and it was not validated by the doctrine of “dependent relative revocation.” The grandchild who offered the 1988 will for probate appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to deny probate of the will without impaneling a jury and also challenging the court’s judgment on the merits. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mosley v. Lancaster" on Justia Law

This case centered on a dispute between appellant Shalanda Sanders (née Riley) and her purported biological half-brother, appellee Curtis Riley over the estate of Clifford "Colonel" Riley, who died without leaving a will. Shalanda claims the right to inherit from Mr. Riley as a child born during the marriage of her mother and Mr. Riley and, alternatively, based on the equitable doctrine known as "virtual adoption." Curtis filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of virtual adoption, arguing that there is insufficient evidence of an agreement by Mr. Riley to adopt Shalanda and the required partial performance of that agreement. The trial court granted Curtis’s motion. In doing so, however, the court did not view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to Shalanda as the party opposing summary judgment, and genuine issue as to any material fact regarding virtual adoption. The court also misinterpreted the requirement of partial performance of the agreement to adopt and erroneously concluded that an established virtual adoption can be undone by showing that the child formed a relationship with her natural father after she learned of his existence when she was a teenager. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of partial summary judgment to Curtis. View "Sanders v. Riley" on Justia Law

This appeal centered on the proper interpretation of a will executed by Hodge King that appeared to leave certain real property to his wife, Hattie in fee simple, but that also appeared to leave this same property to Mr. King’s son and his son’s children upon Mrs. King’s death. After Mrs. King died, the executors of her estate became involved in a legal dispute with Mr. King’s grandchildren regarding whether Mrs. King’s estate owned the property in question in fee simple or whether Mr. King’s grandchildren held any legal interest in the property. The trial court ruled in favor of Mrs. King’s estate and assessed attorney fees against Mr. King’s grandchildren, prompting this appeal. The Supreme Court reversed: because the plain language of Mr. King’s will indicated that he intended to grant Mrs. King a life estate in his property with the remainder to be given to his son and grandchildren, the trial court erred in concluding that Mrs. King’s estate acquired Mr. King’s interest as a tenant in common in the four tracts of land in fee simple. Because the trial court erred by ruling in favor of Mrs. King's estate rather than the grandchildren, the trial court also erred in its award of attorney. View "Thompson v. Blackwell" on Justia Law